Lockett v. State, 03-DP-67

• Decision Date: 01 October 1992
• Docket Number: No. 03-DP-67,03-DP-67
• Citation: 614 So.2d 898
• Parties: Carl Daniel LOCKETT v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 898

614 So.2d 898

Carl Daniel LOCKETT v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 03-DP-67.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Oct. 1, 1992.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 10, 1993.

Rebecca L. Wiggs, Watkins & Eager, Jackson, for petitioner.

Michael C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Marvin L. White, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Charlene R. Pierce, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for respondent.

En Banc.

DAN M. LEE, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

I.

On December 13, 1985, John Calhoun and his wife, Geraldine, were murdered. The Grand Jury for the Circuit Court of Rankin County returned two (2) indictments against Carl Daniel Lockett, one for each of the murders. Following a change of venue to the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Lockett was subjected to two (2) trials--first for the murder of John, followed by trial for the murder of Geraldine. This opinion, the companion to Lockett I, concerns Lockett's first post-conviction application for relief from the conviction and death sentence imposed for the murder of Geraldine Calhoun--DP-67--Lockett II.

II.

Lockett was found guilty of murdering Geraldine Calhoun and sentenced to death based on the unanimous finding of three (3) aggravating factors:

1. The capital offense was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment.

2. The capital offense committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission or an attempt to commit, and flight after committing robbery, burglary and kidnapping.

3. The capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.

Lockett timely appealed his conviction and sentence to this Court on the following claims:

1. The State's racially discriminatory abuse of peremptory challenges violated Mr. Lockett's rights to a representative jury and equal protection under the sixth and fourteenth amendments.

2. The admission of evidence seized pursuant to an invalid search warrant that was issued by a partial magistrate and was never served upon the occupant of the house searched, and pursuant to a warrantless arrest within his house, violated Mr. Lockett's rights under the fourth amendment.

3. The confessions introduced against Lockett at trial were both involuntary and the fruit of the illegal search, seizure and arrest.

4. The introduction throughout both phases of Lockett's trial of evidence and argument concerning a distinct crime of murder, and other crimes, deprived Lockett of his rights under the constitutions of this State and of the United States.

5. The trial court erred in submitting to the jury the aggravating circumstance of a murder committed while under sentence of imprisonment.

6. The charge on capital murder was unacceptably duplicitous.

7. The submission of the same underlying felonies used to elevate the charge to capital murder to elevate it once more in the penalty phase contravened the proscription against double jeopardy.

8. The instructions at the penalty phase deprived Mr. Lockett of his rights under the fifth, sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and Mississippi law.

9. The prosecutor's closing argument at the penalty phase injected the impermissible element of Mr. Lockett's parole eligibility, at a point when he was precluded from rebutting the prosecution's theory.

10. The death sentence imposed upon Mr. Lockett is disproportionate and was the consequence of emotion and caprice.

On September 30, 1987, this Court, by written opinion, affirmed Lockett's conviction of the murder of Geraldine Calhoun and sentence of death in this Court's cause number DP-67. Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346 (Miss.1987). This Court denied the Petition for Rehearing January 13, 1988. Lockett then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court which was denied June 20, 1988. Lockett v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 1210, 108 S.Ct. 2858, 101 L.Ed.2d 895 (1988). On August 25, 1988, the United States Supreme Court denied Lockett's petition for rehearing. Lockett v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 1250, 109 S.Ct. 13, 101 L.Ed.2d 963 (1988).

On December 22, 1988, Lockett filed with this Court the subject of this Memorandum: his first application for post-conviction relief from conviction and death sentence for the murder of Geraldine Calhoun. Lockett seeks post-conviction relief on the following grounds:

1. The trial court erred in admitting a prior conviction as an aggravating circumstance.

2. The trial court erred in failing to suppress an invalid search warrant that was issued by a partial magistrate and was never served upon the occupant of the house searched and the fruits of the illegal search including Lockett's confession.

3. Petitioner was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase of his trial.

4. Mr. Lockett was denied the effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial.

5. The prosecutor's exclusion of all potential black jurors from petitioner's trial creates a prima facie violation of Batson v. Kentucky [476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69] and Griffith v. Kentucky [479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649].

