Lockhart v. State

• Decision Date: 21 June 1890
• Citation: 13 S.W. 1012
• Parties: LOCKHART <I>v.</I> STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

13 S.W. 1012

LOCKHART

v. STATE.

Court of Appeals of Texas.

June 21, 1890.

Appeal from district court, McCulloch county; J. W. TIMMINS, Judge.

Prosecution for the larceny of 64 head of sheep. William Chaffin testified for the state that defendant told him that he had stolen the sheep, and that, at the request of defendant, he drew up a bill of sale purporting to transfer the sheep from a third party to defendant. On the subject of accomplice testimony, the court charged that a conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect defendant with the offense charged, and that the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense, and defined an "accomplice" in statutory language. Defendant was convicted, and appeals.

R. H. Ward and W. Anderson, for appellant. Asst. Atty. Gen. Davidson, for the State.

WHITE, P. J.

It is complained that the charge of the court upon accomplice testimony is insufficient in that it did not instruct the jury that the witness William Chaffin was an accomplice. The charge, as far as it went, sufficiently charged the law. Willson, Crim. St. § 2455. It could have been made more pointed, perhaps, by directly submitting to the jury the necessity of the corroboration of the accomplice testimony, if they should find from the evidence and law as given that said Chaffin was an accomplice; but, in the absence of a special requested instruction amplifying the charge in that respect, no error is made to appear.

Exception was made to the charge of the court upon recent possession, the objectionable language being as follows: "When the state relies upon the possession of recently stolen property as a presumption of guilt," etc. This was tantamount to telling the jury that guilt was presumable, and might be presumed from recent possession. Recent possession is but a fact or circumstance to be weighed by the jury in determining the question of guilt. The inculpatory inference from such recent possession is not a presumption or conclusion of law, but a deduction of fact to be drawn and ascertained by the jury alone from the circumstances of the case. Boyd's Case, 24 Tex. App. 570, 6 S. W. Rep. 853; Mattock's Case, 25 Tex. App. 654, 8 S. W. Rep. 818; Florez's Case, 26 Tex. App. 477, 9 S. W. Rep. 772. To charge the jury that recent possession is a presumption of guilt would be a charge directly upon the weight of evidence. The charge excepted to...