Ligon v. Stilley

• Decision Date: 04 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. 08–73.,08–73.
• Citation: 371 S.W.3d 615,2010 Ark. 418
• Parties: Stark LIGON, Executive Director of the Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, Petitioner, v. Oscar Amos STILLEY, Respondent.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

2010 Ark. 418
371 S.W.3d 615

Stark LIGON, Executive Director of the Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, Petitioner,
v.
Oscar Amos STILLEY, Respondent.

No. 08–73.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Nov. 4, 2010.

[371 S.W.3d 622]

Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, by Stark Ligon, Executive Director, Little Rock, for petitioner.

Oscar Stilley, Fort Smith, pro se.

RONALD L. SHEFFIELD, Justice.

Stark [2010 Ark. 1]Ligon, Executive Director of the Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct (“the Committee”), brings this original action to disbar attorney Oscar Amos Stilley, Ark. Bar No. 91096. Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1–2(a)(5) (2010). We adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the special judge and agree that the appropriate sanction is disbarment.¹

I. Procedural History

On [2010 Ark. 2]October 29, 2004, then Circuit Judge James R. Marschewski referred Stilley to the Committee for possible ethics violations (CPC No.2006–067, “the Marschewski Complaint”). On December 14, 2007, after hearing the matter, Panel B of the Committee voted to initiate disbarment proceedings against Stilley. The panel members also voted to place him on interim suspension pending the conclusion of such proceedings. An order of suspension was filed with the clerk of this court on December 27, 2007.

Ligon subsequently filed a petition for disbarment on January 16, 2008, and alleged twenty-eight violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct (“Rules”). The petition raised two additional allegations related to Stilley's “overall fitness” to hold a law license. Stilley responded to the petition on March 3, 2008.

[371 S.W.3d 623]

By per curiam order on April 15, 2008, we appointed Special Judge John Lineberger to hear the disbarment petition and to provide the court with findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of an appropriate sanction. Ligon v. Stilley, 373 Ark. App'x 675, 283 S.W.3d 185 (2008) (per curiam).

On June 20, 2008, Panel B authorized disbarment proceedings related to a subsequent complaint filed against Stilley by Circuit Judge Stephen Tabor (CPC 2007–062, “the Tabor Complaint”). On June 27, 2008, Ligon filed a first amended/supplement petition for disbarment based on the Tabor Complaint. The amended petition raised nine additional counts for disbarment and ten additional allegations related to Stilley's fitness to hold a law license.

Throughout the proceedings before the special judge, Stilley filed numerous motions, [2010 Ark. 3]which will be addressed in this opinion as they are relevant. On April 22, 2009, following a three-day hearing on December 8, 9, and 10, 2008, at which he heard testimony and received evidence, the special judge entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. The order was one hundred and nineteen pages in length and found that Ligon had met his burden of proof with respect to the thirty-two counts charged in the petition for disbarment and the amended petition for disbarment.

On May 21, 2009, the special judge heard testimony and received evidence relevant to a determination of the appropriate sanction. On August 6, 2009, an order recommending disbarment was filed. We are now considering the recommendation of disbarment.

II. Standard of Review

The authority to regulate the practice of law arises from the Arkansas Constitution, specifically amendment 28 and amendment 80, section 4. The power to regulate the practice of law is also an inherent power of the courts. See, e.g., Ligon v. McCullough, 2009 Ark. 165A, 303 S.W.3d 78;see also In re Anderson, 312 Ark. 447, 851 S.W.2d 408 (1993); Hurst v. Bar Rules Comm., 202 Ark. 1101, 155 S.W.2d 697 (1941); Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149 (1860). The Procedures Regulating Professional Conduct (“Procedures”) were promulgated by this court and govern attorney discipline. See Ark. Sup.Ct. P. Regulating Prof'l Conduct § 1(A) (2010) (“These Procedures are promulgated for the purpose of regulating the professional conduct of attorneys at law and shall apply to complaints filed and formal complaints instituted against attorneys.”).

Under section 13 of the Procedures, the process for a disbarment action, as relevant to [2010 Ark. 4]the instant matter, is as follows:

(A) An action for disbarment shall be filed as an original action with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. Upon such filing, the Arkansas Supreme Court, pursuant to Amendment 28 of the Arkansas Constitution, shall assign a special judge to preside over the disbarment proceedings.... In disbarment suits, the action shall proceed as an action between the Executive Director and the respondent. Proceedings shall be held in compliance with the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure and the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, and trial shall be had without a jury.