6. Petitioner's sentence of death is tainted by racial prejudice and discrimination in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.

7. The Mississippi Supreme Court failed to make a proportionality review of the sentence in this case as required by State law and thereby violated Petitioner's rights.

8. Use of the "especially heinous, atrocious and cruel" aggravating circumstance failed to channel and limit the jury's discretion as required by the eighth amendment.

9. The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding the burden of proof when weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

10. The stacking of aggravating circumstances deprived petitioner of his rights under the eighth and fourteenth amendments.

11. Petitioner's Constitutional rights were violated by the exclusion from the jury of persons opposed to the death penalty.

12. The trial court's refusal to grant a mercy instruction deprived petitioner of his rights under the fifth, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and Mississippi law.

13. Mississippi's capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional when viewed as a whole.

Lockett filed two (2) additional Motions December 22, 1988: (1) Motion for Stay Pending Disposition of Motion to Vacate; and (2) Motion for appointment of counsel and for funds. This Court granted the Motion for Stay December 28, 1988; the motion for appointment of counsel and for funds is still pending and is addressed in this opinion.

III.

The procedural bars of waiver, different theories, and res judicata ¹ and the exception thereto as defined in Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 99-39-21(1-5) are applicable in death penalty PCR Applications. Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305 (Miss.1986); Evans v. State, 485 So.2d 276 (Miss.1986). Rephrasing direct appeal issues for post-conviction purposes will not defeat the procedural bar of res judicata. Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305 (Miss.1986); Rideout v. State, 496 So.2d 667 (Miss.1986); Gilliard v. State, 446 So.2d 590 (Miss.1984). The Petitioner carries the burden of demonstrating that his claim is not procedurally barred. Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 99-39-21(6) (Supp.1991); Cabello v. State, 524 So.2d 313, 320 (Miss.1988). However, "an alleged error should be reviewed, in spite of any procedural bar, only where the claim is so novel that it has not previously been litigated, or, perhaps, where an appellate court has suddenly reversed itself on an issue previously thought settled." Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305, 311 (Miss.1986).

IV.

Lockett readily admits that some of the PCR claims asserted were raised on direct appeal and decided adversely to him. However, he urges this Court to reconsider precedent governing those issues and address the claims raised because each claim concerns issues still debated in this country's death penalty jurisprudence.

The State contends that all of Lockett's claims, with the exception of the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, are procedurally barred by waiver and/or the doctrine of res judicata, and are void of any showing of cause or actual prejudice. Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 99-39-21(1-6).

Each of the claims raised in the PCR Application are individually addressed.

1. The trial court erred in admitting a prior conviction as an aggravating circumstance.

This claim was raised on direct appeal as assignment 4, addressed by this Court on direct appeal and decided adversely to Lockett. Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1354-55 (Miss.1987). Lockett has not demonstrated a novel claim nor a sudden reversal of law relative to this point which would exempt this claim from the procedural bar. Therefore, this issue is procedurally barred by the doctrine of res judicata pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 99-39-21(3) (Supp.1991). See also Rideout v. State, 496 So.2d 667 (Miss.1986); Mann v. State, 490 So.2d 910 (Miss.1986).

2. The trial court erred in failing to suppress an invalid search warrant that was issued by a partial magistrate and was never served upon the occupant of the house searched and the fruits of the illegal search including Lockett's confession.

This claim was raised on direct appeal as assignment 2, addressed by this Court on direct appeal and decided adversely to Lockett. Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1354 (Miss.1987). Lockett has not demonstrated a novel claim nor a sudden reversal of law relative to this point which would exempt this claim from the procedural bar. Therefore, this issue is procedurally barred by the doctrine of res judicata pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 99-39-21(3) (Supp.1991). See also Rideout v. State, 496 So.2d 667 (Miss.1986); Mann v. State, 490 So.2d 910 (Miss.1986).

3. Petitioner was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase of his trial.

4. Mr. Lockett was denied the effective assistance of counsel at...