Lindley v. McGlauflin
| Decision Date | 04 March 1910 |
| Citation | 57 Wash. 581,107 P. 355 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | LINDLEY v. McGLAUFLIN. |
Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; John F. Main Judge.
Action by Hervey Lindley, doing business as the Lindley Lumber & Realty Company, against J. R. McGlauflin. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Roberts Battle, Hulbert & Tennant, for appellant.
J. T. Watson and Dorr & Hadley, for respondent.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in an action tried by the court without the intervention of a jury. The appellant contended that the action was an action at law, and demanded a trial by jury, paying into court a jury fee. The court, however, ruled that the action was one of equitable cognizance, properly triable as such, and proceeded accordingly. The correctness of this holding is the sole question presented by the appeal.
The complaint of the plaintiff contained three separate causes of action. In the first it was alleged in brief that the plaintiff was the lessee of a certain manufacturing plant consisting of a planing and shingle mill, an office building, and certain other buildings, together with the land on which the plant and buildings were situated; that he entered into an oral agreement with the defendant by which the defendant agreed to manage the plant and business of the plaintiff for a consideration and salary of $100 per month; that the defendant entered upon his duties as such, and continued therein for the period of about one year, during which time he had the sole custody and charge of the business, including the keeping of the accounts of the business; that the appellant desired to make a trip abroad, and just prior to leaving gave the defendant positive instructions concerning the conduct of the business; that he did make such a trip, being abroad some five months; that on returning he found that the defendant had disobeyed his instructions, in that he had purchased large and excessive amounts of material, had used the plaintiff's materials to construct a house for himself and wife, had borrowed on plaintiff's account large sums of money in excess of the amounts he was authorized to borrow, had largely overdrawn his account, and had credited himself with money to which he was not entitled to credit himself with, and had appropriated to his own use moneys derived from the business and belonging to the plaintiff for which he had made no accounting at all. The items charged as having been misappropriated were set forth in detail, and made a total of $1,291.30. For a second cause of action the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, without the knowledge or consent of the lessors or the plaintiff, moved a building from the leased ground to ground not included in the lease, and not owned by the lessors, and that the plaintiff was obligated to return the building to its proper place, to his damage in the sum of $200. For a third cause of action the plaintiff alleged that during his absence the defendant through gross carelessness and negligence had left the safe in the office building unlocked, and that some person or persons unknown to plaintiff had entered therein and had stolen and carried away moneys of the plaintiff aggregating $88.75. The prayer of the complaint was for the recovery of these several sums with interest. The defendant, answering the complaint, admitted the fact that he was employed as manager of the plaintiff's business, but denied practically all of the other allegations of the complaint. For a first separate answer he alleged that he was employed at a salary of $150 per month, instead of $100 per month as alleged by the plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to receive 20 per cent. of all profits made in the business; that the business made a profit during the 12 months in which he acted as manager of $7,344, and that in salary and profits he was entitled to take from the business $3,268.80; that he had taken but $1,650, leaving a balance due him of $1,618.80. For a second separate answer he alleged that he owned in his own separate right certain personal property of the...
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Little Bill v. Swanson
... ... pleaded, the cause may be first tried as one of equitable ... cognizance. This rule was afterwards affirmed in Lindley ... v. McGlauflin, 57 Wash. 581, 107 P. 355. The defense was ... properly pleaded and considered. If there ever was an action ... ...
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Kane v. Klos
...joinder of claims in equity has always been treated more liberally than in actions at law. Indeed, this court said in Lindley v. McGlauflin, 57 Wash. 581, 107 P. 355, that such joinder was desirable to avoid multiplicity of suits. Had the actions been separately instituted, they might have ......
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Sunset Pac. Oil Co. v. Clark
... ... excepted ... In ... determining the nature of an action, the court looks to the ... entire pleadings. Lindley v. McGlauflin, 57 Wash ... 581, 107 P. 355; Reed v. Reeves, 160 Wash. 282, 294 ... P. 995. When the trial court passed upon the demand ... ...
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Starks v. Field
...contends that the facts presented by his complaint entitle him to an accounting, and cites in support of his argument, Lindley v. McGlauflin, 57 Wash. 581, 107 P. 355; Garey v. Pasco, 89 Wash. 382, 154 P. 433; Behneman v. Schoemer, 141 Wash. 560, 252 P. 133, An examination of these cases di......