Steinbeck v. Iowa Dist. Court In and For Linn County, No. 2--57587
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
| Writing for the Court | REYNOLDSON |
| Citation | 224 N.W.2d 469 |
| Docket Number | No. 2--57587 |
| Decision Date | 18 December 1974 |
| Parties | James D. STEINBECK et al., Plaintiffs, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR LINN COUNTY and William R. Eads, Judge, Respondents. |
Page 469
v.
IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR LINN COUNTY and William R. Eads, Judge, Respondents.
Page 470
William O. Gray and Keith Stapleton, Cedar Rapids, for plaintiffs James D. Steinbeck and Wallace, F. Johnson.
R. M. Fassler, Cedar Rapids, for plaintiff Donald T. Rosdail.
William H. Carmichael, Cedar Rapids, for plaintiff Darwin A. Ammeter, Sr.
Robert C. Nelson, Cedar Rapids, for plaintiff Kenneth Millsap.
James P. Hayes, Iowa City, for plaintiff Robert B. Manchester.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Garry D. Woodward, Asst. Atty. Gen., and John M. Heckel, Sp. Asst. County Atty., for respondents.
Heard en banc.
REYNOLDSON, Justice.
These six plaintiffs were indicted by a Linn County grand jury which in the first half of 1974 conducted an intensive investigation of the Cedar Rapids police department and its personnel. Plaintiffs' motions to set aside indictments were overruled by respondent district court judge on August 20, 1974. On September 6, 1974, we granted plaintiffs' petition for writ of certiorari, accelerated filing dates, and ordered the case advanced for prompt disposition. Following en banc submission we now sustain the writ and remand this proceeding to district court with directions to set aside the indictments.
The return to the writ comprises 1243 pages. It discloses the first quarter grand jury of Linn County on July 9, 1974, issued a separate indictment against each of the six plaintiffs alleging certain crimes of conspiracy, perjury and obstruction of justice. A chronology of the manner in which the 1974 Linn County grand juries were impaneled is essential to an understanding of the issues before us.
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December 31, 1973, respondent judge entered an order directing the 1974 grand jury, at its first session, to inquire into matters contained in a county attorney's report relating to the Cedar Rapids police department.
January 7, 1974, the seven persons whose names were drawn from the 1974 grand jury panel were sworn and impaneled as the Linn County grand jury for the first calendar quarter. On January 10, 1974, this grand jury returned indictments in non-related cases and indicated to respondent the police department investigation would be continued on February 4, 1974.
February 14, 1974, the first quarter grand jury was reconvened and commenced its police department investigation.
March 22, 1974, Judge August F. Honsell, Jr. entered an order extending the session of the 'Special Grand Jury' into the second quarter upon an application of an assistant attorney general, filed the same date, entitled 'Application to Extend Session of Special Grand Jury.'
March 29, 1974, Judge James H. Carter entered an order directing the 1974 grand jury panel of twelve not to appear on April 1, 1974, that being the first secular Monday of the first month of the second calendar quarter, but instead to appear on April 8, 1974.
April 3, 1974, Judge Honsell, upon the application of the assistant attorney general, entered a clarifying order indicating his prior order was merely continuing or extending the special session of the first quarter grand jury for 1974 and not a designation that it was to be operating in a special term of said grand jury.
April 4, 1974, the assistant attorney general filed an application for a clarifying order 'extending the January term of the regular Grand Jury into the second quarter or April term of the Grand Jury acting upon the matter under consideration in this additional special or reconvened session of said Grand Jury.'
April 5, 1974, Judge Carter entered an order confirming that his order of March 29, 1974 was not intended to terminate the extended session of the first quarter grand jury acting in special or extended session.
April 8, 1974, the second quarter jury was drawn and impaneled. The foreman was simultaneously serving as a member of the first quarter grand jury. This second quarter grand jury reported six times, returning various indictments and 'no bills' unrelated to the case before us.
June 27, 1974, respondent judge, pursuant to an application of the assistant attorney general, entered an order extending the special session or additional session of the first quarter grand jury into the third quarter and further ordering it to continue to operate, exist and function in this extended or special session until further court order.
July 1, 1974, the third quarter grand jury was drawn and impaneled. The foreman of this grand jury was also simultaneously serving on the first quarter grand jury. On the following day, July 2, 1974, this jury returned non-related indictments, 'no bills,' and continued three cases until its next meeting to be held on July 31, 1974. July 9, 1974, the first quarter grand jury returned the indictments against these plaintiffs and issued a four-page report signed by all the jurors which was filed of record and released to the news media. These indictments are directed 'To the District Court of said State, within and for said County, at the extended or special January term thereof, in the year of our Lord, one thousand, nine hundred and seventy-four.'
