Lindeleaf v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd.

• Decision Date: 29 May 1986
• Docket Number: S.F. 24942,R,AFL-CI
• Citation: 41 Cal.3d 861,718 P.2d 106,226 Cal.Rptr. 119
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 718 P.2d 106, 116 Lab.Cas. P 56,393 Robert J. LINDELEAF, Petitioner, v. AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent; UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA,eal Party in Interest.

Page 119

226 Cal.Rptr. 119

41 Cal.3d 861, 718 P.2d 106, 116 Lab.Cas. P 56,393

Robert J. LINDELEAF, Petitioner, v. AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Real Party in Interest.

S.F. 24942.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

May 29, 1986.

James G. Johnson, Hill, Farver & Burrill, Los Angeles, for petitioner (Lindeleaf).

Daniel G. Stone, Manuel M. Medeiros, Nancy C. Smith and Ismael A. Castro, Deputy Sol., Sacramento, for respondent (ALRB).

Dianna Lyons, Daniel A. Garcia and Wendy Sones, Sacramento, for real party in interest (UFW).

MOSK, Justice.

This case presents a fundamental challenge to the procedure used by the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB or Board) to select hearing officers and render decisions on postelection objections in union representation elections. It also calls into question the threshold requirements for compelling the ALRB to grant an evidentiary hearing on such objections.

We conclude that ALRB regulations for selecting investigative hearing examiners (IHEs) and delegating to them the initial task of conducting hearings and issuing recommended findings to the Board do not conflict with either the language or the policy of the Labor Code. At the same time, we reaffirm the principle announced in J.R. Norton Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 26 Cal.3d 1, 160 Cal.Rptr. 710, 603 P.2d 1306 that to be entitled to administrative review by the Board complainants must present a prima facie case that specific misconduct tainted the election. Therefore we reverse the Court of Appeal's judgment annulling the ALRB decision certifying the United Farm Workers (UFW) as the exclusive bargaining representative for employees of Robert J. Lindeleaf (Lindeleaf). (Robert J. Lindeleaf (1982) 8 ALRB No. 22.) Furthermore, because each of Lindeleaf's specific allegations of misconduct appears to be without merit, and its prolonged litigation of its election objections unreasonable, its refusal to bargain in good faith with the UFW warrants our affirmance of the make-whole order imposed against Lindeleaf by the ALRB. (Robert J. Lindeleaf (1983) 9 ALRB No. 35.)

On August 29, 1980, the UFW filed a petition with the ALRB, seeking certification as the exclusive bargaining representative for the agricultural employees of Lindeleaf. An election was held September 4, 1980, and the UFW emerged the clear winner. The tally of votes was: UFW--71; no union--35; void--1; challenged ballots--4.

Pursuant to Labor Code section 1156.3, subdivision (c), ¹ Lindeleaf filed 11 objections that allegedly warranted setting the election aside. After review, the ALRB executive secretary summarily dismissed certain of these objections in their entirety and others in part. Lindeleaf filed a request for review, and the ALRB set four issues for hearing.

The hearing was conducted by an IHE, who determined that the objections were uniformly unmeritorious: the claimed violations were found to be either unsubstantiated or de minimis, and did not affect the outcome of the election. The ALRB "affirm[ed] the IHE's rulings, findings and conclusions," and adopted her recommendation that the UFW be certified. (Robert J. Lindeleaf (1982) 8 ALRB No. 22, at p. 3.)

Insisting that certification was improper, Lindeleaf refused to bargain with the UFW, and the union filed charges of unfair labor practices with the ALRB pursuant to section 1153, subdivisions (a) and (e). On stipulated facts, the ALRB found Lindeleaf's refusal to bargain constituted an unfair labor practice; it ordered the parties to bargain in good faith and imposed a make-whole sanction on Lindeleaf, requiring it to reimburse present and former employees who suffered pay and other economic losses as a consequence of its refusal to bargain. (Robert J. Lindeleaf (1983) 9 ALRB No. 35.)

Lindeleaf petitioned for review in the Court of Appeal, urging it to set aside the ALRB decision and make-whole order. It contended that the ALRB abused its discretion in summarily dismissing certain of its post-election objections and in overruling others after the investigative hearing. In a supplemental brief, raising the issue for the first time, Lindeleaf challenged the ALRB's delegation of authority to an IHE to issue findings and a recommended decision, as contravening an express mandate of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA). The Court of Appeal annulled the decision, concluding that the Board improperly delegated its quasi-judicial function by adopting the IHE's recommendation and that three of Lindeleaf's objections summarily rejected by the Board required a full hearing. It remanded to the ALRB for reconsideration without reference to the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the IHE.

