School Committee of Southbridge v. Brown

• Decision Date: 20 June 1978
• Citation: 377 N.E.2d 935,375 Mass. 502
• Parties: , 98 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3178 SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF SOUTHBRIDGE v. Robert BROWN.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 935

377 N.E.2d 935

375 Mass. 502, 98 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3178

SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF SOUTHBRIDGE v. Robert BROWN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,Worcester.

Argued April 5, 1978.

Decided June 20, 1978.

Sandra C. Quinn, Boston (Brian A. Riley, Boston, with her), for defendant.

Matthew R. McCann, Worcester (James F. Cosgrove, Worcester, with him), for plaintiff.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and BRAUCHER, KAPLAN, WILKINS and LIACOS, JJ.

WILKINS, Justice.

The defendant (Brown), a fifth grade school teacher, appeals from an order staying arbitration of his grievance that the school committee improperly denied his request for a sabbatical leave. We granted Brown's application for direct appellate review.

Brown claims that the school committee agreed in a collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate any grievance concerning the denial of a sabbatical leave. The school committee replies that it did not agree to arbitrate such an issue, and that, even if it did, the grant or denial of sabbatical leaves is a subject vested by G.L. c. 71, § 41A exclusively in school committees and cannot be delegated to an arbitrator for decision. We conclude that the school committee did not agree to arbitration of decisions denying sabbatical leaves, but that it did agree to arbitration of claims that it inequitably or unfairly applied the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement concerning sabbatical leaves.

The collective bargaining agreement provides that, "(s)abbatical leave may be granted to members of the Southbridge Teachers' Association by the Superintendent of Schools for approved scholarly programs" subject to certain conditions. ¹ One condition was that "(n)o more than 3 (three) members of the teaching staff shall be absent on sabbatical leave at any one time." The collective bargaining agreement imposed a variety of obligations on the school committee, including provisions concerning filling of vacancies, evaluating teacher performance, making certain payroll deductions, and, of course, paying salaries and giving fringe benefits. A grievance is defined as "any alleged violation, misinterpretation or inequitable or unfair application of the provisions of this Agreement." The agreement provides four levels for resolution of grievances, culminating in arbitration of grievances not otherwise satisfactorily resolved.

In September, 1976, Brown applied for a sabbatical leave for the following school year to do a project in the field of anthropology. The superintendent of schools recommended that the application not be approved, and on November 2, 1976, the school committee voted to deny the application. Brown filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement, demanding that "the decision . . . be reversed and the sabbatical leave be granted." The school committee and the superintendent denied that the matter was subject to the grievance procedure but agreed to process the grievance and did so. The school committee voted to deny the grievance. Brown requested arbitration, and the school committee commenced this action under G.L. c. 150C, § 2(b )(2) to stay the arbitration proceeding. Section 2(b ), inserted by St.1959, c. 546, § 1, provides that "the superior court may stay an arbitration proceeding commenced or threatened if it finds . . . (2) that the claim sought to be arbitrated does not state a controversy covered by the provision for arbitration and (if it finds that) disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the arbitration provision are not themselves made subject to arbitration." ²

The question for decision is whether the claim which Brown seeks to arbitrate states "a controversy covered by the provision for arbitration" in the collective bargaining agreement. A request for arbitration of a grievance should not be treated with the precision expected of formal court pleadings, but we are unable to determine from Brown's grievance whether he is claiming a "violation," or a "misinterpretation," or an "inequitable or unfair application" of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, or some combination of these. We assume that Brown makes a claim under one or more of these conditions.

We recognize that our function is not to decide the merits of an arbitrable matter. That is the function of the arbitrator. School Comm. of Danvers v. Tyman, --- Mass. ---, --- ^a, 360 N.E.2d 877 (1977). Greene v. Mari & Sons Flooring Co., 362 Mass. 560, 563, 289 N.E.2d 860 (1972). United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-583, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). It is, however, the proper function of a court to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute. This is a matter of the intention of the parties. Because the language of the collective bargaining agreement is clear on the issue before us, we do not decide whether there is a presumption of arbitrability or of nonarbitrability in public sector collective bargaining agreements. ³

The collective bargaining agreement gives the school committee discretion in granting sabbatical leaves. This is consistent with G.L. c. 71, § 41A, which, subject to certain conditions, gives school committees discretion to grant leaves of absence for study. Because the collective bargaining agreement gives the school committee discretion on this subject, unlike many other matters, a decision to deny a sabbatical leave by itself does not violate the agreement. In the absence of explicit contrary language, discretionary decisions are not "violations" subject to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement involved here. We draw support for our interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement from the provision that no more than three teachers may be on sabbatical leave at any one time. If each sabbatical leave determination was intended for ultimate review and decision by an arbitrator, this numerical limitation might be...