Lingle v. State
| Decision Date | 18 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 17AP-252,No. 17AP-251,17AP-251 |
| Citation | 2019 Ohio 2928,140 N.E.3d 1031 |
| Parties | Harmon LINGLE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE of Ohio, et al., Defendants-Appellant. Mark Grosser, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. State of Ohio, et al., Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
On brief: Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Katherine A. Szudy, for appellees.
On brief: [Dave Yost], Attorney General, and Zachary Huffman for appellant State of Ohio, Attorney General, [Dave Yost].
DECISION
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, the State of Ohio ("State"), through its Attorney General, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting, in part, the Civ.R. 12(C) motions for judgment on the pleadings of plaintiffs-appellees, Harmon Lingle and Mark Grosser (collectively "appellees"). The State presents the following, sole assignment of error for our review:
The Common Pleas Court erroneously granted Appellees' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings where it found that Appellees were "entitled to a hearing whereat they must prove by clear and convincing evidence that they are not likely to commit a sexually-oriented offense in the future." [ ] The applicable section of the Ohio Revised Code does not grant a Court jurisdiction to hold such a hearing, make such determination, or to alter a sexual predator's registration requirements if it is found that the offender is not likely to recidivate.
{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
{¶ 3} On February 26 and March 10, 2016, respectively, appellees filed separate complaints against the State and the Sheriff of Franklin County. Through their complaints, appellees sought declaratory judgments from the court regarding their rights, status, and other legal relations under former R.C. 2950.09 and State v. Williams , 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108. Appellees were both classified as sexual predators in this State after they moved to Ohio from Florida.
{¶ 4} Lingle was indicted on May 18, 1990 for committing a lewd and lascivious act, in violation of Fla.Stat. 800.04. Lingle pled guilty to the charge, and ultimately served a prison sentence after violating his probation. On Lingle's release from prison in 1998, Lingle began registering as a sexual offender in Florida. Lingle moved to Ohio in 2008, and was originally classified as a sexually-oriented offender. In January 2012, the Ohio Attorney General informed Lingle that his classification had been changed to that of sexual predator.
{¶ 5} Grosser was indicted on June 29, 2007 for two counts of solicitation of a child over the internet, in violation of Fla.Stat. 847.0135(3), and one count of transmission of material harmful to minors, in violation of Fla.Stat. 847.0138(2). Grosser pled no contest to the charges. The Florida court found Grosser guilty, sentenced him to six months in jail, and classified him as a sexual offender. Grosser moved to Ohio in 2008, and was originally classified as a Tier I offender. In February 2012, the Ohio Attorney General informed Grosser that his classification had been changed to sexual predator.
{¶ 6} As their respective crimes both occurred before the January 1, 2008 effective date of 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, appellees alleged that they were bound to comply with the provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950 which were in place before that date. Appellees asserted that, under R.C. 2950.09(F), they could petition the court to request removal of their Ohio sexual predator classification. Appellees admitted that their Florida convictions were substantially equivalent to offenses listed in former R.C. 2950.01(D)(1)(a), (b), (c), or (d). See Lingle Compl. at ¶ 23; Grosser Compl. at ¶ 26. Appellees alleged that their Florida convictions did not obligate them to register for life in Florida.
{¶ 7} Appellees attached Fla.Stat. 775.21, identifying the registration requirements for Florida sexual predators, and Fla.Stat. 943.0435, identifying the registration requirements for Florida sexual offenders, to their complaints. Appellees noted that, while both statutes appeared to obligate those subject to the statutes to register for life, sexual offenders, unlike sexual predators, could petition the court to request removal "from the registry in accordance with the statute's mandates." (Grosser Compl. at ¶ 30; Lingle Compl. at ¶ 27.)
{¶ 8} Appellees sought an order from the court declaring that the State and the Sheriff had incorrectly classified them as sexual predators, and further declaring that they should have been classified as sexually-oriented offenders. Alternatively, appellees both sought orders declaring that they were entitled to a hearing to present evidence demonstrating that, under Ohio law, they would have been adjudicated sexually-oriented offenders, not sexual predators.
