Lindstrom v. Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis

• Decision Date: 25 January 1974
• Docket Number: No. 43861,43861
• Parties: Richard L. LINDSTROM, et al., Respondents, v. YELLOW TAXI COMPANY OF MINNEAPOLIS, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 672

214 N.W.2d 672

298 Minn. 224

Richard L. LINDSTROM, et al., Respondents, v. YELLOW TAXI COMPANY OF MINNEAPOLIS, Appellant.

No. 43861.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 25, 1974.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The granting of a motion for a new trial on the ground of erroneous instructions to the jury rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a clear abuse of that discretion.

2. An entry made in a hospital record as to the cause of an accident is not admissible under the Minnesota Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act as having been made in the regular course of business unless it is germane to medical history, treatment, or diagnosis.

Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren and James P. Larkin, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Ramier & Hynes and Rodney M. Hynes, Minneapolis, for respondents.

Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and OTIS, PETERSON, and MULALLY, JJ., and considered en banc.

EDWARD D. MULALLY, Justice. ^*

This is an action to recover damages sustained by plaintiffs while passengers in defendant's taxicab. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiffs moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial. A new trial was ordered on the ground that the court committed an error of law in instructing the jury on two conflicting standards of care applicable to defendant, a common carrier. Defendant appealed from the order granting the new trial, claiming that the court had abused its discretion.

The accident occurred during the evening of April 11, 1969, near the intersection of Highways Nos. 55 and 62, when the taxicab suddenly swerved to the right, injuring plaintiffs. The parties are not in agreement as to why the taxicab swerved. However, there was no contact with any other vehicle. Plaintiffs testified that the cab driver was in the left lane going north on No. 55, approaching the intersection with No. 62, at a speed of 60 to 65 miles per hour; that he suddenly turned to the right, hit his brakes, went into the ditch, and came out again; and that they did not see any other vehicle which could have caused the cab to swerve. Plaintiffs further testified that they had never given any different version of how the accident happened, nor had they discussed the details of the accident with anyone.

In its instructions to the jury, the court defined negligence in terms of the reasonably-prudent-person standard of care, basically as set out in Minnesota Jury Instruction Guides, Instruction 101. ¹

The court also gave the definition of a common carrier and instructed the jury that a common carrier has a duty to use the highest degree of care for the safety of its passengers consistent with the practical operation of its business. ² Although Minnesota does not have a statute imposing a degree of care upon common carriers and specifically a taxicab company, this court has held that they are bound to the highest degree of care. Ford v. Stevens, 280 Minn. 16, 19, 157 N.W.2d 510, 513 (1968); Fieve v. Emmeck, 248 Minn. 122, 126, 78 N.W.2d 343, 347 (1956); McKellar v. Tht Yellow Cab Co., 148 Minn. 247, 250, 181 N.W. 348, 349 (1921). See, Annotation, 75 A.L.R.2d 988, 990; 14 Am.Jur.2d, Carriers, § 918; 3A Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 1261; 13 C.J.S. Carriers § 685.

Continuing with related instructions, the court instructed the jury on the common-law rules of the road, using the term 'reasonable care' twice, and referring to a driver's duty to 'use all reasonable means at his disposal to avoid an accident.' ³ The court's instructions on sudden emergency referred to the carrier's highest degree of care. In instructing the jury on proximate cause, the court used the phrase 'a person ought in the exercise of reasonable care.' ⁴

Upon completion of the court's charge to the jury, plaintiffs objected to the court's instructions relative to the standard of reasonable care rather than the highest degree of care and contended that the instructions were ambiguous and confusing as to the degree of care required. The court overruled plaintiffs' objections and submitted the case to the jury. Some 2 1/2 hours later, the jury requested additional instructions as to the factors to be considered in determining negligence. Plaintiffs renewed their objections to the instructions on the basis that conflicting standards of care had been given.

