Lilian G. v. Dep't of Child Safety, V.P., A.P., L.P.
| Decision Date | 26 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 1 CA-JV 16-0322,1 CA-JV 16-0322 |
| Parties | LILIAN G., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, V.P., A.P., L.P., Appellees. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County
Nos. S1400JD20150349, S1400JD20150350, S1400JD20150351
The Honorable Kathryn Stocking-Tate, Judge
AFFIRMED
Office of the Legal Defender, Yuma
By William P. Katz
Counsel for Appellant
By Nicholas Chapman-Hushek
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
MEMORANDUM DECISIONJudge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.
¶1 Lilian G. ("Mother") appeals the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights to V.P., A.P., and L.P. ("the children").1 Mother challenges several findings of the juvenile court, including the court's finding that severance was in the children's best interests. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶2 Mother is the biological mother of the children, who were born from 2004 to 2009. Mother has a decade-long history of substance abuse—most specifically, methamphetamine—that has persistently and negatively affected her ability to parent the children.
¶3 In October 2014, Mother and her "significant other" were involved in a "verbal altercation" that escalated into them throwing things at one another. Police officers were called to the home for a domestic disturbance, and the officers observed the significant other hitting five-year-old L.P. The significant other was extremely intoxicated and arrested for disorderly conduct, but neither Mother nor the children would cooperate with the officers. The officers also noticed that clothing, trash, dirt, and animal feces covered the floor.
¶4 In March 2015, the Department of Child Safety ("DCS") received a report that Mother was taking the children from hotel room to hotel room while she met with strange men, smoked crystalmethamphetamine with these men in the children's presence, left the children with these men, and kept illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia within the children's reach. Meanwhile, she ignored A.P.'s physical and mental health issues.3 DCS requested that Mother submit to drug testing.
¶5 Approximately three weeks later, DCS noted Mother had initially "cleaned up her act," but she then resumed "using drugs and running around" as soon as she no longer had to undergo drug testing. She would leave the children alone in the home "for hours," would not bathe them regularly, provided them with only dirty clothes to wear, and ignored their long-term, severe lice infestations and hygiene problems. She also ignored calls from the children's school about the lice, hygiene, and other problems, leading to the children's eventual suspension from school due to the lice issue. While at school, the children acted depressed and anxious and had behavioral issues, ostensibly as a result of their having witnessed domestic violence in their parents' places of residence.
¶6 Mother, who was unemployed, had no stable living environment and moved regularly between hotels and family members' homes. Mother requested help from DCS to help her parent and discipline the children, and although DCS offered in-home services to address the children's mental health, hygiene, and discipline issues, Mother did not comply with the services and could not be reached by the service providers or DCS.
¶7 In June 2015, Mother admitted to DCS that she was using methamphetamine at least weekly, although she denied using drugs in the home or around the children. She also admitted moving from motel to motel, ignoring the children's mental health and behavioral issues—including that A.P. would "go[] to the bathroom on herself every couple of days for the past year"—and ignoring the children's year-plus lice infestations.
¶8 DCS removed the children from Mother's care, initially placed each of them with a different maternal relative,4 and petitioned to have the children adjudicated dependent based on Mother's neglect and substance abuse. Mother agreed to services—including substance abuse assessment and treatment, parenting classes, parent-aide services, drugtesting through TASC, domestic violence counseling, a psychological evaluation, transportation, and supervised visitation—and pled no contest to the allegations of the dependency petition.
¶9 After an initial dependency hearing, the juvenile court found the children dependent as to Mother and approved a case plan of family reunification. As part of the reunification plan, DCS required that Mother resolve her substance abuse, domestic violence, behavioral health, parenting, housing, and financial issues; become willing and able to meet the children's needs; and keep DCS informed of her moves.
¶10 Mother, however, failed to obtain employment, find a stable residence of her own, or fully participate in services—including the psychological evaluation, parent-aide services, and visitation—and was eventually closed out of services due to lack of participation. During the dependency, Mother never earned unsupervised contact with the children.
¶11 Mother also continued to use illegal drugs. In July 2015, her hair-follicle test returned positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine. A month later, she appeared for her substance abuse assessment, but did not engage in the substance abuse treatment program offered through TERROS. DCS enrolled her in Catholic Community Services' substance abuse treatment program, but she did not attend and was closed out of the program.
¶12 In January 2016, Mother referred herself for a third treatment program and appeared for her intake session, but did not follow through with the recommended services. In March 2016, DCS referred Mother to Catholic Community Services a second time, but after completing a new assessment, she again did not engage in treatment and twice tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine—in March and April 2016. At an April 2016 report and review hearing, the court instructed her to participate in the Crossroads Mission's ten-day detoxification program, but she did not attend.5 In May 2016, however, Mother admitted herself into Community Bridges' thirty-day, inpatient treatment program, completed the program, and agreed to move to the TLC Center's aftercare group homein June 2016. Soon after, however, she left the TLC Center and moved in with her mother, with whom she had a contentious relationship.6
¶13 On June 21, 2016, DCS moved to terminate Mother's parental rights to the children on neglect, chronic substance abuse, and nine-month out-of-home placement grounds. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 8-533(B)(2), (3), (8)(a) (Supp. 2016).7 By this time, the children had been in DCS's care for approximately twelve months.
¶14 On July 13, 2016, the juvenile court held a hearing on the motion for termination. Although Mother was served with the motion for termination, she was absent,8 and the juvenile court found she had failed to attend the hearing without good cause.9 The court found that she waived her trial rights and admitted the motion's allegations; it then held the termination adjudication hearing in her absence.10
¶15 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court terminated Mother's parental rights after finding DCS had proved each of the statutory grounds alleged for severance, DCS had made diligent efforts to provide reunification services for Mother, and termination was in the children's best interests. On August 5, 2016, the court entered a written order terminating Mother's relationship with the children.
¶16 Mother filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-235(A) (2014) and Rule 103(A) of the Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court.
¶17 "Parents possess a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children." Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 24, 110 P.3d 1013, 1018 (2005) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶ 11, 995 P.2d 682, 684 (2000)). Even fundamental rights are not absolute, however. Id. (citing Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 248, ¶ 12, 995 P.2d at 684). A court may sever those rights if it finds clear and convincing evidence of one of the statutory grounds for severance, and finds by a preponderance of the evidence that severance is in the children's best interests. See A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B), -537(B) (2014); Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 281-82, 288, ¶¶ 7, 41, 110 P.3d at 1015-16, 1022.
¶18 The juvenile court retains great discretion in weighing and balancing the interests of the child, parent, and state. Cochise Cty. Juv. Action No. 5666-J, 133 Ariz. 157, 160, 650 P.2d 459, 462 (1982). As the trier of fact in a termination proceeding, the juvenile court "is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts." Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18, 219 P.3d 296, 303 (App. 2009) (quoting Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 4, 100 P.3d 943, 945 (App. 2004)). Thus, the resolution of conflicts in the evidence is uniquely the province of the juvenile court, and we will not reweigh the evidence in our review. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d 203, 207 (App. 2002); see also Pima Cty. Adoption of B-6355, 118 Ariz. 111, 115, 575 P.2d 310, 314 (1978) . We will not disturb the juvenile court's order unless noreasonable evidence supports its factual...
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