Local No. 48, United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America

• Decision Date: 07 November 1990
• Docket Number: No. 90-1594,90-1594
• Citation: 920 F.2d 1047
• Parties: 136 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2001, 117 Lab.Cas. P 10,440 LOCAL NO. 48, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants, Appellees. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 1047

920 F.2d 1047

136 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2001, 117 Lab.Cas. P 10,440

LOCAL NO. 48, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 90-1594.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard Nov. 7, 1990.

Decided Dec. 7, 1990.

J. William Gagne, Jr., Hartford, Conn., with whom Harry B. Elliott, Jr., Prospect, Conn., and Gagne & Collins, Hartford, Conn., were on brief, for plaintiffs, appellants.

Christopher N. Souris, with whom Michael A. Feinberg and Feinberg, Charnas & Schwartz, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for defendants, appellees.

Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, BROWN ^* and BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judges.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

Local 48 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (UBCJA) and certain of its officers, arguing that the international union had unreasonably attempted to snuff out Local 48's life, brought suit in federal district court seeking money damages, an injunction, and other relief. ¹ The suit was premised upon section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185; sections 101, 302, 501, 609 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 411, 462, 501, 529; and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(3). The district court ruled in defendants' favor. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

UBCJA (an unincorporated international labor organization comprised of chartered subordinate bodies, including local unions, district councils, and the like) decided to merge Local 48 and Local 107 (both UBCJA affiliates). Local 48, based in Fitchburg, had jurisdiction over north-central Massachusetts. It numbered roughly 315 members. Local 107, based in Worcester, had jurisdiction over an area due south of Local 48's territory. Its membership was more than double that of Local 48.

The UBCJA Constitution (Constitution) grants the General President broad discretionary authority both to determine the viability of subordinate bodies and to define local unions' territorial boundaries. In relevant part, the Constitution provides:

The [UBCJA] is empowered, ... in the discretion of the General President subject to appeal to the General Executive Board, where the General President finds that it is in the best interests of the [UBCJA] and its members, locally or at large, to merge or consolidate Local Unions or Councils, to establish or dissolve any Local Unions or Councils, to establish or alter the trade or geographical jurisdiction of any Local Union or Council, ... including the right to establish statewide, province-wide and regional Local Unions or Councils.... The vested rights of the members shall be preserved and where action as herein described is taken the General President and General Executive Board shall preserve the membership rights of the members of the affected Local Unions....

Constitution Sec. 6-A.

In January 1990, the General President, Lucassen, ordered Local 48 merged into Local 107, effective February 1, 1990 (at which time Local 48 was to return its charter and deliver its assets and membership to Local 107). The vested membership rights of Local 48's enrollees were duly preserved. Notwithstanding, Local 48 voted to oppose the merger and appealed the order to UBCJA's General Executive Board (Board). After a hearing, the Board, finding the merger to comport with Section 6-A, sustained the order (which, under the Constitution, then became "final," that is, subject to no further review).

II. THE INSTANT LITIGATION

Five days later, plaintiffs sued to block the merger. Their complaint contained five counts. Characterizing the merger decision as "arbitrary, unreasonable and illegal," the first three counts charged that defendants' actions violated the LMRDA and the "contract" between the UBCJA and its local unions comprised by the Constitution and bylaws. Count 4 accused Lucassen and the district representative, Lia, see supra note 1, of conspiring to deprive plaintiffs of rights guaranteed by federal law in derogation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(3). Count 5 posited an illegal trusteeship. The International counterclaimed to enforce the merger.

The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on all counts and entered a permanent injunction restraining plaintiffs from further resisting the merger order. Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal and moved for interim relief in this court. We expedited the appeal. We also stayed both the merger and the injunction, permitting Local 48 to retain its separate identity and to continue expending funds in the ordinary course of its business (but only for certain carefully circumscribed purposes).

Before us, appellants raise issues by the baker's dozen, contending that the district court's reasoning was long on icing but short on substance. We consider these offerings, first discussing the applicable summary judgment standard (Part III); then moving to a discussion of two crusty issues that surround the first three counts of plaintiffs' complaint (Parts IV, V); and thereafter examining briefly a breadbasket of lesser issues (Part VI). Given the ingredients discernible in the record, leavened by the applicable principles of law, we conclude, without serious question, that the court below committed no reversible error (Part VII).

III. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Once the movant avers "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), the latter must establish the existence of at least one fact issue that is both "genuine" and "material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990); Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.1990). A "genuine" issue exists if the evidentiary submissions, viewed in the light most congenial to the nonmovant, will allow a rational factfinder to find in favor of either party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511; Medina-Munoz, 896 F.2d at 8. A "material" issue exists if the factual dispute necessarily "affect[s] the outcome of the suit," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510, in the sense that it "need[s] to be resolved before the related legal issues can be decided." Mack v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989); see also Garside, 895 F.2d at 48.

Rule 56 does not invite a court to enter the realm of surmise. Evidence that is based on conjecture or farfetched supposition is not sufficient to derail the operation of the rule. See Mack, 871 F.2d at 181. By the same token, "evidence [that] is merely colorable, or [ ] not significantly probative" cannot forestall summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11 (citation omitted). Even in cases involving so ineffable a matter as motive or intent, summary judgment may be warranted "if the nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Medina-Munoz, 896 F.2d at 8; see also Rossy v. Roche Products, Inc., 880 F.2d 621, 624 (1st Cir.1989); Oliver v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 109-10 (1st Cir.1988).

In this case, it is important to memorialize that plaintiffs, eschewing any and all discovery, served no interrogatories and took no depositions. Nor did they engage the gears of Rule 56(f) in an effort to buy time for such discovery. ² They must, therefore, bear the predictable consequences of the limited record which was before the district court. See Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985, 989 (1st Cir.1988) (remarking, in connection with a party's failure to use Rule 56(f), that: "Courts, like the Deity ... most frequently ... help those who help themselves.").

IV. THE URGE TO MERGE

In merging Local 48 into Local 107, Lucassen acted under Section 6-A of the Constitution, stating that he had determined consolidation to be in the best interests of the UBCJA and its members. In denying Local 48's appeal, the Board concluded that the decision comported with Section 6-A. Appellants do not dispute that the letter of Section 6-A gives the General President power to make such decisions and the Board power to ratify them. Rather, appellants would engraft an epibolic condition upon the exercise of these powers, requiring that the "best interests" determination be reasonable from the standpoint of all affected parties. The weight of authority is against them.

There is a well-established, soundly based policy of avoiding unnecessary judicial intrusion into the affairs of labor unions. See, e.g., Motion Picture & Videotape Editors Guild, Local 776 v. International Sound Technicians, Etc., Local 695, 800 F.2d 973, 975 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1022, 107 S.Ct. 3267, 97 L.Ed.2d 765 (1987); Jou-Jou Designs, Inc. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 643 F.2d 905, 911 (2d Cir.1981); Tincher v. Piasecki, 520 F.2d 851, 854 (7th Cir.1975). While the LMRDA is intended to protect union members against overreaching by their leaders, we have long since settled that the statute does not comprise "a license for judicial interference in the internal affairs of a union." Howard v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices, Etc., Local No. 131, 560 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir.1977). Courts have neither a monopoly on fairness nor a sufficient expertise in the administration of labor organizations to warrant pervasive judicial intervention in union affairs. Hence, we agree...