Lloyd v. District Court of Scott County

• Decision Date: 18 October 1972
• Docket Number: Nos. 55546--55548,s. 55546--55548
• Citation: 201 N.W.2d 720
• Parties: Willie Earl LLOYD, Sr., Appellant, v. DISTRICT COURT OF SCOTT COUNTY, Iowa, Hon. M. L. Sutton, Presiding Judge, Appellee. Wornice LLOYD, Appellant, v. DISTRICT COURT OF SCOTT COUNTY, Iowa, Hon. M. L. Sutton, Presiding Judge, Appellee. Willie ELLIS, Appellant, v. DISTRICT COURT OF SCOTT COUNTY, Iowa, Hom. M. L. Sutton, Presiding Judge, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 720

201 N.W.2d 720

Willie Earl LLOYD, Sr., Appellant, v. DISTRICT COURT OF SCOTT COUNTY, Iowa, Hon. M. L. Sutton, Presiding Judge, Appellee.

Wornice LLOYD, Appellant, v. DISTRICT COURT OF SCOTT COUNTY, Iowa, Hon. M. L. Sutton, Presiding Judge, Appellee.

Willie ELLIS, Appellant, v. DISTRICT COURT OF SCOTT COUNTY, Iowa, Hom. M. L. Sutton, Presiding Judge, Appellee.

Nos. 55546--55548.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 18, 1972.

Thomas L. Wine, Davenport, for Willie Earl Lioyd, Sr., appellant.

Morton A. Teitle, Davenport, for Wornice Lioyd, appellant.

Donald Doyle, Davenport, for Willie Lee Ellis, appellant.

Edward N. Wehr, County Atty., and Gary M. Lane, Asst. County Atty., Davenport, for appellee.

Heard before MOORE, C.J., and MASON, RAWLINGS, REES and REYNOLDSON, JJ.

REES, Justice.

This matter comes to us as an original certiorari proceedings on three cases, consolidated for the purpose of hearing, to test the validity of respondent-court's order overruling plaintiffs' motions to change place of trial of criminal charges from Scott County to some county outside the seventh judicial district.

Plaintiffs in this cause were charged by county attorney's information with first degree murder for allegedly having killed a Davenport police officer while he was engaged in the discharge of his duties. They were also charged with burglary with aggravation and two counts of robbery with aggravation. All of the events occurred on the night of December 5, 1971 and, in addition to the plaintiffs, a fourth subject--one Wesley Betts--was taken into custody and similarly charged.

All three plaintiffs filed motions in the district court of Scott County asking changes of venue to some county outside of the seventh judicial district, claiming that excitement in the community and prejudice engendered by widespread publicity in newspapers and over radio and television stations precluded them from getting fair and impartial trials in Scott County or in any of the surrounding counties comprising the seventh judicial district of Iowa.

All plaintiffs filed affidavits in support of their motions, and counter-affidavits were filed by the county attorney with the resistances to the several motions to change venue. The fourth party charged--Betts--never sought a change of venue from Scott County.

On April 19, 1972 the Scott County district court, the Honorable M. L. Sutton, judge, following a hearing, ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to establish grounds for changes of venue under Iowa Code chapter 778. The occurrences of December 5, 1971, that is to say, the killing of the peace officer and the burglary and robberies were given daily news coverage by the Davenport Times-Democrat, a newspaper of wide circulation, by radio and television station WOC, by radio station KSTT, both of Davenport, and by radio and television station WQAD-TV of Moline, Illinois, and radio and telecasting station WHBF of Rock Island, Illinois. Copies of the newspaper articles and of the radio scripts were incorporated in the return to the writ of certiorari and have been subjected to our scrutiny.

Counsel for all three plaintiffs have collaborated in the preparation of the brief and argument, and assert as propositions justifying our sustaining the writ that:

I. The court erred in not finding that there existed enough local excitement and prejudice to warrant a change of venue under Iowa Code chapter 778.

II. The court's overruling of plaintiffs' motions for change of venue was an unconstitutional denial of due process of law because of the probability or possibility of inherent local prejudice.

Respondent urges in his brief and argument, as propositions relied upon for an affirmance of the trial court's actions and a quashing of the writ, that:

I. A ruling on a motion for a change of venue rests within the discretion of the trial court and will only be reversed upon a showing that the trial court...