Lindgren v. Harmon Glass Co., C1-92-238

Citation489 N.W.2d 804
Decision Date18 August 1992
Docket NumberNo. C1-92-238,C1-92-238
Parties2 A.D. Cases 644 Patricia A. LINDGREN, Appellant, v. HARMON GLASS COMPANY, Respondent.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Minnesota

Syllabus by the Court

1. Excessive absenteeism may be a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for terminating a disabled employee even when the absenteeism is directly related to the employee's disability.

2. When a disabled employee has been absent from her job for prolonged time periods, and the employer must hire a substitute employee to perform the disabled employee's job during these prolonged absences, no reasonable accommodation is possible.

3. To overcome the presumption of at-will employment, an employer's statements must be specific and definite, not merely general reassurances of job security.

4. An employer's true statements that a disabled employee has been terminated from employment due to her prolonged absences are not defamatory.

John C. McIntosh, Daniel R. Butler, Daniel R. Butler & Assoc., P.A., St. Paul, for appellant.

David Y. Trevor, Dorsey & Whitney, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Considered and decided by PETERSON, P.J, and FORSBERG and AMUNDSON, JJ.

OPINION

AMUNDSON, Judge.

Appellant Patricia A. Lindgren brought this action against her former employer, respondent Harmon Glass Company. Her complaint seeks recovery on a number of claims, including disability discrimination, breach of contract, defamation, infliction of emotional distress, and breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. She challenges the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Harmon Glass. We affirm.

FACTS

Lindgren was first employed by Harmon Glass in October 1972. She began working as a secretary in June 1974 and held that position until her termination in 1990. In 1966 Lindgren was diagnosed as having rheumatoid arthritis. She did not experience any substantial problems from her condition until 1977, when she began a treatment regimen.

Between 1978 and 1990, Lindgren underwent nine major surgeries for her arthritis. With the exception of the last emergency procedure in February 1990, all of her operations were planned to create a minimum of disruption in her job. Following each procedure, Lindgren was absent from work for extended periods of time. Between March 1989 and March 1990, the year immediately prior to her termination from employment, she underwent three surgeries and missed 63 full days of work. She was also absent from work at other times due to doctor visits or minor illnesses.

In August 1989 Lindgren's supervisor, Ferd Dobmeyer, questioned her about her medical absences and a planned vacation. Lindgren testified Dobmeyer told her further surgeries might result in a reassessment of her employment. Dobmeyer also said it would not look good to others in the department if she took a vacation so soon after a medical leave. Lindgren explained she and her husband had made a substantial deposit which would be forfeited if they did not leave as scheduled. Lindgren went on vacation as planned.

In November 1989 Dobmeyer met again with Lindgren. He told her if she had any more major surgery, he would have to take a serious look at her continued employment. Dobmeyer did not discuss any other performance problems at either of his meetings with Lindgren.

Following her February 1990 emergency surgery, Dobmeyer met with two other individuals for whom Lindgren worked, Gary Jacobson and Tom McBride. Both Jacobson and McBride expressed concern about Lindgren's lengthy absences. However, the ultimate decision to terminate Lindgren's employment was made by Dobmeyer.

Prior to Lindgren's scheduled return to work, Dobmeyer informed her that she could no longer work for Harmon Glass, and that he was placing her on permanent disability status so she could receive long-term disability benefits. In a March 8, 1990 letter he stated:

Pat, in my judgment, you are no longer able to perform the normal duties of your secretarial position, and, therefore, the Company considers you to be disabled. Of course, the disability to which I refer is the direct result of the rheumatoid arthritis.

* * * * * *

Pat, I've worked with you for about 18 years. It was difficult to have to make the decision that your arthritis is now preventing you from being able to perform your job responsibilities. I do care about you, and I want to do what is fair and just for you, at the same time as I take care of the secretarial needs at our office.

Lindgren testified that after this discussion with Dobmeyer she called two co-workers. From them she discovered they already knew about her termination. She had no knowledge, however, of any statements made by Harmon Glass about her termination to anyone either inside or outside the company. McBride testified that when other Harmon Glass employees asked about Lindgren, he merely stated she "was no longer with us."

