Little v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 380

• Decision Date: 06 April 1960
• Docket Number: No. 380,380
• Citation: 252 N.C. 229,113 S.E.2d 689
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: June Carter LITTLE, Administrator cum testamento annexo of the Estate of Zeb Grubb Little and individually, Plaintiff, v. WACHOVIA BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Executor and trustee under the Will of Zeb V. Grubb, Alma Lee Grubb, W. B. Hunt, Administrator of the Estate of Robert Lay Grubb, Lillian Hunt Grubb, Robert Lay Grubb, Jr., Rochelle T. Grubb, Mary Lougenia Grubb, W. B. Hunt, Guardlan of Mary Grubb, Edna Grubb Little, Beulah Grubb Fitzgerald, R. C. Fitzgerald, Eula (Eulah) Grubb Beck, R. T. Beck, Zetta Grubb Walser, H. O. Walser, Theo Grubb, Miriam S. Grubb, and Jeane H. Little, Defendants.

Page 689

113 S.E.2d 689

252 N.C. 229

June Carter LITTLE, Administrator cum testamento annexo of the Estate of Zeb Grubb Little and individually, Plaintiff, v. WACHOVIA BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Executor and trustee under the Will of Zeb V. Grubb, Alma Lee Grubb, W. B. Hunt Administrator of the Estate of Robert Lay Grubb, Lillian Hunt Grubb, Robert Lay Grubb, Jr., Rochelle T. Grubb, Mary Lougenia Grubb, W. B. Hunt, Guardlan of Mary Grubb, Edna Grubb Little, Beulah Grubb Fitzgerald, R. C. Fitzgerald Eula (Eulah) Grubb Beck, R. T. Beck, Zetta Grubb Walser, H O. Walser, Theo Grubb, Miriam S. Grubb, and Jeane H. Little Defendants.

No. 380

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 6, 1960.

Charles W. Mauze, Lexington, and Womble Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, Winston-Salem, for defendant Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., executor and trustee, appellant.

Stoner & Wilson and DeLapp & Ward, Lexington, for defendants Beulah Grubb Fitzgerald, Eula (Eulah) Grubb Beck, R. T. Beck, Zetta Grubb Walser, H. O. Walser, Theo Grubb and Miriam S. Grubb, appellants.

Walser & Brinkley and Gaither S. Walser, Lexington, for defendants W. B. Hunt, adm'r of estate of Robert Lay Grubb, Lillian Hunt Grubb, Robert Lay Grubb, Jr., Rochelle T. Grubb, Mary Lougenia Grubb, W. B. Hunt, guardian of Mary Lougenia Grubb, appellants.

Vaughn, Hudson, Ferrell & Carter, Winston-Salem, for plaintiff-appellee.

Frank P. Holton, Jr., Lexington, for defendant Alma Lee Grubb, appellee.

MOORE, Justice.

All the diverse interests agree that there are at least two presently subsisting controversies affecting the trust estate of Zeb Vance Grubb which should be resolved for the guidance of the trustee in administering the trust: (1) the correct disposition of the four per cent income share willed to Zeb Grubb Little which has accrued since his death and will continue during the existence of the trust, and (2) the proper disposal of the sum of $20,803.28 which was retained from the twenty per cent income share of Robert Grubb as the net value of the bequest in Article VI of the will of Zeb Vance Grubb. The other controversies involving construction of provisions of the will are, according to the contention of Wachovia Bank and Trust Company, trustee, remote, premature and unnecessary for the present management of the trust and the court lacks jurisdiction to determine them at this time.

This action was instituted pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments Act, G.S. § 1-253 et seq. The complaint makes no specific reference to the Act, but there is no statutory requirement that such reference be made. 'It is the facts alleged that determine the nature of the relief to be granted.' Bolich v. Prudential Insurance Company, 206 N.C. 144, 150, 173 S.E. 320, 323; Wright v. McGee, 206 N.C. 52, 55, 173 S.E. 31.

Plaintiff is sole devisee and legatee of Zeb Grubb Little. And Zeb Grubb Little is a named beneficiary in the testamentary trust of Zeb Vance Grubb's estate. Plaintiff claims property rights and interests in the trust estate. 'Any person interested under a * * * will * * * may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument * * * and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.' G.S. § 1-254. 'Any person interested as or through (a) * * * devisee, legatee * * * in the administration of a trust, or of the estate of a decedent * * * may have a declaration of rights or legal relations in respect thereto * * * to determine any question arising in the administration of the estate or trust, including questions of construction of wills and other writings.' G.S. § 1-255.

