Lloyd v. State, 65631
| Decision Date | 17 March 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 65631,65631 |
| Parties | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 211, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 347 Donald Robert LLOYD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Laura R. Morrison, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Candance M. Sunderland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
Donald Robert Lloyd appeals his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death imposed by the trial judge in accordance with the jury recommendation. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. This murder was observed by the victim's five-year-old son, who was a critical witness at the trial. We find that the child was competent to testify and affirm the conviction, but, finding two of the three The following are the material facts necessary to address the issues presented. The victim, a twenty-eight-year-old woman, was murdered in her home in Tampa, Florida, on June 2, 1983. A neighbor, James Thornton, testified that he rode his bicycle to get a newspaper at approximately twelve o'clock noon on the date of the incident. He stated that on his way to get the newspaper there were no vehicles parked in a vacant lot near the victim's house. On his return a few minutes later, he noticed a Volkswagen van parked in the lot. As he was passing the van, he heard a woman's scream coming from the home of the victim. He then heard a crack-like explosive sound and thought it was a gunshot. As he turned into his driveway, he heard a second, more muffled shot. He looked toward the victim's house and saw a man running from the house. He described the man as approximately 5'8"' to 5'10"' tall, weighing about 180 to 200 pounds, with black bushy hair. He stated he was carrying a medium-size bag in his right hand and was trotting away from the house. Thornton testified that he got back on his bicycle and followed the man; that he saw the man approach the van and enter it; that he turned around and drove past the van, making full eye contact with the man; and that he took down the license number of the van. Thornton explained that he then went to the victim's house, knocked on the front door, and, when no one answered, he knocked harder and the door opened enough to reveal the victim's five-year-old son standing there. Thornton stated he asked the child if his mother was there and the child responded that someone had shot her and took Thornton by the hand to the bathroom where he saw the victim. Thornton immediately telephoned the police and later gave them the information about the man and the license tag of the van. Approximately fourteen hours after the incident, Thornton picked out the appellant from a photo pack as the man he saw in the van.
aggravating circumstances improper, we conclude proportionality requires that we reduce Lloyd's sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years.
Another neighbor of the deceased testified that on the day of the murder, at approximately 11:40 a.m., he noticed a van proceeding down the street rather slowly at approximately five or six miles per hour toward the victim's house. He described the van as a Volkswagen microbus, red with a white top, in very good condition. He described the driver of the van as having a beard and a neatly-cropped hairstyle that was dark, sultry grey on top. He stated about twenty minutes later he saw the van returning from the direction it had come from but this time it was traveling at a speed of about thirty to thirty-five miles per hour and the same person was driving the van.
At trial, Ryan, the five-year-old son, testified that he was in the garage when a man came to the door; that he went in the house and saw who was at the door and that the man had a beard and a mustache and was wearing driving glasses; that he was a guitar player and had a suitcase and a gun; that he told Ryan and his mother to go into the bathroom; that his mother got shot twice and that prior to her being shot the man told his mother to give him money; that his mother had her wallet out and tried to give the man money and a ring. Ryan stated that after the shots the man went outside. He further stated that he went outside and saw the man go to his van, which he described as having a red top with a white bottom; that he went back inside after the man got into the van and that a neighbor arrived and called an ambulance. The evidence established that, within twenty-four hours of the incident, Ryan was shown five photographs by the police and he picked out a photograph of the appellant as the man who "hurt" his mother. Evidence was also submitted that on the first day of the trial Ryan was shown the pictures and selected a person other than the appellant out of the same group of photographs. As a result, the trial court denied the prosecution's request to allow Ryan to identify the appellant in the courtroom, but did allow the information of the original photo identification and subsequent The medical examiner testified that during his autopsy of the victim he found two gunshot wounds, the first was a wound on the right side of the neck, and the second was a direct gunshot wound to the top of the head, which was the cause of death. He testified that this latter gunshot wound was made with the gun actually in contact with the head. The bullets found at the scene were both .38 caliber bullets. One of the bullets was a lead bullet; the other a "wad-cutter" bullet.
misidentification to be presented to the jury.
The investigating detective testified that a computer check of the tag number given to him by Thornton identified Lloyd, who resided in Vero Beach, as the owner of the van. In the afternoon following the shooting, officers from the Indian River County sheriff's office went to Lloyd's home and advised his wife they were looking for the appellant. When the appellant later called home, his wife told him about the contact with the police and Lloyd advised her to meet him at the sheriff's office. Lloyd and his wife met at the sheriff's office and waited for Tampa detectives to arrive. When the Tampa detectives arrived, they obtained basic information from him, such as his name, height, weight, address, prior record, and occupation prior to reading him his rights. He was then read his Miranda * rights and questioned concerning his whereabouts on June 2, the day of the killing. The appellant told the detectives that he was in Tampa looking for work and he inquired of them as to why they were interrogating him. He was advised that their investigation involved the homicide of a twenty-eight-year-old woman who was shot and killed and that his vehicle was positively identified at the scene and a person fitting his description had been seen running from the victim's home. At that point the appellant stated, The interrogation ceased at that point. The Tampa officers then departed, after taking photographs of the appellant.
Two deputies stated that while Lloyd was in the waiting room of the Indian River sheriff's department, he volunteered the statement, "If I had known this about a contract killing, I would have been on my way to Mexico by now," and The deputies also testified that they overheard Lloyd tell his wife to sell everything and forget about him, that he was no good.
A deputy sheriff for the Indian River County sheriff's department testified that he had given the defendant .38 caliber ammunition within the last two years, and that they were wadcutters. The appellant did not testify in his own behalf.
The jury found Lloyd guilty of first-degree murder.
During the penalty phase, appellant presented testimony from his wife, his nine-year-old daughter, and other family members that he was a good husband and father, and from an employer that he was a good, dependable worker. At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury, by a seven-to-five vote, recommended that Lloyd be sentenced to death. The trial judge, in imposing the death sentence, found three aggravating circumstances: (1) that the offense was committed while the appellant was engaged or was an accomplice in the commission of or an attempt to commit any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, or kidnapping; (2) that the felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification; and (3) that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. The trial judge also found one mitigating circumstance, that the appellant had no significant history of prior criminal activity. The court concluded that "insufficient mitigating circumstances exist[ed] to outweigh the aggravating circumstances."
With regard to the guilt phase of the trial, the appellant raises six asserted claims of trial court error. He contends the trial court erred (1) by denying appellant's expert psychologist sufficient time to evaluate the victim's child before he allowed him to testify at trial; (2) in ruling the child was a competent witness; (3) in denying appellant's motion to suppress the pretrial photographic identification of the appellant by the child; (4) in admitting testimony as to the child's out-of-court identification of the appellant; (5) in failing to suppress the appellant's statements; and (6) in allowing the witness Jack Williamson to testify.
The first two contentions concern the evaluation of five-year-old Ryan to testify and the finding of the trial court that Ryan was competent to testify. At the outset it is appropriate to set forth the following chronology of events concerning these competency issues: June 2, 1983, the victim was...
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