Lima v. Stanley
| Decision Date | 07 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | 5:14-CV-896-FL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
| Parties | MADAY LIMA, Plaintiff, v. TERRY STANLEY; MH & WH, LLC; HALLE BUILDING GROUP; WENDY HOWINGTON; and A. HUMPHRIES, Holly Springs Police Department, Defendants. |
This pro se case is before the court on the motion to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (D.E. 1) by plaintiff Maday Lima ("plaintiff") and for a frivolity review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). These matters were referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (See Public D.E. dated 24 Dec. 2014).
The court finds that plaintiff has adequately demonstrated her inability to prepay the required court costs. Her motion to proceed in forma pauperis is therefore ALLOWED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to file the complaint form (D.E. 1-1) and the exhibits thereto (D.E. 1-2 to D.E. 1-15).
Plaintiff's allegations are set out, in part, in an eight-page complaint form (DE. 1-1)1 completed in handwriting. There is also a five-page typewritten statement, the original attached to the complaint form in Spanish (D.E. 1-3) and a separately filed version in English (D.E. 3) ("Statement"). Thirteen exhibits, including the Spanish version of the Statement, are attached to the complaint form. (D.E. 1-2 through D.E. 1-18).
Plaintiff appears to name as defendants: (1) Terry Stanley ("Stanley"); (2) MH & WH, LLC ("MH & WH"); (3) Wendy H. Howington ("Howington"); (4) Halle Building Group ("Halle"); and (5) A. Humphries ("Humphries"), a patrol sergeant with the Holly Springs Police Department.2
Plaintiff alleges as follows:
Plaintiff worked in construction for defendants MH & WH and Halle, two companies she alleges were actually the same company for all intents and purposes. (Stmt. 2). They had a total of about 100 employees. (Compl. Form ¶ 2). During the course of her employment, Howington, the wife of the owner of MH & WH, frequently shorted plaintiff's pay for hours worked, and plaintiff regularly worked 50 to 55 hours a week with no overtime pay. (Stmt. 2).
Plaintiff was assigned to work at an apartment complex in Holly Springs as the head of sheetrock and painting. (Id.). Her boss informed her that Stanley, the assistant chief superintendent, would be at the complex. (Id. at 2-3). Stanley gave plaintiff instructions for the work she was to perform. (Id.). A contractor complained to Stanley about plaintiff's work. (Id. at 3). Thereafter, starting in mid-January 2013, Stanley began to scold and harass plaintiff regularly, which she found insulting and humiliating. (Id.; Compl. Form ¶ 8). Stanley mistreated plaintiff because she is a woman. (Compl. Form ¶ 6(C)).
On 2 May 2013, when plaintiff was standing on a board inspecting a ceiling, the crew leader asked her to come down. (Compl. Form ¶ 8; Stmt. 3, 5). When she did, Stanley began to verbally attack her and reprimanded her for something she did not do. (Stmt. 3). Stanley knew plaintiff has a health condition. (Id.). When plaintiff asked Stanley to calm down, he got angrier and grabbed a can of sealer she was holding, removed the cylinder, and threw it at her face. (Id. at 4). The sealer hit plaintiff in the arm when she blocked her face. (Id.). Plaintiff started crying and left work. (Id.). She did not call the police because she did not think they would help her. (Id.).
The next day, plaintiff could not make it into work because she was shaking and had not been able to sleep. (Id.). She was called at home by the owner of the company and asked why she did not report to work. (Id.). She explained that she was upset about Stanley's actions. (Id.). The owner, Stanley, and the crew leader made up a lie about the incident, and plaintiff was terminated on or about 12 May 2013. (Id.; Compl. Form ¶ 8).
Plaintiff suffered nightmares over her treatment by Stanley. (Stmt. 4). A neighbor took her to the hospital because one side of her body had become paralyzed. (Id.). At the hospital, she was advised to file a police report. (Id.). The following day, she went to the police stationand was told that the police could not file a report. (Id. at 4-5). Plaintiff returned to the police department a second time and again was told that a report could not be filed, but was advised to report her complaints to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (Id. at 5).
Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the purported wrongdoing she not only lost her job, but also incurred unpayable medical debt, lost her home, and is disabled from working. (Id. at 5-6).
Plaintiff submitted a complaint with the EEOC on or about 15 May 2013. (See EEOC Det'n Ltr. (D.E. 1-14); Compl. Form ¶ 11). According to the determination letter from the EEOC, the complaint, which plaintiff did not file in this case, was against Halle, and plaintiff claimed a hostile work environment because of her sex, retaliation for complaining about it, and having to resign as a result of the mistreatment. (EEOC Det'n Ltr. 1). Subsequent settlement efforts by the EEOC failed, and it issued plaintiff a right-to-sue letter on 23 September 2014. (See Right-to-Sue Ltr. (D.E. 1-15)). Plaintiff received the right-to-sue letter on the date it was issued. (Compl. Form ¶ 11). She commenced this action on 22 December 2014 by filing her motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
Plaintiff expressly alleges that she is asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Compl. Form ¶ 3). On these claims, she seeks equitable and other relief under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), including recovery of back pay, but not reinstatement to her former job. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 12(A)).
Given the liberal interpretation to which they are entitled, plaintiff's allegations can be read as purporting to assert the following additional claims: violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.; violation of the North Carolina Wage andHour Act ("NCWHA"), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.1 et seq.; assault; battery; and violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for failure to charge Stanley. Plaintiff does not make an express demand for damages relating to these claims.
Plaintiff expressly alleges subject matter jurisdiction for the Title VII claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. (Compl. Form ¶ 3). Subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining federal claims, for violation of the FLSA and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, would be under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, providing for federal question jurisdiction, and over the remaining state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, providing for supplemental jurisdiction.
After allowing a party to proceed in forma pauperis, as here, the court must conduct a frivolity review of the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court must determine whether the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant, and is thereby subject to dismissal. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 27 (1992) (standard for frivolousness). Although in evaluating frivolity a pro se plaintiff's pleadings are held to "less stringent standards" than those drafted by attorneys, White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1989), the court is not required to accept a pro se plaintiff's contentions as true, Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. Instead, the court is permitted to "pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Such baseless claims include those that describe "fantastic or delusional scenarios." Id. at 328. Provided that a plaintiff's claims are not clearly baseless, the court must weigh the factual allegations in plaintiff's favor in its frivolity analysis. Denton,504 U.S. at 32. The court must read the complaint carefully to determine if a plaintiff has alleged specific facts sufficient to support the claims asserted. White, 886 F.2d at 724.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, a pleading that states a claim for relief must contain "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . . [and] a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2). Case law explains that the factual allegations in the complaint must create more than a mere possibility of misconduct. Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). Likewise, a complaint is insufficient if it offers merely "labels and conclusions," "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," or "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against its employees on the basis of the employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). "Absent direct evidence, the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII are: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class." Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010). Title VII also permits the assertion of a claim for a hostile work environment where a plaintiff can show conduct that is "(1) unwelcome, (2) based on [plaintiff's] gender or race, (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her...
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