Liljedahl v. Glassgow
| Decision Date | 19 January 1921 |
| Docket Number | 33474 |
| Citation | 180 N.W. 870,190 Iowa 827 |
| Parties | G. J. LILJEDAHL, Appellant, v. FRANK GLASSGOW et al., Appellees |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Page District Court.--THOMAS ARTHUR, Judge.
PLAINTIFF appeals from a judgment upon a verdict of the jury returned by direction of the court.
Reversed.
Ferguson Barnes & Ferguson, for appellant.
Wilson & Keenan and William M. Jackson, for appellee.
ARTHUR, J. took no part.
On May 20, 1915, one L. D. Bailey, who was the owner of a tract of land located in the state of Colorado, executed promissory notes in the aggregate amount of $ 6,000, with interest coupons attached, and, to secure payment thereof, at the same time executed a mortgage upon the Colorado land. The notes are dated and made payable to H. I. Foskett of Shenandoah, at the Shenandoah National Bank in said city, and were shortly thereafter assigned to plaintiff, who loaned the money to Bailey thereon. Two days later, the said Bailey executed a deed before a notary public in Shenandoah, describing the Colorado land, but without the insertion of the name of anyone as grantee. The consideration recited in said deed is $ 1.00 and other valuable consideration. The deed contained the following clause:
"This deed is made subject to one loan of $ 6,000 and one of $ 600 which the grantee assumes and agrees to pay as part of the purchase price above mentioned."
Plaintiff alleged in his petition that, during the summer of 1917, the said Bailey conveyed the Colorado land to Frank Glassgow by delivering the deed in question to him, and that the said Glassgow in turn conveyed the same to A. M. Hiatt, and the said Hiatt later conveyed to the defendant Joe Hilger, all of said conveyances being accomplished by the delivery and acceptance of said deed without the insertion of the name of the purchaser as grantee; that each of said purchasers became and were, in fact, grantees under said deed, with full right and authority to insert therein his own name as such; that each conveyance was for a full consideration; and that, by reason thereof, the said defendants became liable for the payment of the mortgage indebtedness to the plaintiff; that default was made in the payment of the interest coupons; and that, by the terms of said instrument, the whole indebtedness thereby became due: and plaintiff demands judgment for $ 6,000, interest, and costs. After suit was commenced, Frank Glassgow died, and the defendant Nellie Glassgow, administratrix of his estate, was substituted. Each defendant filed a separate answer, containing a general denial, followed by the admission that the said Bailey owned the land and executed the notes and mortgages described; that the deed in question was delivered by him to Glassgow; and that he in turn delivered it to Hiatt; and that, after passing through the hands of various parties it was delivered to one C. E. Brown, who inserted his name therein as grantee, and caused the same to be recorded. Each of the defendants specifically denied that he assumed or agreed to pay the mortgage indebtedness, and averred that the deed was, in fact, void, and conveyed no interest in said real estate under the laws of Colorado, except to C. E. Brown, whose name was finally inserted in the blank space as grantee. At the conclusion of all the evidence, the court, upon motion of counsel for defendant, directed the jury to return a verdict in their behalf, and judgment was accordingly entered against plaintiff for costs, and he appeals.
The law is settled in this state that the equitable title passes by the delivery of a deed blank as to the name of the grantee, to a purchaser for a valid consideration (Bossingham v. Syck, 118 Iowa 192, 91 N.W. 1047, Logan v. Miller, 106 Iowa 511, 76 N.W. 1005); and that, by accepting a deed containing a clause by which the grantee assumes and agrees to pay incumbrances, such purchaser becomes liable for the payment thereof, the same as he would if his name were written in the instrument. Beeson v. Green, 103 Iowa 406, 72 N.W. 555; Bossingham v. Syck, supra; Marble Sav. Bank v. Mesarvey, 101 Iowa 285, 70 N.W. 198; Bennett Sav. Bank v. Smith, 171 Iowa 405; Santee v. Keefe, 127 Iowa 128, 102 N.W. 803; Gray v. Bricker, 182 Iowa 816, 166 N.W. 284; Logan v. Miller, 106 Iowa 511, 76 N.W. 1005. Under the law of Colorado, however, a deed blank as to grantee is a nullity, and passes no interest whatever by delivery to a purchaser, until his name is written therein. He has implied authority to insert his name therein, and by doing so he acquires title. McGrew v. Lamb, 60 Colo. 462 (154 P. 91); Halliwill v. Weible, 64 Colo. 295 (171 P. 372); Herr v. Denver M. & M. Co., 13 Colo. 406 (6 L. R. A. 641, 22 P. 770). Counsel for appellee base their principal contention upon the fact that the defendants, who received and passed the deed without designation therein of a grantee, never became such under the law of Colorado, or acquired any interest in the land; and that the clause above interposed no obligation upon them to pay said incumbrance. On the other hand, counsel for appellant take the position that, while the question as to the sufficiency of the deed to convey title must be determined by the law of Colorado, the assumption of the incumbrance and the agreement to pay the same are personal covenants, executed and to be performed in the state of Iowa, and that, therefore, the legal effect thereof must be determined by the law of this state, and not by the law of Colorado. It is a rule of universal application that instruments of conveyance, in so far as they relate primarily or directly to the title, are to be construed according to the lex rei sitae. Wharton on Conflict of Laws (8th Ed.) 591; Finnes v. Selover, Bates & Co., 102 Minn. 334 (113 N.W. 883); Clement v. Willett, 105 Minn. 267 (117 N.W. 491). But personal covenants or agreements in instruments of conveyance will be given effect according to the law of the place where the same are executed and to be performed. Finnes v. Selover, Bates & Co., supra; Clement v. Willett, supra; Polson v. Stewart, 167 Mass. 211 (45 N.E. 737); Cochran v. Ward, 5 Ind.App. 89 (29 N.E. 795); Wharton on Conflict of Laws (8th Ed.) 591.
It is not claimed that the alleged conveyance of said land by Bailey to Glassgow, and by Glassgow to Hiatt, or by Hiatt to Hilger, was without...
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