Local 63, Textile Workers Union of America, C.I.O. v. Cheney Bros.

• Decision Date: 09 November 1954
• Citation: 109 A.2d 240,141 Conn. 606
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: LOCAL 63, TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, C. I. O. v. CHENEY BROTHERS. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 240

109 A.2d 240

141 Conn. 606

LOCAL 63, TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, C. I. O. v. CHENEY BROTHERS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Argued March 3, 1954.

Decided May 18, 1954.

Reargued Oct. 14, 1954.

Opinion on Reargument Nov. 9, 1954.

Wesley A. Sturges, New Haven, with whom were Pomeroy Day and William K. Cole, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

A. A. Ribicoff, Hartford, and Irving S. Ribicoff, Hartford, with whom was Louise H. Hunt, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before INGLIS, C. J., and WYNNE, DALY, MOLLOY ^*, and O'SULLIVAN, JJ.

INGLIS, Chief Justice.

The judicial phase of the controversy between the parties to this appeal began on January 15, 1953, when the plaintiff, acting under § 8161(d) of the General Statutes, applied to the Superior Court to vacate an arbitration award rendered against it and in favor of the defendant. The latter filed an answer and a cross application in which correction and confirmation of the award, as corrected, were sought. The court decided that the award ought to be vacated. From the judgment entered thereon the defendant has appealed.

The finding, which is not subject to correction, recites the following facts: For many years, the defendant, hereinafter called the company, has operated a textile plant in Manchester and, since 1937, has recognized the plaintiff, hereinafter called the union, as the bargaining representative of its production and maintenance employees. Long-term agreements affecting the labor relations of the parties were successively concluded by them as of March 30, 1942, August 1, 1947, and August 1, 1952. All three agreements contained a provision permitting either party at any time to reopen the question of wages and to seek a revision of the previously established rates. It was further provided that, if the union objected to any request by the company for a reduction in wages, the differences between the parties were to be resolved by proceedings culminating, when necessary, in arbitration under the industrial arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association.

On March 26, 1951, as a result of negotiations between the parties, the company gave a general wage increase to about 1600 employees. The increase did not affect about twenty engravers. The hourly rate employees, that is, those compensated on the basis of a definite amount of money for each hour worked, were now to receive a flat 9.75 cents an hour more. The rates of pay for all other employees except engravers were then computed so as to give them an increase comparable to the 9.75 cents per hour. Since the wages of pieceworkers were determined, not by the number of hours worked, but by the number of units produced during a given unit of time, the fixing of the many thousands of piece rates prevailing in the plant to conform to the increase of 9.75 cents in the hourly rate had to be done by intricate mathematical computation. The upshot of the wage increase of March 26, 1951, was as follows: (1) Hourly rate employees, totaling 850, were to receive 9.75 cents an hour more; (2) 20 engravers were to get no additional pay; (3) 'base rates' for pieceworkers, totaling 750, were fixed at an amount which would produce an average increase of 8.1 cents an hour; (4) the 'hiring rate' ¹ was increased 6 cents an hour and affected 10 employees; (5) the 'minimum rate' ¹ was increased 5 cents an hour and affected 40 employees. The increases thus granted represented an estimated average of 9.75 cents per hour for all the employees affected. In actuality, many received more and many less than this average. As a result of the various computations, however, the over-all increase described as 9.75 cents per hour was considered to be approximated for all employees involved.

As of the date the wage increase became effective, the parties incorporated into their bargaining agreement a cost-of-living 'escalator' clause. A 1 cent quarterly wage adjustment, up or down, was automatically to follow every change of 1.153 points in the consumer price index of the United States bureau of labor statistics, but no adjustment which would reduce the rates of pay below those which were effective on March 26, 1951, was to be made through this process.

On September 17, 1952, the company proposed (1) a wage reduction to offset the increase granted on March 26, 1951, and (2) a revision of the escalator clause. Both proposals were rejected. The company then asked the union to join in submitting the dispute to arbitration under the agreement, but the union refused to do so. On October 10, 1952, the company forwarded a written request for arbitration to the American Arbitration Association and sent a copy thereof to the union. The request was for the arbitration of two matters, expressed by the company in the following language:

'1. A direct wage decrease of 9 3/4 cents per hour for all employees covered by the current agreement, to offset the wage increase which became effective on March 26, 1951.