The courts have no jurisdiction to determine matters purely speculative, enter anticipatory judgments, declare social status, deal with theoretical problems, give advisory opinions, answer moot questions, adjudicate academic matters, provide for contingencies which may hereafter arise, or give abstract opinions. Finch v. Honeycutt, 246 N.C. 91, 101, 97 S.E.2d 478;

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Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Schneider, 235 N.C. 446, 454, 70 S.E.2d 578; Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Iseley, 203 N.C. 811, 819, 167 S.E. 56; Reid v. Alexander, 170 N.C. 303, 304, 87 S.E. 125. 'The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act does not license litigants to fish in judicial ponds for legal advice.' Lide v. Mears, 231 N.C. 111, 117, 56 S.E.2d 404, 409. An order directing distribution of corpus in the event of the death of the contingent beneficiary prior to the time fixed by the will must be vacated. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Schneider, supra. But 'this act is remedial; its purpose is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations, and is to be liberally construed and administered.' Walker v. Phelps, 202 N.C. 344, 349, 162 S.E. 727, 729. 'Where, * * * it appears from the allegations of the complaint in an action instituted under the authority and pursuant to the provisions of the act, (1) that a real controversy exists between or among the parties to the action; (2) that such controversy arises out of opposing contentions of the parties, made in good faith, as to the validity or construction of a * * * will * * * ; and (3) that the parties to the action have or may have legal rights, or are or may be under legal liabilities which are involved in the controversy, * * * the court has jurisdiction, and on the facts admitted in the pleadings or established at the trial may render judgment, declaring the rights and liabilities of the respective parties, as between or among themselves, and affording the relief to which the parties are entitled under the judgment.' Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Iseley, supra, 203 N.C. at page 820, 167 S.E. at page 61. It has been held by this Court that the question as to whether or not adopted children are contingent remaindermen under the provisions of a testamentary trust is justiciable even though the contingency has not happened and the children may not be living at the time the contingency arises. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 238 N.C. 339, 344, 78 S.E.2d 174, 178. There it is said: 'It is purely a question of law, now determinable, and nothing except the death of all three of the adopted children * * * prior to the death of the last survivor of the niece and nephew of the testator can obviate the necessity for its determination. This contingency, in our opinion, does not justify the postponement of a decision thereon. * * * The adoptive parents are entitled to know whether or not these children will share * * *. Doubtless, plans for the future of the children will be governed somewhat by the answer to this question.' The court has jurisdiction if the judgment will prevent future litigation. Bradford v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 572, 577, 75 S.E.2d 632. The validity of the assignment of an interest by a legatee may be adjudicated. First Security Trust Co. v. Henderson, 226 N.C. 649, 39 S.E.2d 804. The Act enables courts to take cognizance of disputes at an earlier stage than that permitted by ordinary legal procedure, if the controversy is real and actually exists between parties having adverse interests. Lide v. Mears, supra, 231 N.C. at page 118, 56 S.E.2d at page 409.

Plaintiff contends, as the sole devisee and legatee of Zeb Grubb Little, he has a vested estate and interest in fee in a substantial portion of the corpus of the trusts created by the will of Zeb Vance Grubb and has certain rights with respect to the trust income. He asks that his rights be declared. His contentions are strongly controverted. It is our opinion that plaintiff is entitled to have his rights and interests determined, though his enjoyment thereof, if any he has, must of necessity be postponed. It is a controversy which must in any event be determined at this or a future date. Plaintiff asserts that his rights are not contingent but vested, he is the ascertained owner thereof, and his ownership is indefeasible. He insists further that, as administrator, c. t. a., of the Zeb Grubb Little estate, he is entitled to know with certainty of what that estate consists in order to make correct accounting and proper tax returns. He also contends that as a business man it

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is important that he know with reasonable accuracy the extent of his property in making financial statements and establishing credit rating, and, further, that without this information he cannot plan the proper disposition of his property during his lifetime or by will.

In any event, it is necessary to construe the pertinent provisions of the will in order to determine the matters which all agree are presently in controversy. While the cause is here, we have jurisdiction and ought to determine those matters in controversy which of necessity must be ultimately determined in any event, whether the declaration of rights is needful to the trustee presently or not. This course will prevent litigation and save the expense of a multiplicity of suits. Of course, we do not undertake and have no jurisdiction to resolve all possible contingencies and we do not anticipate the happening of events which in the course of administering the trust may never transpire.

It must be conceded, in the light of occurrences since the death of the testator, that the trust provisions of the will of Zeb Vance Grubb contain ambiguities and apparent contradictions. Questions for judicial construction are presented. In such circumstance, the fundamental object in construing the will is to discover and effectuate testator's intention. This intention must be arrived at by an examination of the will, from its four corners, when read in the light of all surrounding facts and circumstances known to the testator. Entwistle v. Covington, 250 N.C. 315, 318, 108 S.E.2d 603; Van Winkle v. Catholic Missionary Union, 192 N.C. 131, 134, 133 S.E. 431.

From the uncontroverted findings of fact and the will itself we reach the following conclusions which bear...