The court concluded that under Urban v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 256 Minn. 1, 96 N.W.2d 698 (1959), and Flaherty v. Minneapolis & S.L. Ry. Co., 251 Minn. 345, 87 N.W.2d 633 (1958), it had committed error in giving both the highest-degree-of-care standard for a common carrier (Instruction 376) and the reasonable-care standard (Instruction 101). The court then proceeded to reinstruct the jury by rereading Instruction 101, telling the jury to disregard it, and telling them the only standard of care applicable to the defendant in this case is that of the highest degree of care consistent with the practical operation of its business (basically as set out in Instruction 376). The jury foreman then requested a listing of the negligence factors enumerated by plaintiffs' counsel in his final argument. The court answered by saying:

'* * * (Y)ou should in your deliberations, as far as the law that you are to apply in this case, consider only what I told you this morning and now this afternoon, along with the corrective instructions that I have given you with reference to what I said this morning; and those things and those only should be considered.'

On April 20, 1972, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of defendant. On June 7, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for a new trial solely on the ground that the court had committed an error of law in instructing the jury on two conflicting standards of care applicable to the defendant.

1. The primary issue for consideration by this court is whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. We hold that it did not.

Defendant submits that the supplemental instructions cured any error existing in the original instructions and that in any event plaintiffs acquiesced in those corrective instructions and allowed the case to go to the jury on that basis. This latter contention is a factually debatable point at best. In any event, this court has held that the duty or degree of care imposed on a party is fundamental law and objections to instructions relative thereto could be assigned for the first time in a motion for a new trial. Trudeau v. Sina Contracting Co. Inc., 241 Minn. 79, 62 N.W.2d 492 (1954). Rule 51, Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in part:

'* * * An error in the instructions with respect to fundamental law or controlling principle may be assigned in a motion for a new trial though it was not otherwise called to the attention of the court.'

Defendant further argues that the trial court should have declared a mistrial if it thought the jury was confused, but when it determined that the error could be cured by further instructions, the trial court was bound by its choice. Defendant cites no authority for this proposition, and none has been found.

It is basic that a jury instruction may not be attacked successfully by lifting a single sentence or word from its context. Instead it must be construed as a whole and tested from the standpoint of its total impact on the jury. Zurko v. Gilquist, 241 Minn. 1, 62 N.W.2d 351 (1954); Froden v. Ranzenberger, 230 Minn. 366, 41 N.W.2d 807 (1950).

Errors are likely to be considered fundamental or controlling if they 'destroy the substantial correctness of the charge as a whole,' ⁵ cause a miscarriage of justice, ⁶ or result in substantial prejudice. ⁷

Where the instructions are misleading and conflicting on a material issue, a new trial should ordinarily be granted unless the error is cured by withdrawal of the defective instruction. 'But an erroneous statement of the law clearly applicable to the facts of the case is not cured by subsequent correct instructions which do not specifically correct the misstatement.' 19A Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 9796.

The crux of this issue is how many of the original instructions were permeated by the error of failing to instruct on the highest degree of care. Defendant views the error on the standard of care as limited to the single instruction on the ordinary-care standard (Instruction 101), which was cured by the trial court's withdrawal and corrective instructions. Plaintiffs submit that the fundamental error was not limited to the court's giving of Instruction 101 but involved repeated references to the ordinary-care standard in related instructions in the charge on common-law rules of the road and proximate cause. It was apparent to the trial court, as it is to this court, that the error was not limited to the giving of Instruction 101 but included repeated references to the ordinary-care standard. The corrective instructions failed to convey clearly to the jury the single standard of care applicable to a common carrier. This court has said:

'The granting of a motion for a new trial on the ground of erroneous instructions to the jury, unlike a denial thereof, rests largely in the sound discretion of the court, and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a clear abuse of that discretion.' Storey v. Weinberg, 226 Minn. 48, 51, 31 N.W.2d 912, 914 (1948).

There was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge and the order granting a new trial is affirmed.

2. Defendant purports to appeal also from the trial court's order excluding from the plaintiffs' hospital records entries relating to the manner in which the accident occurred. While the order is not subject to review by this court as a matter of right, in view of the fact that the trial court may again be called upon to rule as to the admissibility of these disputed entries, we will, pursuant to Rule 103.04, Rules...