(B) The judge shall first hear all evidence relevant to the alleged misconduct and shall then make a determination as to whether the allegations have been proven. Upon a finding of misconduct, the judge shall then hear all evidence relevant to an appropriate sanction to be imposed, including evidence related to the factors listed in Section 19 and the aggravating and mitigating factors set out in the American Bar Association's

[371 S.W.3d 624]

Model Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, §§ 9.22 and 9.32 (1992). See Wilson v. Neal, 332 Ark. 148, 964 S.W.2d 199 (1998).

(C) The judge shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the alleged misconduct of the respondent attorney and the imposition of sanctions, including the factors discussed in subsection 13(B).... The judge shall make a recommendation as to the appropriate sanction from those set out in Section 17(D).

(D) The findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of an appropriate sanction shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with a transcript and the record of the proceedings. Upon the filing, the parties shall file briefs as in other cases. The findings of fact shall be accepted by the Supreme Court unless clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court shall impose the appropriate sanction, if any, as the evidence may warrant. In imposing the sanction of suspension, the attorney may be suspended for a period not exceeding five (5) years. There is no appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court except as may be available under federal law.

Id.§ 13.

Section 1(C) of the Procedures states that attorney disciplinary proceedings are neither civil nor criminal in nature but are sui generis, meaning of their own kind. See id.§ 1(C); see also Ligon v. Dunklin, 368 Ark. 443, 247 S.W.3d 498 (2007). We will accept the judge's [2010 Ark. 5]findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and we impose the appropriate sanction as warranted by the evidence. Ark. Sup.Ct. P. Regulating Prof'l Conduct § 1(C); see also McCullough, 2009 Ark. 165A, 303 S.W.3d 78. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. McCullough, 2009 Ark. 165A, 303 S.W.3d 78;see also Ligon v. Stewart, 369 Ark. 380, 255 S.W.3d 435 (2007).

Because the special judge's findings are not clearly erroneous, we adopt them in full. Further, we agree with the special judge that disbarment is the appropriate sanction given the serious and widespread nature of Stilley's professional misconduct.

III. Evidence Supports the Special Judge's Findings and Recommendation

For his first point on appeal, Stilley contends that there was a “complete and total absence of evidence in support of [Ligon's] claims.” Stilley urges that the special judge erred in recommending disbarment under the circumstances. Ligon responds that Stilley has failed “to address the overwhelming factual evidence in the record against him and the Special Judge's carefully reasoned and fully-supported findings as to guilt on all thirty-two charges of misconduct.” Ligon argues instead that Stilley's arguments relate more to procedure.

A. Underlying Facts

The facts giving rise to this disbarment proceeding are complex and have been set forth in multiple previous cases. The essence of the charges is that Stilley attempted to relitigate issues that had previously been decided by filing multiple lawsuits in state and federal courts. [2010 Ark. 6]In doing so, it is alleged that Stilley was disrespectful toward the courts and toward individual judges; was repeatedly sanctioned under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 11; threatened to report a circuit

[371 S.W.3d 625]

judge and opposing counsel to the prosecuting attorney's office and to the professional misconduct committee if they did not comply with his demands; personally sued various judges and justices after they ruled against him; withheld material information from the court; directly violated court orders; and repeatedly attempted to be admitted to practice before federal courts without disclosing his disciplinary history in Arkansas.

In 2002, Stilley filed a complaint in the Sebastian County Circuit Court on behalf of his client, John Parker, against the following parties: the county judge; the county collector; and the county treasurer; the Fort Smith School District; Westark Community College, a/k/a University of Arkansas–Fort Smith; the City of Fort Smith; and Sebastian County. The complaint alleged that Act 758 of 1995 violated amendment 59 to the Arkansas Constitution and that the defendants were imposing illegal taxes on the plaintiff and other similarly-situated taxpayers. Circuit Judge Marschewski granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on grounds that res judicata barred the lawsuit because the claims raised were litigated in Elzea v. Perry, 340 Ark. 588, 12 S.W.3d 213 (2000). Judge Marschewski also imposed Rule 11 sanctions against Stilley after finding that he was the attorney in the Elzea case and had, therefore, previously filed an identical...