Lingle v. State

• Decision Date: 23 December 2020
• Docket Number: 2019-1309,Nos. 2019-1247,s. 2019-1247
• Citation: 164 Ohio St.3d 340,172 N.E.3d 977
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court
• Parties: LINGLE et al., Appellants, v. The STATE of Ohio et al., Appellees.

164 Ohio St.3d 340

172 N.E.3d 977

LINGLE et al., Appellants,

v.The STATE of Ohio et al., Appellees.

Nos. 2019-1247

2019-1309

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted July 8, 2020

Decided December 23, 2020

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant Public Defender, for appellants.

Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, State Solicitor, and Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, for appellee state of Ohio.

Barbara E. Wright, Medina, in support of neither party for amici curiae, Ohio Rational Sexual Offense Laws and National Association for Rational Sexual Offense Laws.

Kennedy, J. {¶ 1} This is a discretionary appeal and certified conflict from the Tenth District Court of Appeals. It requires this court to determine what a sex offender whose offenses were committed in another state must prove pursuant to former R.C. 2950.09(F)(2) in order to successfully have the automatic sexual-predator classification under former R.C. 2950.09(A) removed.

{¶ 2} In this case, the trial court incorrectly determined that out-of-state offenders who are automatically required to register as sexual predators in Ohio pursuant to former R.C. 2950.09(A) must prove that they are not likely to commit another sexually oriented offense to successfully challenge the sexual-predator classification. We hold that the court of appeals was correct to reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings. However, we reject the court of appeals' holding that a sex offender who is subject to lifetime registration in another state must be permanently classified as a sexual predator in Ohio if the other state's lifetime registration requirements (such as the frequency of reporting) are substantially similar to Ohio's registration requirements for a person classified as a sexual predator.

{¶ 3} Based on the plain language of former R.C. 2950.09(F)(2) and the statutory scheme as a whole, we hold that an out-of-state offender challenging his or her automatic designation as a sexual predator under former R.C. 2950.09(A) must prove by clear and convincing evidence first, the reason for the imposition of the lifetime registration requirement in the other state and second, that the reason for the lifetime registration requirement is not substantially similar to a classification as a sexual predator under former R.C. Chapter 2950.

{¶ 4} We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the court of appeals, and we remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

Facts and procedural history

{¶ 5} Appellant Harmon Lingle pleaded guilty to committing a lewd and lascivious act in Florida and was classified as a sex offender. When he moved to Ohio in 2008 after serving his prison sentence, he was initially classified as a sex offender before being reclassified as a sexual predator based on his lifetime registration requirement in Florida.

{¶ 6} Appellant Mark Grosser pleaded no contest in Florida to solicitation of a minor over the Internet and transmitting material harmful to a juvenile; he was classified as a sex offender in Florida and sentenced to jail and probation. In 2008, his probation was transferred to Ohio, where he was classified as a Tier I sex offender before being reclassified as a sexual predator, also because of his lifetime registration requirement in Florida.

{¶ 7} In separate actions brought against the Ohio Attorney General and the Franklin County sheriff, Lingle and Grosser sought a declaratory judgment that they had been incorrectly classified as sexual predators and subjected to mandatory lifetime registration requirements. They argued that they should have been classified as sexually oriented offenders in 2008.

{¶ 8} Lingle also sought a declaration that because he had already registered for the ten-year period required for sexually oriented offenders, the Ohio Attorney General must remove him from Ohio's sex-offender database, while Grosser sought a declaration that his registration requirement would terminate in 2018. The trial court consolidated the actions.

{¶ 9} Lingle and Grosser moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court granted in part and denied in part. The trial court determined that former R.C. 2950.09(A), 2006 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 260, 151 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1915, 2000, is the version of Ohio's sex-offender-registration statute that applies in this case and found that under that statute, Lingle and Grosser were properly classified as sexual predators in Ohio based on their convictions in Florida. However, the trial court determined that under former R.C. 2950.09(F)(2), id. at 2012, Lingle and Grosser are entitled to an evidentiary hearing at which they would have the opportunity to prove that they had been convicted in Florida of offenses that are substantially similar to violations of Ohio laws that would result in classifications as sexually oriented offenders and therefore should have their sexual-predator classifications removed. At that hearing, the trial court explained, Lingle and Grosser would have the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that they are not likely to commit another sexually oriented offense.

