Linch v. Sagamore Mfg. Co.

Decision Date05 January 1887
Citation9 N.E. 728,143 Mass. 206
PartiesLINCH v. SAGAMORE MANUF'G CO.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
COUNSEL

Cummings & McDonough, for plaintiff.

Upon all the evidence it was a question of fact for the jury to say in regard to the boilers, and in supplying stop-cocks, etc. Snow v. Housatonic Ry. Co., 8 Allen, 441; Gilman v. Eastern R.R., 10 Allen, 233; Arkerson v. Dennison, 117 Mass. 407; Patrick v. Pote, Id. 297; Wheeler v. Wason Manuf'g Co., 135 Mass. 294. What constitutes due care must depend upon the circumstances of each case. It cannot be defined as matter of law. Gaynor v. Old Colony & N.Ry. Co., 100 Mass. 214; Reed v. Inhabitants of Deerfield, 8 Allen, 524. It is only when there is an entire absence of any facts to authorize the inference that the plaintiff was conducting himself with reasonable prudence and discretion, or the undisputed facts of a case prove actual negligence, that a case like the case at bar should be withdrawn from the jury. Mayo v. Boston & M.R.R., 104 Mass. 140; Fox v. Sackett, 10 Allen, 536. The evidence showed that the plaintiff opened the valve slowly; that he opened it a quarter of a turn as slow as he could, and was exercising due care at the time.

Morton & Jennings, for defendant.

We submit that the evidence offered was immaterial. The defendant had the right to conduct its business in such manner, and with such machinery, as it saw fit. Ladd v. New Bedford R. Co., 119 Mass. 412; Sullivan v. India Manuf'g Co., 113 Mass. 396.

OPINION

C. ALLEN, J.

This case falls within the rule that where a servant, knowing and appreciating the danger, enters upon a perilous work, even though he does so unwillingly, and by order of his superior officer, he must bear the risk. Russell v. Tillotson, 140 Mass. 201; S.C. 4 N.E. 231; Taylor v. Carew Manuf'g Co., 140 Mass. 150; S.C. 3 N.E. 21; Leary v. Boston & A.R.R., 139 Mass. 580; S.C. 2 N.E. 115; Ferren v. Old Colony R.R., ante, 608. The plaintiff knew the danger from letting on the steam when water was in the pipes. He had this in mind at the time, and that water might be in the pipe. He acted with reference to this knowledge, and let the steam on slowly, because he knew there was danger. He understood the situation. Nobody could have given him any information. The very thing happened which he had in mind and feared. In such case, he must be held to take the risk. It is urged that he did not know that there was water in the pipe. But he knew that it was likely to be there, and acted with reference to this contingency.

Judgment on the verdict.

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