Plaintiffs' contentions, summarized, are 1) the first quarter 1974 grand jury ceased to exist by operation of law on March 31, 1974, and was therefore without jurisdiction or viable life to indict them in the third quarter of 1974, 2) first quarter grand jurors simultaneously serving as second and third quarter grand jurors could not legally participate in the investigations of the first quarter jury or be present when the question was taken upon the finding of the
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indictments, 3) violations of several statutes in the above proceedings deprived plaintiffs of due process and equal protection under designated provisions of the United States and Iowa Constitutions. As our holding on the first issue is dispositive, it is unnecessary to consider the other two.I. Respondent does not challenge plaintiffs' right to test the ruling of August 20, 1974 by an original certiorari proceeding. This court has said, however, it will determine on final hearing whether certiorari is a proper remedy even though the question is not raised by the party litigants. Wilkinson v. County Board of Education, 251 Iowa 876, 880, 102 N.W.2d 924, 926 (1960); Kommelter v. District Court, 225 Iowa 273, 275, 280 N.W. 511, 512 (1938).
In Maley v. District Court, 221 Iowa 732, 266 N.W. 815 (1936), trial court's denial of a motion to quash indictments was successfully tested by certiorari in this court. But in Uhl v. District Court in and for Monona County, 231 Iowa 1046, 1051, 2 N.W.2d 741, 744 (1942), the procedure employed in Maley was disapproved. An examination of the Uhl opinion discloses it relied on authorities holding a writ of certiorari should not issue 'where there is another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.' See 231 Iowa at 1051, 2 N.W.2d at 744. This was the import of the statute then in force. Section 12456, The Code, 1939. The 'other remedy,' of course, was the right to appeal after final judgment. Section 793.2, The Code.
Certiorari is now governed by rules 306 through 319, Rules of Civil Procedure. These rules abolished the former requirement that certiorari could not be maintained if there was another adequate remedy. See Comment, 4 Iowa Rules Civil Procedure Annotated, p. 421 (1970); rule 308, R.C.P. Freed from the statutory constraint, this court has consistently enlarged the scope of certiorari as a remedial procedure to avoid unnecessary and costly litigation, particularly where the lower court's jurisdiction or the legality of its acts is challenged on exclusively law or constitutional issues. State v. Holliday, 169 N.W.2d 768, 770 (1969); Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. v. Fachman, 55 Iowa 989, 994, 125 N.W.2d 210, 213 (1963); Knott v. Rawlings, 250 Iowa 892, 898, 96 N.W.2d 900, 903 (1959). In a more limited sense, we sometimes have permitted this remedy where the basic issues were factual, reasoning there is an illegality within the meaning of the rule when there is not substantial evidence to support the findings on which the lower court or tribunal based its conclusions of law. Reed v. Gaylord, 216 N.W.2d 327, 334 (Iowa 1974); see Sueppel v. Eads, 261 Iowa 923, 926, 156 N.W.2d 115, 116 (1968). In change of venue cases, we make an 'independent evaluation of the circumstances' to determine whether the lower court's ruling illegally violates...
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State v. Paulsen, Nos. 61487
...same calendar quarter was not shown to have been discharged when the second grand jury was selected. In Steinbeck v. Iowa District Court, 224 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Iowa 1974), we held section 770.1 implies there shall be only one grand jury each quarter. However, a variance from statutory proced......
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State v. Bent, No. 29,227.
...service would entail, and eliminating the possibility of semi-professional jurors.” Steinbeck v. Iowa Dist. Ct. In & For Linn Cnty., 224 N.W.2d 469, 475 (Iowa 1974). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated succinctly: “A tendency to establish anything approaching permanency in a grand jury is......
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State v. Cullison, No. 2--57573
...the findings on which the lower court or tribunal based its conclusions of law. Steinbeck v. Iowa Dist. Ct. in and for Linn County, 224 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa 1974); Reed v. Gaylord, 216 N.W.2d 327, 334 (Iowa 1974). Where there is no factual dispute and no conflicting inferences may be drawn......
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State v. Bent, Docket No. 29,227
...service would entail, and eliminating the possibility of semi-professional jurors." Steinbeck v. Iowa Dist. Ct. In & For Linn Cnty., 224 N.W.2d 469, 475 (Iowa 1974). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated succinctly: "A tendency to establish anything approaching permanency in a grand jury is......
-
State v. Paulsen, Nos. 61487
...same calendar quarter was not shown to have been discharged when the second grand jury was selected. In Steinbeck v. Iowa District Court, 224 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Iowa 1974), we held section 770.1 implies there shall be only one grand jury each quarter. However, a variance from statutory proced......
-
State v. Bent, No. 29,227.
...service would entail, and eliminating the possibility of semi-professional jurors.” Steinbeck v. Iowa Dist. Ct. In & For Linn Cnty., 224 N.W.2d 469, 475 (Iowa 1974). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated succinctly: “A tendency to establish anything approaching permanency in a grand jury is......
-
State v. Cullison, No. 2--57573
...the findings on which the lower court or tribunal based its conclusions of law. Steinbeck v. Iowa Dist. Ct. in and for Linn County, 224 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa 1974); Reed v. Gaylord, 216 N.W.2d 327, 334 (Iowa 1974). Where there is no factual dispute and no conflicting inferences may be drawn......
-
State v. Bent, Docket No. 29,227
...service would entail, and eliminating the possibility of semi-professional jurors." Steinbeck v. Iowa Dist. Ct. In & For Linn Cnty., 224 N.W.2d 469, 475 (Iowa 1974). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated succinctly: "A tendency to establish anything approaching permanency in a grand jury is......