De Loach v. Scheper
| Decision Date | 26 August 1938 |
| Docket Number | 14745. |
| Citation | 198 S.E. 409,188 S.C. 21 |
| Parties | DE LOACH v. SCHEPER et al., Board of County Directors. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Controversy without action by W. A. De Loach against F. W. Scheper, Jr. and others, constituting the Board of County Directors of Beaufort County, S. C., wherein the petitioner sought to permanently enjoin the respondents from issuing general obligation bonds.
Petition dismissed.
Wm. N Levin, of Beaufort, for petitioner.
W Brantley Harvey, of Beaufort, for respondents.
This matter, heard by permission in the original jurisdiction of the Court, is a controversy without action, under Section 668, Code of 1932, being submitted upon an agreed case containing the facts upon which the controversy depends. The petitioner is a resident taxpayer of Beaufort Township in Beaufort County. He seeks to permanently enjoin the Respondents, who constitute the Board of County Directors of Beaufort County, from issuing $300,000 of general obligation bonds of Beaufort, Sheldon and St. Helena Townships, in Beaufort County. Unless restrained by this Court, Respondents intend to proceed with the issuance and sale of these bonds, the proceeds of which are to be used, along with a grant of $235,000 from the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works, to defray the cost of building two bridges in St. Helena Township, Beaufort County, across Harbor River and Johnson's Creek to Hunting Island.
Hunting Island is one of South Carolina's barrier islands which is now owned by the South Carolina State Forestry Commission. Previous to 1936 the greater portion of this island was owned by Dr. Arthur W. Elting and the Honorable James M. Cameron. The remaining portion was owned by the United States Government. In that year Dr. Elting and Mr. Cameron conveyed their interest in the island to Beaufort County upon the condition that it be developed as a park and game sanctuary. During this year the United States conveyed its interest to Beaufort County on similar conditions. Subsequently the County conveyed the entire Island to the State Forestry Commission subject to the same conditions as appear in the respective deeds of conveyance to it. That latter body now proposes to develop the Island as a park and game sanctuary in order to carry out the purposes of the grant. At the present time the Island is inaccessible save by boat and in order to properly develop it it will be necessary to build two bridges from St. Helena Island to Hunting Island. The Board of County Directors has employed an engineer who has estimated the costs of these bridges at $535,000; the grant to be obtained from the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works will approximate $235,000. To raise the $300,000 needed for the sponsor's share the Board of County Directors proposes to issue these bonds.
Apparently two methods of financing the project were provided by the General Assembly in 1936. These appear as Acts 1028 and 1029 of the Statutes at Large for 1936. The first of these Acts, approved the 21st day of May, 1936, authorized the Board of County Directors to issue and sell not exceeding $300,000 of general obligation bonds of Beaufort County. The second of these Acts authorized the Board of County Directors to issue and sell $300,000 of bonds of any Township or group of Townships in the County to raise these funds. Beaufort County is divided into Townships which have for many years been recognized as political subdivisions.
During the 1938 session of the General Assembly an effort was made to amend Section 2 of Act No. 1029. The title of the amendatory Act, Act 1016, is as follows: "An Act to Provide for the Levy of Taxes for County, School and Other Purposes, for the Year 1938-1939 and Direct the Expenditure Thereof in Beaufort County, and Amend a Joint Resolution Known as Act No. 1029 of the Acts of 1936."
It is conceded that this statute is the vehicle for appropriations for Beaufort County for the current fiscal year and is commonly referred to as a Supply Bill. It is under the provisions of Act 1029, as amended by the 1938 Statute, that the Board of County Directors has acted in adopting resolutions providing for the bond issue sought to be restrained in this action.
The petition sets forth some 7 grounds of objection to the issuance of these bonds. It attacks the constitutionality of the amendatory Statute of 1938, the Statute as amended, and the Statute in unamended form. Petitioner's counsel has presented a thorough brief contending that the Board of County Directors is without power to issue the bonds.
