Livesay v. Baltimore
Decision Date | 19 November 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 7,7 |
Citation | 862 A.2d 33,384 Md. 1 |
Parties | Joseph Kevin LIVESAY v. BALTIMORE COUNTY, Maryland, et al. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Howard J. Schulman, Joseph S. Kaufman (Schulman & Kaufman, LLC, on brief), Baltimore, for appellant.
Thomas H. Bostwick, Asst. Cty. Atty. (Edward J. Gilliss, Cty. Atty., on brief), for appellees.
Argued before BELL, C.J. RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ.
This case is a lawsuit filed pursuant to the Local Government Tort Claims Act, Md.Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol., 2004 Cum.Supp.), § 5-301 et seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.1 The complaint alleges negligence against Baltimore County, Baltimore County Detention Center Warden Dorothy Williams, Classification Supervisor George Jackson, Corrections Officer Ricky Fore, and nurse Kenya Thomas of Prison Health Services, Inc., in connection with appellant Joseph Kevin Livesay's attempted suicide while he was an inmate at the detention center.2 The Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted summary judgment in favor of Fore and Baltimore County on the grounds of public official immunity and Governmental Immunity, and in favor of Jackson on the grounds that there were no material facts in dispute and he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.3 Appellant noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals and this Court granted certiorari on its own initiative. We consider the following questions: (1) Whether the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA) eliminates the immunity defenses asserted by the County employees; (2) whether Md.Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol., 2004 Cum.Supp.), § 5-507(b)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article applies to county as well as municipal employees; (3) whether a Corrections Officer is a "public official" entitled to statutory and common law qualified immunity; and (4) whether Officer Fore was acting in a discretionary capacity when he discovered appellant. We shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court and hold that Fore and the County were entitled to immunity and that summary judgment was proper as to Jackson.
Appellant was arrested on June 30, 1999, after a traffic stop, and charged with fleeing and eluding a police officer, driving while revoked and suspended, and related traffic offenses. The District Court set bail at $10,000 and appellant was committed and transported to the Detention Center. He received a health evaluation, conducted by Kenya Thomas, a Prison Health Services, Inc., nurse. On the checklist completed during this evaluation, Thomas indicated that Livesay's general appearance and affect were normal, that he had no history of suicide attempt, no current suicidal ideation, and no history or evidence of self-mutilation.4 Thomas also indicated that Livesay could be assigned to the general population. The next day, a classification counselor at the Detention Center found no medical or mental health issues and specifically, no suicide risk.5 Livesay was assigned a "mid-level" classification.
At approximately 6:50 P.M. on July 5, 1999, an inmate alerted appellee Corrections Officer Ricky Fore that there was an unconscious man in cell twenty. According to Fore's deposition, he immediately ran up a flight of stairs to discover Livesay sitting slumped on the floor of his cell, a bed sheet tied between his neck and the bunk bed. Fore did not render direct assistance to Livesay, but instead radioed a "Code Two" medical alert to summon the facility's Emergency Response Team ("ERT"). Inmates had gathered outside Livesay's cell, and Fore next cleared the area by ordering them to "lock in" to their own cells. Fore did not believe himself to be in any physical danger, but described himself as "just in shock." The ERT arrived approximately five minutes after Fore issued the Code Two. The ERT personnel rendered emergency medical aid until paramedics arrived; appellant was then transported to Greater Baltimore Medical Center and eventually to Shock Trauma for further treatment. Appellant suffered oxygen deprivation, which caused some brain damage.6
Section 11.3(H) of the Baltimore County Bureau of Corrections Operations Manual ("Operations Manual") states as follows:
According to an internal affairs investigation report, appellee Fore had attended a Bureau of Corrections presentation entitled Suicide Discovery and Response on September 23, 1998, and received a passing score on the examination. Sgt. John Ripley, the Bureau's Training Coordinator, told the internal affairs investigator that Corrections Officers are taught to respond in the following manner to inmate suicide attempts:
Sgt. Ripley stated to the investigation that he does not deviate from his lesson plan (the "Lesson Plan"), which reads as follows:
Eugene M. Nuth, a former Warden of several Maryland county and state facilities, executed an affidavit (the "Nuth Affidavit") stating as follows:
As we have indicated, the Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Fore, Jackson, and the County. The court held that Fore enjoyed statutory immunity under § 5-507(b)(1) and that Fore was a public official, engaged in discretionary actions within the scope of his official duties, and had acted without malice. The court further found that, because Livesay had not offered any evidence of Jackson's negligence, there were no disputed material facts with respect to the negligence claim against Jackson, and that Jackson was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It held that, under the LGTCA, the County could be held liable only to the extent that its employees were liable. Because Livesay was not entitled to relief against Fore and Jackson, the court held that the County was entitled to summary judgment.
Before this Court, Livesay contends that the LGTCA eliminates any immunity that appellees might assert. He also contends that county officials, as opposed to municipal officials, are not entitled to statutory public official immunity. He further contends that Fore was not a public official, and that, even if Fore were a public official, he was not acting in a discretionary capacity.
As indicated previously, this matter was resolved in the Circuit Court on summary judgment. Whether summary judgment was granted properly is a question of law. The standard of review is de novo, and whether the trial court was legally correct. See Walk v. Hartford Casualty, 382 Md. 1, 14, 852 A.2d 98, 105 (2004)
.
Maryland Rule 2-501(e) states that a trial court "shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In reviewing a grant of summary judgment under Rule 2-501(e), we independently review the record to determine whether the parties properly generated a dispute of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jurgensen v. New Phoenix, 380 Md. 106, 114, 843 A.2d 865, 869 (2004). We review the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and construe any reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the facts against the movant. Id. In addition, it is well established in Maryland that an appellate court ordinarily will consider only the grounds relied upon by the trial court in granting summary judgment. See, e.g., Lovelace v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 695, 785 A.2d 726, 729 (2001)
; PaineWebber v. East, 363 Md. 408, 422, 768 A.2d 1029, 1036 (2001).
To survive a motion for summary judgment, there must exist...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Savage v. State
...and perceived integrity of the judicial process." Conover v. Conover , 450 Md. 51, 64, 146 A.3d 433 (2016) (quoting Livesay v. Balt. Cty. , 384 Md. 1, 14, 862 A.2d 33 (2004) ). We have acknowledged, however, that stare decisis "is not an inexorable command." Id. at 65, 146 A.3d 433 (quoting......
-
Bailey v. City of Annapolis
...of their own judgment and conscience and uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. Id. (quoting Livesay v. Baltimore Cnty. , 384 Md. 1, 16, 862 A.2d 33 (2004) ). We do not look to see if there was just any discretion, "but whether the act involves an exercise of the officer's pe......
-
Balt. Action Legal Team v. Office of the State's Attorney of Balt. City
...a dispute of material fact, and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Livesay v. Balt. Cnty. , 384 Md. 1, 10, 862 A.2d 33 (2004) ; Gurbani , 237 Md. App. at 289, 185 A.3d 760 (citing La Belle Epoque, LLC v. Old Europe Antique Manor, LLC , 406 Md. 194......
-
Lawrence v. State
...principles, public reliance on our judicial decisions, and the perceived integrity of the courts." Id. (citing Livesay v. Baltimore Cty. , 384 Md. 1, 14, 862 A.2d 33 (2004) ). We have recognized two "extremely narrow" situations where it "would be appropriate to overrule our own precedent."......