Lippert v. Jung
Decision Date | 12 October 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 16,16 |
Citation | 783 A.2d 206,366 Md. 221 |
Parties | Frederick W. LIPPERT et ux., v. Barry S. JUNG. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Bruce A. Kent (Richard I. Martel, Jr., and Francis A. Pommett, III, on brief), Baltimore, for appellants.
William R. Levasseur, Jr. (Martin & Levasseur, on brief), Towson, for appellee.
Argued before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ.
In this very interesting case involving title to real property, Frederick and Ruth Lippert, appellants, claim title to the land in question by virtue of adverse possession allegedly extending for the statutory period. The unique aspect of this case is that almost nineteen years of the statutory period occurred prior to a tax sale of the premises at issue and a final order foreclosing the right of redemption, and the remaining portion of the statutory period occurred after the foreclosure of the right of redemption. It is the appellants' position that the adverse possession of property continues and survives successive owners, even when the last owner achieved his title through a tax sale and has properly foreclosed the equity of redemption.
Barry S. Jung, appellee, the successor in interest to the purchasers at the tax sale, contends that the statutory period begins to run anew in respect to property that has been purchased at a tax sale where the equity of redemption has been properly foreclosed.
In the mid-1970s, the Lipperts purchased a lot1 in a subdivision in Baltimore County, Maryland. They mistakenly believed that the parcel they were buying also included two other, apparently abutting, lots. In addition to using the lot to which they had title, they also began to use the other two lots. The other two lots were eventually sold at a tax sale on May 16, 1991. On February 12, 1992, a proper judgment foreclosing all rights of redemption was entered.
The Lipperts apparently were not aware of the pendency of the tax sale, or of the proceedings to foreclose the equity of redemption. On May 13, 1998, slightly over six years after the judgment in the foreclosure proceeding was entered, appellee notified the appellants to remove various improvements from the property at issue here.
In response, and almost seven years after the redemption rights were foreclosed, appellants filed an action to quiet title to the property based upon adverse possession, claiming that the tax sale proceedings did not interrupt the running of the statutory period in which adverse possession can ripen into title. They claim that the statutory period ripened on July 11, 1993, eighteen months after the judgment was entered foreclosing the right of redemption relating to the tax sale.
At a hearing on a Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court found that the tax sale and foreclosure proceedings terminated the adverse possession period relying on the law of foreign jurisdictions. The appellee asserted below that:
"[APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: ... Maryland is silent and it is surprisingly silent that this is an issue that has never presented itself especially in light of the age and the statute as far as adverse possession...."
The appellants, addressing the trial court's stated position based on the trial court's review of foreign law, stated to the trial court:
Later, appellants' counsel states to the trial court:
2
The trial court then rendered summary judgment in favor of the appellees. Appellants appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. On our own action, by writ, we brought the proceedings before us for our review.
We note that appellants have framed the issue into a simple legal question:
Whether the 20 year time requirement under the doctrine of adverse possession is tolled by a tax sale of the real property?
In reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, we are most often concerned with whether a dispute of material fact exists. Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc., 335 Md. 135, 144, 642 A.2d 219, 224 (1994); Gross v. Sussex Inc., 332 Md. 247, 255, 630 A.2d 1156, 1160 (1993); Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737, 625 A.2d 1005, 1010 (1993); Arnold Developer, Inc. v. Collins, 318 Md. 259, 262, 567 A.2d 949, 951 (1990); Bachmann v. Glazer & Glazer, Inc., 316 Md. 405, 408, 559 A.2d 365, 366 (1989); King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 110-11, 492 A.2d 608, 614-15 (1985) (citations omitted). "A material fact is a fact the resolution of which will somehow affect the outcome of the case." King, 303 Md. at 111, 492 A.2d at 614 (citing Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 273 Md. 1, 8, 327 A.2d 502, 509 (1974)). "[A] dispute as to facts relating to grounds upon which the decision is not rested is not a dispute with respect to a material fact and such dispute does not prevent the entry of summary judgment." Salisbury Beauty Schs. v. State Bd. of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 40, 300 A.2d 367, 374 (1973).
630 A.2d at 1160; Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 320 Md. 584, 592, 578 A.2d 1202, 1206 (1990) (citations omitted). Thus, when there is no dispute of material fact, as in this case, our review is limited to whether the trial court was legally correct. With these considerations in mind, we turn to the case sub judice.
As we have indicated, for the purposes of appeal there are no material facts in dispute. The dispute is purely legal in nature—was the trial court legally correct in finding that the tax sale and foreclosure proceedings terminated the adverse possession period?
Appellants argue that the trial judge ascribed to the majority view, but that Maryland follows, or should follow, the minority view. Appellants' position, the minority view in other jurisdictions, is that a purchaser at a properly conducted tax sale acquires only the interest of the defaulting taxpayer/property owner, and that the interest acquired through the tax sale is thus subject to any inchoate interests then being perfected, such as the inchoate interests of an adverse possessor. Appellee, not surprisingly, argues that the trial court was correct.
Appellants argue that there is no Maryland case law on point. Appellee does not argue to the contrary. Both are, for the most part, wrong. It is true that there is no adverse possession case in respect to the title passed by Maryland's tax sale procedure. There is, however, a body of Maryland law, none of which was cited by either party, in which this Court, and most recently the Court of Special Appeals relying on our previous line of cases, has defined the scope of the title interests acquired through a proper tax sale and foreclosure of right of redemption proceedings. This line of cases supports the decision of the trial judge, albeit he also did not rely on those cases.
The Court of Special Appeals, citing to our cases, which we will discuss, infra, in Bell v. Myers, 28 Md.App. 339, 343, 345 A.2d 105, 108 (1975), in reversing the trial court, stated:
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