Petition of Anderson
| Decision Date | 05 April 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-430,92-430 |
| Citation | 312 Ark. 447,851 S.W.2d 408 |
| Parties | In re Petition of Sam L. ANDERSON, Jr. for Readmission to the Bar of Arkansas. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Robert S. Hargraves, Hot Springs, for appellant.
Tucker Raney, Letty C. McAdams, Little Rock, for appellee.
The petitioner was admitted to the Bar of Arkansas in 1980. In 1983 and 1984, while a practicing attorney, petitioner committed a number of felonies. He was charged by the United States Attorney in a three-count indictment filed in United States District Court. He was tried in 1985, and the jury found him guilty on all three counts of the indictment. He was sentenced to three years in federal prison on each count and fined $2,000 on each count. He petitioned this court and asked to unconditionally surrender his license in order to avoid disbarment. On December 8, 1986, by per curiam order, this court unconditionally accepted the surrender of his license.
Petitioner was discharged from parole on October 9, 1990. Three months later, on January 2, 1991, he filed a petition with the Board of Law Examiners asking for reinstatement to the Bar of Arkansas. That Board determines whether, and on what conditions, one should be readmitted to the Bar. The Board held a hearing and, by a divided vote, denied the petition for reinstatement. The conclusion of the Board's finding is as follows:
Mr. Anderson is far along in the rehabilitation process and that he has met all the technical requirements for admission, however, his felony conviction[s] singularly outweighs the positive evidence of the record; that Mr. Anderson has not met his burden of establishing eligibility for reinstatement and his petition is denied.
The petitioner appeals from the Board's ruling. We affirm the ruling.
The facts involved in the crimes for which petitioner was convicted in federal district court are significant to our holding, and, therefore, the counts of the indictment are quoted in full:
Count 1.
On or about November, 1983 and continuing through the end of February, 1984, SAM ANDERSON, JR., the defendant herein, did knowingly and wilfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree with Roger Clinton to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of Title 21 United States Code, Section 841(a)(1).
The following overt acts were committed in furtherance of the conspiracy:
1. In November, 1983, SAM ANDERSON and Roger Clinton discussed the purchase and distribution of cocaine in the Hot Springs area.
2. In November, 1983, SAM ANDERSON paid Roger Clinton $4,000.00 for cocaine.
3. On or about November 21, 1983, SAM ANDERSON paid $4,000.00 to Roger Clinton and received approximately two ounces of cocaine.
4. On or about December 11, 1983, Roger Clinton travelled to New York City to purchase cocaine for SAM ANDERSON.
5. On or about December 15, 1983, SAM ANDERSON paid Roger Clinton approximately $6,000.00 for cocaine.
6. On or about December 19, 1983, SAM ANDERSON paid Roger Clinton $4,000.00 for cocaine.
7. In January, 1984, SAM ANDERSON paid Roger Clinton approximately $4,000.00 for cocaine.
8. On or about January 19, 1984, Roger Clinton flew to New York City to purchase cocaine for SAM ANDERSON.
9. On or about January 22, 1984, SAM ANDERSON paid Roger Clinton approximately $10,000.00 for cocaine.
10. In February, 1984, SAM ANDERSON and Roger Clinton discussed the purchase of 10 to 15 ounces of cocaine.
11. On or about February 24, 1984, Roger Clinton picked up approximately nine ounces of cocaine from Maurice Rodriguez for delivery for SAM ANDERSON.
All of which acts were in furtherance of the conspiracy and in violation of Title 21 United States Code, Section 846.
Count II.
Beginning in early May, 1984, and continuing through the end of June, 1984, in the Western District of Arkansas, Hot Springs Division, SAM ANDERSON, JR., the defendant herein, did knowingly and wilfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree with Maurice Rodriguez to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, a Scheduled II controlled substance, in violation of Title 21 United States Code, Section 841(a)(1).
The following overt acts were committed in furtherance of the conspiracy:
1. On or about the middle of May, 1984, SAM ANDERSON and Maurice Rodriguez discussed the purchase of cocaine.
2. On or about May 15, 1984, Maurice Rodriguez received $8,000.00 from SAM ANDERSON to purchase cocaine.
3. On or about May 16, 1984, Maurice Rodriguez travelled to New York City.
4. On or about May 23, 1984, Maurice Rodriguez returned to Hot Springs from New York City.
5. On or about May 23, 1984, Maurice Rodriguez delivered approximately four ounces of cocaine to SAM ANDERSON.
6. On or about June 4, 1984, SAM ANDERSON gave a German license tag to Maurice Rodriguez to use on a vehicle driven by Rodriguez to Arkansas.