'2. Revision of our cost of living formula (Section 9 of the current agreement) by providing for adjustment upon each change of 1.32 points in the applicable index instead of 1.153 points.'

In conformity with its rules, the American Arbitration Association selected an arbitrator who, on November 25 and 26, 1952, held hearings in which both the company and the union participated. At these hearings the arbitrator was not advised of the meaning of 'hourly rates,' 'base rates,' 'piece rates,' 'plant minimum rates' and 'hiring minimum rates,' as those expressions were used by the company in its wage structure, nor was he told of the method by which the wage increase of March 26, 1951, was computed and fixed for the various types of wage earners.

On December 28, 1952, the arbitrator made the following award:

'1. Beginning with the first payroll period which commences after December 31, 1952, all hourly rates and base rates shall be reduced by 9.75 cents. Piece rates and plant hiring minimum rates shall be adjusted accordingly.

'2. Beginning with the first payroll period which commences after December 31, 1952, Section 9 of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties dated August 1, 1952 shall be modified so as to provide for a 1 cent cost-of-living adjustment for every 1.32 index points' change in the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumers' Price Index for Moderate Income Families in Large Cities. Old Series. The February 1951 Index of 184.2 shall continue to be used as the starting point in calculating changes in the cost of living. The effect of this will be to reduce the Cost-Of-Living Allowance payable for the current quarter from 7 cents to 6 cents per hour.'

Although the rules of the arbitration permitted but did not require it, the arbitrator delivered with the award, and stapled to it, a twenty-two page opinion. As directed in the first paragraph of the award, a reduction of 9.75 cents an hour in all 'base rates,' as that expression is used and applied in the company's wage system, would result in an average decrease of substantially 11.7 cents per hour in the actual earnings of pieceworkers. This decrease would affect 750 employees. Certain other facts found by the court will be mentioned when the legal claims advanced by the parties are discussed.

The problems presented by this appeal readily group themselves into two main divisions, of which one deals exclusively with the first, and the other with the second paragraph of the award. The court concluded that the former was void because it went beyond the submission and, in any event, because it was not a final and definite answer to the question to which it purported to respond.

Early in our judicial history we expressed the view that, since arbitration is designed to prevent litigation, it commands much favor from the law. Parmelee v. Allen, 32 Conn. 115, 116; see Mallory v. Town of Huntington, 64 Conn. 88, 95, 29 A. 245. Especially is it to be encouraged as a means of promoting tranquility and the prompt and equitable settlement of disputes in the field of labor relations. Colt's Industrial Union v. Colt's Mfg. Co., 137 Conn. 305, 309, 77 A.2d 301. It is true, however, that the submission should set forth the questions to be resolved in such a manner as to show clearly what disputes are to be arbitrated. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America v. Shapiro, 138 Conn. 57, 68, 82 A.2d 345. Clarity is important because the source of the arbitrator's authority is found in the agreement of submission. 'The charter of an arbitrator is the submission and no matter outside the submission may be included in the award. Palmer v. Green, 6 Conn. 14, 18; Hamlin v. City of Norwich, 40 Conn. 13, 23; Schoolnick v. Finman, 108 Conn. 478, 481, 144 A. 41; Sturges, Commercial Arbitrations & Awards, pp. 144, 229; Russell, Arbitrations & Award, 13th Ed., pp. 201, 210, 211.' Pratt, Read & Co. v. United Furniture Workers, 136 Conn. 205, 208, 70 A.2d 120, 122.

It necessarily follows that an award must conform to the submission. Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Chase Brass & Copper Workers Union, 139 Conn. 591, 594, 96 A.2d 209; Continental Milling & Feed Co. v. Doughnut Corporation, 186 Md. 669, 677, 48 A.2d 447; Baldwin v. Moses, 319 Mass. 401, 402, 66 N.E.2d 24; 6 Williston, Contracts (Rev.Ed.) § 1929. Ordinarily, an award which does not respond to the submission cannot be upheld. Blackstone Valley Gas & Electric Co. v. Rhode Island Power Transmission Co., 64 R.I. 204, 223, 12 A.2d 739; Pumphrey v. Pumphrey, 172 Md. 323, 325, 191 A. 235. It is void to the extent, to which it is outside the submission. Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 301, 169 N.E. 386. To that extent the award must be vacated by the Superior Court upon proper application. General Statutes, § 8161(d).

On the other hand, if part of an award is within the submission and part of it is not, the former may be...