I

At the outset, we must determine whether the present challenge to ALRB hearing procedures is properly before this court. Lindeleaf concedes that it failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by raising this contention before the ALRB. (See Lab.Code, § 1160.8.) It is true that courts ordinarily accord administrative agencies the initial opportunity to address claims involving interpretation of their own regulations (Highland Ranch v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 848, 859, 176 Cal.Rptr. 753, 633 P.2d 99), and a petitioner is deemed to waive any objections that could have been raised before the ALRB. (Carian v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 654, 685, fn. 6, 205 Cal.Rptr. 657, 685 P.2d 701; Nish Noroian Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 726, 737, 201 Cal.Rptr. 1, 677 P.2d 1170.)

Lindeleaf maintains that its failure to contest ALRB regulations is excusable under the unusual circumstances of this case: while its petition was pending in the Court of Appeal, the same court raised that very issue sua sponte in another case and held that ALRB hearing procedures contravene the express mandate of the Labor Code. (A & D Christopher Ranch v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., Civ. No. A020605, an opinion subsequently ordered not to be published.) Prior to that decision, Lindeleaf argues, it would have been futile to raise such an objection before the Board.

Although these circumstances certainly account for Lindeleaf's tardy challenge, they may not excuse it as arising from the "exceptional circumstance" of a change in the law. Lindeleaf's reliance on N.L.R.B. v. Robin American Corp. (5th Cir.1982) 667 F.2d 1170, is misplaced. In that case, the court permitted the plaintiff to raise a tardy objection to a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) remedy for refusal to bargain after the United States Supreme Court decided a case changing the law on what constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining. Here, by contrast, once we ordered Christopher depublished, it could not be cited as authority and Lindeleaf could no longer claim an effective modification of the law.

Moreover, although it had apparently never occurred to any litigants, including Lindeleaf, to contest the validity of the ALRB regulations in question until the short-lived holding in Christopher, it would not have been futile or frivolous to do so. The futility exception to the requirement that parties exhaust their administrative remedies demands that the petitioner state with assurance that the Board would rule adversely in its own particular case. (Gantner & Mattern Co. v. California E. Com. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 314, 318, 109 P.2d 932; Doyle v. Chino (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 673, 683, 172 Cal.Rptr. 844.) Because the issue had never been presented to the ALRB, its probable decision could not be forecast. To permit Lindeleaf retroactively to second-guess the Board would improperly dilute the Board's power to "make, amend, and rescind" its own regulations. ( § 1144.)

Nevertheless, we elect to address this challenge on its merits. Our refusal to do so would affect not only the present parties, but also the parties to every nonfinal decision of the ALRB on election challenges that involved hearings and recommendations by an IHE. Although waiver is the general rule when parties fail to exhaust their administrative remedies, we may agree to hear a case involving important questions of public policy. (Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 394, 149 Cal.Rptr. 375, 584 P.2d 512, and cases cited.)

II

Lindeleaf contends that the ALRB regulations concerning the selection and duties of the IHEs contravene the language and intent of the ALRA. It submits that the Board's statutory mandate established it as a quasi-judicial body that must reach its own decisions, and that by appointing IHEs to arrive at findings of fact and recommend decisions, the Board improperly delegates its discretion to mere "functionaries."

Lindeleaf relies on the provision of the ALRA that election hearings "may be conducted by an officer or employee of a regional office of the Board. He shall make no recommendations with respect thereto." ( § 1156.3, subd. (c).) The Board has interpreted this section to require that only a hearing examiner who is an officer or employee of a regional office is barred from recommending disposition of election challenges; to expedite its review procedures, it has ruled that no such officers or employees may conduct hearings (Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 8, § 20370, subd. (a)) and that IHEs "shall issue an initial decision including findings of fact, conclusions of law ... and a recommended disposition of the case." (Id., subd. (f).) Lindeleaf maintains that these regulations both prohibit what the ALRA permits--hearings conducted by officers or employees of ALRB regional offices--and require what the statute forbids--findings and recommendations by IHEs. We disagree.

Our review of administrative regulations is in any case limited: as long as the regulations are "reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute" (Gov.Code, § 11342.2), we will defer to the agency's expertise. Our inquiry is thus ...