All of which acts were in furtherance of the conspiracy and in violation of Title 21 United States Code, Section 846.
Count III.
On or about June 20, 1984, in the Western District of Arkansas, Hot Springs Division, SAM ANDERSON, JR., knowingly and intentionally did unlawfully distribute cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 United States Code, Section 841(a)(1).
The jury might not have found that petitioner committed each of the specific acts alleged, but it did find that he committed a sufficient number of them to find him guilty of both of the conspiracies and of distributing cocaine. Another fact that is significant to the holding is that, commencing in 1982, the petitioner served as Roger Clinton's attorney and represented him in a number of matters.
Rule 17 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides that if a member of the bar is "convicted of a felony ... under the laws ... of the United States," disciplinary action, including disbarment, may be taken. Rule 7(D) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides that a member of the bar may voluntarily surrender his or her license to practice law. Such surrenders of a license are absolute. In re Webster, 307 Ark. 40, 816 S.W.2d 612 (1991). Petitioner unconditionally surrendered his license "to avoid unnecessary proceedings," and we unconditionally accepted petitioner's surrender of his license.
This court has the inherent power to discipline an attorney. Hurst v. Bar Rules Comm., 202 Ark. 1101, 1108, 155 S.W.2d 697, 701 (1941). In addition to this court's inherent power, Amendment 28 to the Constitution of the State of Arkansas expressly gives this court the authority to regulate the practice of law. The constitutional amendment was adopted in 1928 to make it absolutely clear that this court could make rules regulating both the practice of law and the conduct of attorneys. The purpose of the amendment was to protect the public and to maintain the integrity of the courts and the honor of the profession. An attorney's client often entrusts his property, or his liberty, or possibly his life, to the attorney. A position of trust, if not an actual fiduciary relationship, often exists. It is the responsibility of this court to see that the public can maintain that trust in the Bar. We have said the "honor of the profession" is one of the considerations in determining readmission. Hurst v. Bar Rules Comm. The practice of law is a privilege, not a right. In re Petition for Reinstatement of Lee, 305 Ark. 196, 806 S.W.2d 382 (1991). Once a lawyer has lost his license to practice law, either through surrender or disbarment, there is a presumption against readmission. Hurst v. Bar Rules Comm.
The protection of the public and the honor and integrity of the profession have long been the principal criteria in determining whether a person should be admitted or readmitted to the bar. In the case of In re Petition of Shannon for Readmission to the Bar of Arkansas, 274 Ark. 106, 108-A, 621 S.W.2d 853, 855 (1981), we said: "The overriding considerations on the question of readmission are the public interest, the integrity of the bar and the courts with due consideration to the rehabilitation of the petitioner with respect to good moral character and mental and emotional stability." (Emphasis added.)
Petitioner first argues that the ruling of the Board of Law Examiners is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Petitioner's argument is primarily based upon his rehabilitation, but it does not give sufficient weight to the overriding considerations of the public interest and the integrity of the Bar. The finding of guilt on the three counts of the federal indictment demonstrates that the criminal conspiracies entered into by petitioner were lengthy and complex. They were planned and designed by a member of the Bar and were committed with full intent to break the law. Even worse, the petitioner, who was a member of the Bar, entered into a criminal conspiracy with one of his clients, and did so while he was serving as the client's counsel. Finally, the distribution of cocaine is a most hurtful offense.
As previously set out, the overriding considerations for readmission are the public interest and the integrity of the bar. It is indubitable that public confidence in the bar, as well as the integrity of the bar, would be diminished by the readmission of a lawyer who had been convicted of entering into a criminal conspiracy with his client, just as it would be diminished by the readmission of a lawyer who had been convicted of distributing cocaine. Even if confidence in the Bar were not harmed at the local level by this case, and even if the integrity of the bar at the local level were not diminished by this case, both would be subsequently damaged at the state level because the Board of Law Examiners would be obliged to follow the precedent and allow readmission to criminals who had held a law license and who had been convicted of crimes involving their clients.
On the other hand, petitioner has made remarkable progress in...
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