Local 1814, Intern. Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 1338,P,D,AFL-CI,1338
• Citation: 965 F.2d 1224
• Parties: 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2489, 60 USLW 2786, 122 Lab.Cas. P 10,224, RICO Bus.Disp.Guide 8023 LOCAL 1814, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION,laintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK SHIPPING ASSOCIATION, INC., Defendant-Appellee, United STATES of America, Defendant-Intervenor-Appellee. ocket 92-6018.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 1224

965 F.2d 1224

140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2489, 60 USLW 2786,

122 Lab.Cas. P 10,224,

RICO Bus.Disp.Guide 8023

LOCAL 1814, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION AFL-CIO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK SHIPPING ASSOCIATION, INC., Defendant-Appellee United STATES of America, Defendant-Intervenor-Appellee.

No. 1338, Docket 92-6018.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued March 16, 1992.

Decided June 1, 1992.

Ernest L. Mathews, Jr., New York City (Thomas W. Gleason, Kevin Marrinan, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

Donato Caruso, New York City (Lambos & Giardino, C. Peter Lambos, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.

Chad A. Vignola, Asst. U.S. Atty. for the Southern District of New York, New York City (Otto G. Obermaier, U.S. Atty., for the Southern District of New York, Richard W. Mark, Asst. U.S. Atty. for the Southern District of New York, of counsel), for defendant-intervenor-appellee.

Before: MESKILL and PRATT, Circuit Judges, and EUGENE H. NICKERSON, District Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

GEORGE C. PRATT, Circuit Judge:

When two federal statutes apply to a situation, but are seemingly incompatible, which one must give way? That is the issue we are faced with on this appeal, which arises from the intersection of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968, and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101-115. Plaintiff, Local 1814, International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO ("Local 1814", or "the union") appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Leonard B. Sand, Judge, which (1) dismissed the union's complaint seeking arbitration under its collective bargaining agreement with defendant New York Shipping Association, Inc. (NYSA), (2) denied the union's request for a "reverse Boys Markets injunction", and (3) permanently enjoined "any arbitration involving Local 1814's grievance" that by entering into a proposed consent judgment with the government, NYSA would violate its collective bargaining agreement with Local 1814.

On appeal, Local 1814 contends that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which divests federal courts of jurisdiction to enter injunctions in all "labor disputes", takes precedence over RICO, a criminal statute that gives district courts civil "jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of [the act] by issuing appropriate orders"; thus, the union argues, the district court's injunction was

                in excess of its jurisdiction.   We reject the argument and accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court
                

FACTS AND BACKGROUND

Although disposition of this appeal turns on questions of law and involves largely undisputed facts, it is nevertheless necessary to review the events underlying this action in some detail before we can review the decisive legal issues.

A. The government institutes a civil RICO action.

In an effort to rid the Port of New York and New Jersey (the waterfront) of the influence of organized crime, the government instituted, on February 20, 1990, a civil RICO action (the waterfront case) against numerous defendants. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964. The complaint named as defendants purported members of the Genovese and Gambino organized crime families, purported members of the "Westies" organized crime group, six union locals (including Local 1814), two waterfront employers, and two waterfront employers' organizations (including NYSA). The employers and employers' organizations named as defendants were named not as RICO violators, but simply as "Representatives of Employers in Industries Affecting Waterfront Commerce" in order to effectuate complete relief.

The 125-page civil RICO complaint sought extensive equitable relief against the various defendants, not unlike the sweeping reforms sought by the government in the ubiquitous Teamsters litigation, which by now is well-chronicled in second circuit caselaw. See, e.g., 905 F.2d 610 (2d Cir.1990); 907 F.2d 277 (2d Cir.1990); 931 F.2d 177 (2d Cir.1991). More specifically, the government sought in the waterfront case (1) to bar organized crime members and their associates from involvement with the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA), as well as (2) reforms of disciplinary and election procedures within the union locals in order to prevent future influence of organized crime. Four of the six locals have already entered into consent judgments with the government, each of which has been approved by Judge Sand.