The Board of County Directors on the other hand feel assured of the soundness of their position and seem convinced that the project which they have undertaken is one that will inure to the benefit of the community. With these matters before us we must now proceed to undertake a disposition of the questions raised by the petition. To do this makes it necessary that we discuss the constitutionality of the amendatory Act of 1938, the constitutionality of the Act as amended, and finally the constitutionality of the original Statute of 1936. In doing this we must bear in mind and apply the principle that it is the duty of the judiciary to uphold the constitutionality of a Statute unless its invalidity is manfest beyond reasonable doubt, and unless it is clearly violative of some provision in the Constitution.
The questions to be decided by this Court are well expressed in the Petitioner's brief under the heading, "Questions Involved." We shall discuss them in the order there enumerated.
The first question there stated is: (1) Does the Beaufort County Supply Bill for 1938-1939 relate to more than one subject, in violation of Article 3, Section 17?
That provision of the Constitution provides that each Act or Resolution, having the force of law, shall relate to but one subject and that shall be expressed in the Title. There is no doubt but that this section of the Constitution is a wise provision, intended to apprise the members of the General Assembly of the contents of an Act by reading the Title and to prevent legislative log-rolling. A third reason given for the insertion of this provision in the Constitution has been said to be to inform the people of the State of the matters with which the General Assembly concerns itself. It must be conceded that there can be no objection to the amendatory provisions contained in the 1938 Statute, insofar as they are unrelated to the subject as expressed in the title. The Title very clearly and definitely states that the purpose of the Act is to provide for the fiscal affairs of Beaufort County for the year 1938-1939 and to amend a Joint Resolution, No. 1029 of 1936, which is the vehicle for the issuance of these bonds. It is contended, however, that the Act itself relates to more than one subject and for this reason is unconstitutional. In order to determine this question it is well to consider the applicable rules of construction. In the first place, there is a marked distinction between the object of a law and the subject of a law. Very few enactments have but one object or purpose in mind. A striking example of the distinction between the objects of an Act and its subject is found in the Statute attacked on similar grounds in the case of State ex rel. Coleman v. Lewis, 181 S.C. 10, 186 S.E. 625. The opinion in that case shows there were some five objects which the Legislature wished to reach in the passage of that Act, but, as the Court observed, the Act 'showed that it related to but one cognate subject.'
An examination of the amendatory Act or Supply Bill of 1938 shows that among its purposes were the ordinary expenditures of County, Schools and Townships in Beaufort County, a tax levy to provide funds therefor and the amending of Act 1029 of 1936. As already observed, both of these objects are expressed in the Title. The Act also relates to other objects which need not be set forth here. The sufficiency of them does not concern us since their insertion cannot affect the portions of the Statute now under discussion. If, for any reason, it can be said that those objects do not relate to the subject of the Act, or that, because of their insertion, the Act relates to more than one subject, those provisions might fall but not the remaining part of the Act. On that question, however, we express no opinion.
It cannot be questioned that the primary purpose or object of this Act is the fiscal affairs of Beaufort County for the current year. It must, therefore, be determined whether that portion of the Statute which seeks to amend the Joint Resolution of 1936 relates to the subject of the fiscal affairs of Beaufort County, for the constitutional provision here invoked does not preclude the Legislature from dealing with several branches of one general subject in a single Act. 59 C.J., 802. With the application of this principle, the difficulty of the problem disappears. The Supply Bill relates to the general subject of the fiscal affairs of Beaufort County and its political subdivisions. So does that portion of the Act which has to do with the issuance of bonds by certain of its townships. For these reasons we hold that the 1938 Statute is valid and accomplishes the purposes it set out to do in amending the Joint Resolution passed in 1936.
It is next contended, in question 2, that the issuance of these bonds is unconstitutional because it necessitates the levy of a discriminatory tax on certain property...
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