Littleton v. State

• Decision Date: 09 March 1921
• Docket Number: (No. 6210.)
• Citation: 228 S.W. 946
• Parties: LITTLETON v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

228 S.W. 946

LITTLETON v. STATE.

(No. 6210.)

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 9, 1921.

Appeal from District Court, Eastland County; Geo. L. Davenport, Judge.

Habeas corpus for bail on behalf of John Littleton against the State of Texas. From an order refusing bail, relator appeals. Judgment affirmed.

J. R. Stubblefield and D. G. Hunt, both of Eastland, for appellant.

R. H. Hamilton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

MORROW, P. J.

Relator is indicted for murder and appeals from an order of the district judge refusing bail.

On the night of January 26th the relator shot and killed his father-in-law, Cal Yancey. Some 15 days prior to the homicide, relator and his wife separated, and she was at the home of her parents. Inferentially it appears that at least, in part, the mission of the relator at the home of the deceased was to deliver to his wife some money due her in the division of their property. Upon his entry, he was invited to a seat by the deceased, but declined and went with his wife into an adjoining room, and there engaged with her in a conversation for some 30 minutes, at the termination of which he appeared at the door which separated the two rooms, ordered the deceased, who was sitting with his back to the door, to throw up his hands. The deceased complied, started to rise from the chair, and wheeled in the direction of the relator, and received a shot in the top of his head on the left side near the front. Immediately before the shooting he was engaged in a game played on a checkerboard with one Webb, and was sitting at a point in the living room at a distance from the door connecting that room with the kitchen, which distance is in controversy; some of the witnesses placing him at about 2 feet and others at about 10 feet from the door. The deceased fell in the kitchen. Two other shots were fired by the relator, one immediately after the first and the other after a short interval, during which the relator backed some distance into the kitchen. During the interview with his wife, the deceased walked through the kitchen and back to the living room, leaving the door between the two rooms ajar. His reason for going is not definitely disclosed, though no conversation appears to have taken place. Some days before the homicide, relator in a conversation with his wife, was overheard to say:

"I am coming back and bring you that money when I get it; I am coming back one more time, and when I leave, I will leave satisfied."

During the conversation on the occasion of the homicide, Webb overheard some remarks which in substance, related to a discussion about dividing the property, in which relator was asked by his wife if the division was satisfactory, upon which he remarked that it was, and added, "I will be satisfied before I leave here."

Relator's wife had been twice married. Prior to the first marriage he was a suitor, and his suit was disfavored by the deceased on account of the age of his daughter. Subsequent to the death of her first husband, her marriage with the relator seems to have taken place without objection. Immediately before the shot was fired, she exclaimed; "Look out, papa!" After the shooting, relator backed out of the house, holding the pistol presented, ran away, and subsequently voluntarily surrendered to the officers.

We have made a substantial but not a detailed statement of the evidence. Upon the rules of law touching the right to bail, there is but little room for controversy. We recently stated them in Ex parte Townsley, 220 S. W. 1092, as follows:

"`All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof is evident.' Const. art. 1, § 11. The relator is held on a charge of capital offense. The burden was upon the state to show that the proof was evident. Firmin v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. R. 370, 131 S. W. 1113; Newman v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 164, 41 S. W. 628, 70 Am. St. Rep. 740."

"The rule of law controlling has been stated in varying language, but there is a substantial agreement that `if the evidence is clear and strong, leading a well-guarded and dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed, the accused is a guilty agent, and that he would probably be punished capitally if the law is administered, bail is not a matter of right.' Ex parte Smith, 23 Tex. App. 100, 5 S. W. 101. Unless the evidence is of such character, bail is a matter of right. Russell v. State, 71 Tex. Cr. R. 377, 160 S. W. 76; Ex parte Stephenson, 71 Tex. Cr. R. 380, 160 S. W. 77."...