Little v. State
| Decision Date | 25 January 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 65542,65542 |
| Citation | 165 Ga.App. 389,300 S.E.2d 540 |
| Parties | LITTLE v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Milton F. Gardner, Jr., Milledgeville, for appellant.
Alberto C. Martinez, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Joseph H. Briley, Dist. Atty., Gray, for appellee.
Appellant was indicted separately on two charges of selling marijuana in violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. The matters were consolidated for trial, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on one charge but not guilty on the other. Appellant received a sentence of seven years imprisonment to be followed by three years probation.
The evidence adduced at trial was essentially uncontroverted. On January 22, 1982, Foster, a narcotics agent with the GBI, accompanied by a confidential informant, approached appellant and inquired about the prospect of purchasing some marijuana. Appellant indicated that he could procure marijuana for Foster and later that day did produce 3.8 ounces of the substance. Foster paid appellant $85 for the contraband and delivered it to the State Crime Laboratory in Macon, Georgia, where test results proved positive for marijuana.
The evidence regarding the second charged violation on February 6, 1982, followed the same pattern. Foster approached appellant seeking to purchase marijuana, and appellant procured a substance alleged to have been marijuana for which Foster paid appellant another $85. Again, Foster delivered the substance to the State Crime Laboratory, but evidence of the test results was not admitted at trial because appellant had not been provided a copy of the scientific report before trial.
On appeal, appellant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the indictments for trial, (3) the trial court erred in allowing Foster to testify that numerous persons and authorities had told him that appellant was a drug dealer, and (4) the trial court erred in disallowing cross examination of the prosecution witness concerning the identity of the confidential informant who had witnessed the transaction. Held:
1. Appellant's assertion that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction is without merit. Review of the evidence clearly shows that a rational trier of fact could have reasonably found from the evidence adduced at trial that appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Black v. State, 154 Ga.App. 441, 268 S.E.2d 724 (1980). Indeed, given the uncontroverted nature of the evidence, it appears that the finding of guilt was not merely reasonable but virtually demanded.
2. Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance, relying upon Bradford v. State, 126 Ga.App. 688, 191 S.E.2d 545 (1972), for the proposition that consolidation of separate indictments is impermissible unless the defendant has consented to such. However, the Supreme Court has recently held as follows: Jackson v. State, 249 Ga. 751, 758, 295 S.E.2d 53 (1982). This court has also ruled, subsequent to the 1972 Bradford decision, that the decision to grant a severance lies within the discretion of the trial court even where the offenses are separately indicted. See Green v. State, 159 Ga.App. 28, 283 S.E.2d 19 (1981); Schamber v. State, 152 Ga.App. 196, 262 S.E.2d 533 (1979).
Continuing sales of the same type of contraband, as in the case before us, constitute a single scheme or plan and may thus be joined in a single prosecution. Whisenhunt v. State, 156 Ga.App. 583, 275 S.E.2d 82 (1980). Indeed, for this same reason evidence of other such offenses would be admissible for the purpose of showing identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind, and course of conduct, even if each of them was tried separately. State v. Johnson, 246 Ga. 654, 272 S.E.2d 321 (1980). The trial court certainly did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for severance in this case.
3. At trial, the court allowed Foster to testify, over appellant's objection, that he had begun his investigation of appellant because "local authorities ... Mr. Whidby, Sheriff Resseau, and the GBI personnel" had told him that appellant was a suspected drug dealer. Appellant asserts that such testimony was inadmissible hearsay and so prejudicial as to require new trial. We agree that the testimony was inadmissible but find that its admission was not reversible error in this case.
OCGA § 24-3-2 (Code Ann. § 38-302) provides that "when, in a...
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Byrd v. State
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Osborne v. State, A89A1300
...(see generally OCGA § 24-9-20(b)) would be undermined to such an extent as to render it virtually meaningless. See Little v. State, 165 Ga.App. 389(3), 300 S.E.2d 540 (1983). In the context of the other evidence in this case, however, we do not believe the admission of the testimony in ques......
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