{¶ 10} The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that former R.C. 2950.09(F)(2) does not require a hearing to determine whether an out-of-state sex offender automatically classified as a sexual predator is likely to reoffend and does not require the trial court to determine whether the sex offender would have been classified as a sexual predator if the conviction had occurred in Ohio. 2019-Ohio-2928, 140 N.E.3d 1031, ¶ 23-24, 28. Instead, the court interpreted former R.C. 2950.09(F)(2) as requiring the trial court to determine whether Lingle and Grosser "presented clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that the registration requirements for Florida sexual offenders are not substantially similar to Ohio's applicable sexual predator classification." Id. at ¶ 32. The appellate court remanded the case to the trial court to make that determination in the first instance.

{¶ 11} We accepted Lingle and Grosser's appeal on the following proposition of law:

A person with an out-of-state sex offense conviction cannot be required to register in Ohio as a "sexual predator" if they can show that their home-state registration requirement is not substantially similar to Ohio law because the person is not likely to reoffend, and therefore does not fit the statutory definition of "sexual predator" in R.C. 2950.01(E).

See 157 Ohio St.3d 1502, 2019-Ohio-4768, 134 N.E.3d 1226.

Conflict cases

{¶ 12} The Tenth District also certified that its judgment conflicted with judgments of the First and Fifth District Courts of Appeals, which held that if an out-of-state sex offender petitions a court pursuant to former R.C. 2950.09(F)(1) challenging his or her automatic classification as a sexual predator under former R.C. 2950.09(A), then the trial court must apply a two-step analysis. See State v. Pasqua , 157 Ohio App.3d 427, 2004-Ohio-2992, 811 N.E.2d 601 (1st Dist.) ; State v. Forsythe , 2013-Ohio-3301, 996 N.E.2d 996 (5th Dist.). Under that two-step analysis, the trial court must first determine whether the sexually oriented offense in the other state is substantially similar to a sexual-predator classification under Ohio law; if so, then the out-of-state offender is entitled to a hearing to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is not likely to commit another sexually oriented offense. Pasqua at ¶ 22 ; Forsythe at ¶ 20.

{¶ 13} We agreed that a conflict exists, consolidated the conflict case with the jurisdictional appeal, and ordered the parties to brief the following conflict question:

"Does R.C. 2950.09(F) provide out-of-state offenders challenging their R.C. 2950.09(A) automatic sexual predator classification with a right to an evidentiary hearing whereby the offender must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is not likely to commit a sexually-oriented offense in the future?"

157 Ohio St.3d 1501, 2019-Ohio-4768, 134 N.E.3d 1228, quoting the court of appeals' journal entry.

ANALYSIS

Statutory construction

{¶ 14} This case returns us to a familiar place: statutory construction. In construing a statute, we do not ask "what did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact." Slingluff v. Weaver , 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus. "When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need for this court to apply the rules of statutory interpretation." Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth , 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 553, 721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000).

{¶ 15} To determine the plain meaning of a statute, a court relies on the definitions provided by the legislative body. See Fox v. Std. Oil Co. of New Jersey , 294 U.S. 87, 96, 55 S.Ct. 333, 79 L.Ed. 780 (1935). When a term is not defined in the statute, we give the term its plain and ordinary meaning. Brecksville v. Cook , 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 56, 661 N.E.2d 706 (1996). And "[i]n ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole." K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. , 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988).

Former R.C. 2950.09 and out-of-state offenders

{¶ 16} Under Ohio's version of Megan's Law, if a person has committed a sexually oriented offense in another state and is required "as a result of [a] conviction" for that offense to register as a sex offender for life in the other state, "that conviction * * * automatically classifies the person as a sexual predator" in Ohio. Former R.C. 2950.09(A). Under former R.C. 2950.09(A), the automatic sexual-predator classification of certain sex offenders entering Ohio is based mainly on one factor—the length of the...