B. A RICO trial takes place.

Local 1814, along with the remaining defendants in the waterfront case, went to trial. This trial began before Judge Sand on April 15, 1991, and consumed nine weeks over a period of seven months. On December 17, 1991, the day that the defense cases were to begin, Local 1814 and its officers agreed to a proposed consent judgment, which settled the government's claims against Local 1814.

C. Terms of the Local 1814 consent judgment.

This consent judgment provided for the appointment of a "monitor" to oversee certain operations of Local 1814; it stipulated Local 1814's acknowledgements (1) "that there should be no criminal element or organized crime corruption of any part of the ILA, including Local 1814", (2) that the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York "has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action", and (3) "that this Consent Decree is a lawful exercise of the Court's jurisdiction"; and further provided for a permanent injunction against racketeering activity by the union and its members, for specific amendments of its constitution and by-laws, and for the resignation of certain high-ranking officials of Local 1814. Judge Sand approved the consent judgment on December 17, 1991.

D. NYSA and the government agree on a proposed consent judgment.

On November 27, 1991, NYSA and the government also executed a stipulation of settlement in the form of a proposed consent judgment. The pertinent portion reads as follows:

3. List of Individuals Barred From Waterfront Employment. At any time after completion of litigation in the District Court in this case, [the government] may provide to NYSA a list, approved by this Court, of individuals prohibited from With respect to subdivisions (b) and (c) of this paragraph, the Government may seek entry of an order in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) and consistent with the terms of this Consent Judgment which shall state the standards and procedures to be utilized in determining whether an individual falls within subdivision (b) or (c) of this paragraph and thus should be prohibited from seeking, obtaining, or remaining in employment on the Waterfront. Plaintiff may apply to the Court to place any individual on the list described in subdivision (b) or (c) of this paragraph by giving notice to that individual, NYSA, and any known employer of said individual. Proceedings to place individuals on the list shall be conducted in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence. The prohibition pertaining to any individual shall remain in effect for so long as the authority issuing the prohibition maintains it in effect.

                seeking, obtaining, or remaining in employment on the Waterfront.   The list, if so approved by the Court, may include and identify by name and social security number:  (a) any individual defendant herein found to have engaged in a RICO violation in this case;  (b) any individual determined by a United States District Court to be a member, as that term is used in the complaint, of any organized crime group, as that term is used in the complaint;  or (c) any individual who has aided and abetted (within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2) any individual described in subdivision (a) or (b) of this paragraph in committing a federal felony in the Port of New York and New Jersey.
                

This proposed consent judgment contains two other terms relevant to Local 1814's challenge: (1) NYSA "will not knowingly employ in any capacity any individual whose name appears on the list described in paragraph 3 for so long as the Court's injunction against the individual remains in effect"; and (2) the district court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the consent judgment "and to conduct any proceedings related thereto."

Judge Sand has not yet approved this consent judgment.

E. Local 1814 files a grievance.

Local 1814 and NYSA, among others, were parties to a collective bargaining agreement which provided, inter alia, for arbitration of "[a]ny grievance, dispute, complaint or claim arising out of or relating to" the collective bargaining agreement. Believing that NYSA's consent judgment would (1) create new grounds for discharge not otherwise present in the collective bargaining agreement and (2) make a unilateral change in the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (in violation of a specific portion of the agreement prohibiting such unilateral changes), Local 1814 filed a grievance embodying this claim and seeking to prevent NYSA from entering into the consent judgment. After the labor-management panels charged with reviewing grievances in the first three stages of the grievance machinery (processes provided for in the collective bargaining agreement) all deadlocked, the grievance was referred to the arbitration process, the fourth stage in the collective bargaining agreement's grievance machinery.

F. Local 1814 commences the instant action.

On December 3, 1991, Local 1814 learned that NYSA intended to conclude the consent judgment by reaching an agreement with the government no later than December 14, 1991. Noting that our decisions in United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 954 F.2d 801 (2d Cir.1992) (Star Market ) and United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 948 F.2d 98 (2d Cir.1991) (Yellow Freight ) stand for the proposition that court-ratified consent judgments...