LOCAL NO. 1710, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS, AFL-CIO …

• Decision Date: 04 October 1999
• Parties: LOCAL NO. 1710, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS, AFL-CIO v. CITY OF CHICOPEE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

430 Mass. 417

721 NE 2d 378

LOCAL NO. 1710, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS, AFL-CIO v. CITY OF CHICOPEE.¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

October 4, 1999.

December 13, 1999.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., ABRAMS, LYNCH, GREANEY, & IRELAND, JJ.

David B. Rome for the plaintiff.

Barbara J. Sweeney for the defendant.

Donald Siegel, Mary T. Sullivan, Ann Clarke, & David Rome, for Massachusetts AFL-CIO & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

LYNCH, J.

This is an appeal by Local No. 1710, International Association of Fire Fighters (union), from the denial by a Superior Court judge of its motion to compel arbitration. G. L. c. 150C, § 2 (a). The union claims that the judge's decision regarding the timeliness of the grievance was a ruling on "procedural" rather than "substantive" arbitrability in violation of the plain meaning of G. L. c. 150C, § 2 (a), settled State and Federal law, and public policy. The union also disputes the judge's finding of fact regarding the timeliness of the grievance. We granted the union's application for direct appellate review, and we affirm the decision of the Superior Court judge.

1. Facts and procedural history. Paul Loranger and Thomas Stefanik (grievants) were fire fighters who had been employed by the city of Chicopee (city). Each suffered what were eventually ruled to be work-related injuries rendering them incapable of performing their duties as fire fighters.² While the two grievants were absent from work, before a determination that the injuries were work-related, the city did not place them on injured leave, but charged their absences to their accumulated sick or vacation leave.³ Loranger claims that he questioned Chief Robert Nunes about the coverage and was told that the city would reimburse him for the sick leave when it was clear that Loranger's injury was work-related. The city granted the grievants' work-related disability retirements on November 22, 1996.

The grievants were members of the union which had a collective bargaining agreement (agreement) with the city. Article 25.05 of the agreement requires the city to compensate retiring fire fighters "for accumulated unused sick leave credited to their account [according to a formula]." When the grievants retired, their compensation did not include reimbursement for the sick (or vacation) leave they used to cover their absences from work.⁴

Article 5.01 of the agreement provides for a final and binding arbitration when grievances remain unresolved "as to the meaning, application or interpretation of this Agreement relating to wages, hours, standards of productivity or performance or other terms and conditions of employment." On January 27, 1997, sixty-seven days after the grievants retired, the union filed grievances on their behalf arguing that the grievants should have been reimbursed for the sick or vacation leave they used during their work-related illness. The city refused either to proceed with the grievances or to allow them to be submitted to arbitration. The union then moved to compel the city to arbitrate, pursuant to G. L. c. 150C, § 2 (a).

The city argued that the agreement's arbitration clause did not apply to this case for two reasons. First, it argued that, because the grievants were retired when the grievances were filed, they were no longer members of the union and thus not covered by the agreement. Second, the city claimed that the union's grievance was not timely because it was not filed within seventy-five days of the date the grievants became aware of a grievance, as required by the agreement. The city maintained that the grievances arose while the grievants were being denied injured leave. The city stated that the union had to file grievances within seventy-five days of the date they were first denied injured leave, not when they received their retirement compensation.

A Superior Court judge ruled that the union did have standing to sue under the agreement on behalf of retired employees because the grievances arose while the grievants were members of the union. The judge then ruled that the city could not be compelled to arbitrate over these particular claims because the grievances were not timely. The judge found that the grievants were aware or should have been aware that they had a grievance long before they retired.⁵ The judge rejected the union's estoppel argument as to the issue of Chief Nunes's assurances to Loranger that the city would reimburse him.⁶

2. Analysis. The statute applicable to this case, G. L. c. 150C, § 2 (a), states that, if one party to a collective bargaining agreement refuses to arbitrate, the aggrieved party may request a court order to arbitrate, and "[t]he court shall order arbitration unless (1) the opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate; or (2) the claim sought to be arbitrated does not state a controversy covered by the provision for arbitration; provided, that an order for arbitration shall not be refused where a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the arbitration provision is itself made subject to arbitration .... In either event the court shall proceed summarily to the determination of the issue so raised and shall, if it finds for the applicant, order arbitration; otherwise, the application shall be denied."⁷

In applying this and other provisions of the labor statute, Massachusetts courts have looked to a series of United States Supreme Court cases for guiding principles, including AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643 (1986) (AT&T); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).⁸ (The latter are collectively known as the "Steelworkers Trilogy.") See, e.g., Old Rochester Regional Teacher's Club v. Old Rochester Regional Sch. Dist. Comm., 398 Mass. 695, 700 (1986); School Comm. of Southbridge v. Brown, 375 Mass. 502, 504 (1978); School Comm. of Danvers v. Tyman, 372 Mass. 106, 113 (1977); Mugnano-Bornstein v. Crowell, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 347, 351 (1997); Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co. v. Local 455, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 921, 922 (1989).

These United States Supreme Court decisions have established a set of principles governing arbitration that are most clearly set out in AT&T, supra. The first principle is that "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." Id. at 648, quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra at 582. See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547 (1964); School Comm. of Boston v. Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, 372 Mass. 605, 613 (1977), citing Massachusetts Nurses Ass'n v. Lynn Hosp., 364 Mass. 502 (1974) ("there is an understandable attitude of wariness about arbitration forced on a party").

The second principle is that the question whether an agreement creates a duty to arbitrate is "undeniably an issue for judicial determination ... [u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise." AT&T, supra at 649, citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra at 582-583, and cases cited. The courts determine whether a contract to arbitrate exists partly because of contract law and partly because of a public policy favoring arbitration. "The willingness of parties to enter into agreements [to arbitrate] would be `drastically reduced,' however, if a labor arbitrator had the `power to determine his own jurisdiction.'" AT&T, supra at 651, quoting Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1509 (1959).

The third principle is that, "in deciding whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular grievance to arbitration, a court is not to rule on the potential merits of the underlying claims ... [including] determining whether there is particular language in the written instrument which will support the claim." AT&T, supra at 649-650, quoting United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., supra at 568. The final principle is that, "where the contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that `[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage ... Such a presumption is particularly applicable where the clause is ... broad" (emphasis added). AT&T, supra at 649, quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra at 582-583.⁹ The provisions of G. L. c. 150C, § 2 (a), embody these principles because a court must order arbitration, except under two conditions that reflect concerns over contract principles.

For this case, it is important to note that the Steelworkers Trilogy and the AT&T case all involved very broad arbitration clauses. A broad arbitration clause is known as a standard arbitration clause¹⁰ which essentially states that "all disputes" regarding the agreement are subject to arbitration. See AT&T, supra at 645 n.1 ("any differences arising with respect to the interpretation of this contract or ... any obligation" [unless excluded]); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 594 (1960) ("any differences `as to the meaning and application' of the agreement"); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra at 576 ("[s]hould differences arise ... as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement"); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., supra at 565 & n.1 ("all disputes between the parties `as to meaning, interpretation and application of the provisions of this agreement'"). See also Cape Cod Gas Co. v. United Steelworkers, Local...