Lobdill v. Laboring Men's Mut. Aid Ass'n of Chatfield

• Decision Date: 16 June 1897
• Citation: 69 Minn. 14,71 N.W. 696
• Parties: LOBDILL v LABORING MEN'S MUT. AID ASS'N OF CHATFIELD, MINN.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

69 Minn. 14

71 N.W. 696

LOBDILLvLABORING MEN'S MUT. AID ASS'N OF CHATFIELD, MINN.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 16, 1897.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

The defendant insured the plaintiff against loss of time effected through external, violent, and accidental injuries “wholly and continuously disabling him from transacting any and every kind of business pertaining to his occupation of merchant.” Held:

1. That the evidence justified the jury in finding that he was “wholly disabled” within the meaning of the policy.

2. Total disability does not mean absolute physical inability to transact any kind of business pertaining to the occupation of merchant. It is sufficient if his injuries were such that common care and prudence required him to desist from transacting any such business in order to effectuate a cure.

3. Inability to transact some kinds or branches of business pertaining to his occupation as merchant would not constitute total disability within the meaning of the policy, provided he was able to transact other kinds or branches of business pertaining to such occupation.

4. But ability to occasionally perform some trivial or unimportant act connected with some kind of business pertaining to such occupation would not render his disability partial, instead of total, provided he was unable to substantially, or to some material extent, transact any kind of business pertaining to such occupation.

5. The fact that he occasionally performed some act connected with his business as a merchant would not necessarily prove that he was not totally disabled within the meaning of the policy. The frequency and nature of these acts would ordinarily be for the consideration of the jury in determining whether he was totally disabled as above defined.

Appeal from district court, Fillmore county; John Whytock, Judge.

Action by S. C. Lobdill against the Laboring Men's Mutual Aid Association of Chatfield, Minn. Verdict for plaintiff. From an order refusing a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

C. A. Fosness, McConnel & Schweizer, and Burdett Thayer, for appellant.

C. D. Allen and Gray & Thompson, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

The defendant, an accident insurance company, issued its policy to plaintiff, whereby it insured him as a merchant by occupation, under classification preferred, “in the sum of $25 per week, against loss of time not exceeding twenty-six consecutive weeks, resulting from bodily injuries effected through means aforesaid [external, violent, and accidental] wholly and continuously disabling said member from transacting any and every kind of business pertaining to the occupation above stated.” Plaintiff alleged that on May 21, 1895, and during the life of the policy, he was accidentally thrown from his bicycle, and violently thrown forward on his face, thereby dislocating the thumb of his right hand, breaking loose some of his teeth, and so injuring or jarring his head and neck as to affect his spine and nerves to such an extent as to produce severe nervous prostration, by reason of which injuries he was wholly and continuously disabled from transacting any and every kind of business pertaining to his occupation as a merchant for 17 weeks. The principal contest is as to the construction of that part of the policy which we have italicized, and particularly of the term “wholly disabled.” Accident insurance being of comparatively recent origin, the policies do not seem to have acquired any settled form, and the decisions construing them are comparatively few, and do not seem to have agreed on any very definite meaning to be given to the term “total disability.” Such authorities as there are will be found quite fully cited in Bac. Ben. Soc. § 501, and in Nibl. Mut. Ben. Soc. § 401 et seq. See, also, 4 Harv. Law Rev. p. 180. The cases which have placed a construction upon the term “total disability” might seem to be divided into two classes, viz. those which construe it liberally in favor of the insured, and those which construe it strictly against him. Among those of the first class may be cited Hooper v. Insurance Co., 5 Hurl. & N. 545, 556; Young v. Insurance Co., 80 Me. 244, 13 Atl. 896;Turner v. Casualty Co. (Mich.) 70 N. W. 898; and of the second class, Lyon v. Assurance Co., 46 Iowa, 631, and Saveland v. Casualty Co., 67 Wis. 174, 30 N. W. 237. Any apparent conflict in the decisions may, however, be mostly reconciled in view of differences in the language of the policies, and of the different occupations under which the parties were insured. As is well said in Wolcott v. Association (Sup.) 8 N. Y. Supp. 263: “Total disability must, of the necessity of the case, be a relative term, and must depend largely upon the occupation of the party insured.” One who labors with his hands might...