Lindgren claims it was very difficult to look for a new job. She testified she told prospective employers she was terminated for medical reasons, or Harmon Glass had terminated her after a series of operations. In June 1990 Lindgren was hired as a secretary by the Girl Scout Council of Minneapolis.

Harmon Glass contends it terminated Lindgren due to her prolonged absences and poor job performance. By affidavit Dobmeyer stated Lindgren's attendance record was "by far the worst of any employee I have supervised." Dobmeyer further stated:

In my judgment, Ms. Lindgren's attendance record was unacceptable regardless of the cause of her absences. Had they been caused by something other than her rheumatoid arthritis, my employment decision would have been the same.

McBride and Jacobson both made statements during their depositions which suggested that Lindgren's attendance at work was an important part of her job, and that Lindgren's absences adversely affected the business. At her deposition, Lindgren essentially agreed she was terminated due to her absences. When asked about her understanding of the reasons for her termination, she initially just stated she was terminated because of her arthritis. With further questioning, she agreed she was terminated due to the prolonged absences caused by her numerous surgeries.

Lindgren also testified she did not believe Harmon Glass could terminate her employment unless she committed some gross misconduct. She based that belief on her general understanding of the business community, and on an oral promise made some years earlier by Dobmeyer. She claims Dobmeyer made that promise after an individual for whom Lindgren worked retired. She approached Dobmeyer and expressed concern about her job security. She testified Dobmeyer stated "that I did not have to worry about my position, that there would be a job." Dobmeyer recalled that Lindgren was concerned and insecure about losing her position, and that "if I did anything, or said anything to her, it was along the lines of giving her some reinforcement or encouragement."

Lindgren acknowledged that a handbook distributed in 1989 by Harmon Glass to its employees contained a provision which stated "[t]he company maintains an 'At-Will' relationship with its employees," and the company "has the right to terminate employment at any time and for any reason." She further acknowledged that when she received the handbook, she signed a statement indicating she had read the handbook and understood its contents.

ISSUES

1. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on the disability discrimination claim?

2. Does Lindgren have a claim for failure to reasonably accommodate?

3. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on the breach of contract claim?

4. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on the defamation claim?

ANALYSIS

On appeal from summary judgment, this court must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact. Offerdahl v. University of Minn. Hosps. & Clinics, 426 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn.1988). When defending itself against a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff is required to present facts supporting its claims and may not merely argue that those facts will be developed later or at trial. See Schmidt v. Apple Valley Health Care Ctr., Inc., 460 N.W.2d 349, 354 (Minn.App.1990), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 25, 1990).

I

Lindgren claims Harmon Glass violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of a disability. See Minn.Stat. Sec. 363.03, subd. 1(2)(b) (1990). In evaluating such a claim, this court has applied the three-stage analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Rutherford v. County of Kandiyohi, 449 N.W.2d 457, 461 (Minn.App.1989), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 1990).

Under the first step, Lindgren must establish a prima facie case either by presenting direct evidence of discrimination or by showing 1) she was a member of a protected class, 2) was qualified for the position held, 3) was discharged, and 4) was replaced by a non-member of the protected class. See id. For the purposes of its summary judgment motion, Harmon Glass conceded Lindgren established her prima facie case.

Under the second step, the burden shifts to Harmon Glass to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for discharging Lindgren. Id. at 462. If successful, the burden shifts back to Lindgren to establish that Harmon Glass' stated reasons are a mere pretext for discrimination. Id. at 463.

Harmon Glass claims it terminated Lindgren based on her poor job performance and excessive absenteeism. We conclude a genuine issue of material fact exists whether the first reason--poor job performance--was the real reason for her discharge. Harmon Glass presented evidence that Dobmeyer, McBride, and Jacobson were concerned about Lindgren's attitude, the amount of work she was able to handle, and the effect her inefficiencies had on...

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