{¶ 9} On June 1 and June 22, 2016, respectively, appellees filed separate Civ.R. 12(C) motions for judgment on the pleadings. The State and the Sheriff filed memoranda contra the appellees' motions. On October 26, 2016, the trial court issued an agreed order consolidating the cases.
{¶ 10} On February 10, 2017, the trial court issued a decision and entry granting appellees' motions for judgment on the pleadings in part. The trial court observed that the version of R.C. 2950.09 that was in place immediately before 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10's enactment was the appropriate version of the statute to apply to the action. The trial court noted that, under former R.C. 2950.09(F), the court could remove an out-of-state offender's automatic Ohio sexual predator classification if the offender demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that the requirement of the other jurisdiction that the offender register for life was not substantially similar to a classification as a sexual predator in Ohio. The trial court concluded that, although Florida "sexual offenders have the statutory ability to request removal of the registration requirement," because appellees had not sought, nor received, removal from the Florida registry, they remained "lifetime sex offender registrants in their convicting jurisdictions." (Feb. 10, 2017 Decision at 10.) As such, the court held that the State properly classified appellees as sexual predators under former R.C. 2950.09(A).
{¶ 11} The trial court further concluded that appellees were entitled to an evidentiary hearing under former R.C. 2950.09(F)(2). The court noted that the State had not challenged the appellees' assertions that their respective Florida convictions were substantially equivalent to one of the offenses set forth in former R.C. 2950.01(D)(1)(a), (b), (c), or (d). Relying on State v. Pasqua , 157 Ohio App.3d 427, 2004-Ohio-2992, 811 N.E.2d 601 (1st Dist.), the court declared that appellees were "each entitled to a hearing whereat they must prove by clear and convincing evidence that they are not likely to commit a sexually-oriented offense in the future." (Feb. 10, 2017 Decision at 12.)
{¶ 12} The State in its sole assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred in granting appellees' motions and holding that appellees were entitled to an evidentiary hearing to demonstrate that they are unlikely to recidivate. The State contends that the plain language of former R.C. 2950.09(F)(2) does not provide out-of-state offenders with a right to such a hearing, and that accordingly the trial court's reliance on Pasqua was misplaced.
{¶ 13} Civ.R. 12(C) provides that, "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, courts are restricted to the allegations in the pleadings as well as any material incorporated by reference or attached as exhibits to the pleadings. Curtis v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. , 10th Dist. No. 04AP-1214, 2006-Ohio-15, 2006 WL 23248, ¶ 24. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is to be granted when, after viewing the allegations and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Easter v. Complete Gen. Constr. Co. , 10th Dist. No. 06AP-763, 2007-Ohio-1297, 2007 WL 853337, ¶ 9. Motions for judgment on the pleadings are "specifically intended for resolving questions of law." Id. Appellate review of motions for judgment on the pleadings is de novo. Id.
{¶ 14} Declaratory relief is available to a plaintiff who can show that (1) a real controversy exists between the parties, (2) the controversy is justiciable, and (3) speedy relief is necessary to preserve the rights of the parties. Moore v. Middletown , 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 49. In order to be justiciable, a controversy must be ripe for review. Keller v. Columbus , 100 Ohio St.3d 192, 2003-Ohio-5599, 797 N.E.2d 964, ¶ 26.
{¶ 15} Ohio's laws governing the registration and classification of sex offenders have evolved substantially over the years. State v. Bodyke , 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 3. In 1963, the General Assembly created the designation of "habitual sexual offender" for individuals convicted of two or more specified crimes. State v. Hartley , 10th Dist., 2016-Ohio-2854, 64 N.E.3d 472, ¶ 9. In 1996, through Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, the General Assembly enacted Ohio's version of the federal Megan's Law legislation, which created "Ohio's first comprehensive registration and classification system for sex offenders." Bodyke at ¶ 7. Under Megan's law, a court was required to determine whether a sex offender could be classified according to one of three classifications: sexually-oriented offender, habitual sex offender, or sexual predator.
State v. Cook , 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 407, 700 N.E.2d 570 (1998). Among other obligations, a sexual predator was required to register his or her address for life, while a sexually-oriented offender was only...
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