Lockridge v. City of Oldsmar, Fla.
| Decision Date | 27 September 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 8:03CV1246T27EAJ.,8:03CV1246T27EAJ. |
| Citation | 397 F.Supp.2d 1347 |
| Parties | Bill LOCKRIDGE d/b/a Loa Outdoor Advertising d/b/a Lockridge Outdoor Advertising Agency, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF OLDSMAR, FLORIDA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Brooks C. Rathet, Reznicsek & Fraser, P.A., Ponte Vedra Beach, FL, E. Adam Webb, William E. Porter, Webb & Porter, L.L.C., Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.
Cristine M. Russell, William David Brinton, Jacksonville, FL, Shauna F. Morris, Frazer Hubbard Brandt, Trask & Yacavone, Dunedin, FL, for Defendant.
BEFORE THE COURT are Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt.69), Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support (Dkt.70), Defendant's Opposition (Dkt.78), Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.83), Defendant's Memorandum in Support (Dkt.84), and Plaintiff's Opposition (Dkt.92). Upon consideration, the Court having conducted a hearing on August 17, 2005, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt.69) is GRANTED, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.83) is DENIED.
On May 29, 2003, Plaintiff, Bill Lockridge d/b/a LOA Outdoor Advertising d/b/a Lockridge Outdoor Advertising Agency, filed applications with Defendant, City of Oldsmar, for permits for the erection of nine commercial billboards. (Dkt.84, App.41). On May 30, 2003, the applications were denied based upon § 13.3.3(3) of Defendant's Sign Regulations ("ordinance") set forth in Article XIII of the City's Land Development Code ("LDC"). (Dkt.84, App.9, Ex. 9).
As of the date of Plaintiff's applications, Article II of the LDC defined a billboard as: "A non-point-of-sale sign which advertises a business, organization, event, person, place or thing, unless such sign is more specifically defined herein." (Dkt.84, App.10, p. 2). Section 13.3.3(3) of the ordinance provided: "Prohibited signs: Off-premise signs, including billboard signs, except where specifically provided for elsewhere in this Article." (Dkt.1, Ex. 1, pp. 4-5). Section 13.1.2(3) provided: (Dkt.1, Ex. 1, p. 2). Pursuant to § 13.1.1, the purposes of the ordinance are:
"to encourage the effective use of signs as a means of communication in the City; to maintain and enhance the aesthetic environment and the City's ability to attract and maintain sources of economic development; to improve pedestrian and traffic safety; to minimize the possible adverse effect of signs on nearby public and private property; to ensure that signs are constructed, installed and maintained in a safe and satisfactory manner, and to enable the fair and consistent enforcement of this Article."
On June 16, 2003, Plaintiff filed this suit against Defendant, challenging the rejection of his applications and the constitutionality of the ordinance. (Dkt.1, Compl.). Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order declaring the ordinance unconstitutional and void and directing the grant of his applications and erection of the requested billboards. (Dkt.1). Plaintiff also seeks monetary damages associated with the denial of his applications based on the allegedly unconstitutional ordinance.1 (Dkt.1).
On June 15, 2004, Defendant repealed and amended portions of its LDC, including portions of Article II and Article XIII (Ordinance Nos.2004-09 and 2004-10). (Dkt.31, Exs.1-2). Plaintiff challenges only the constitutionality of the former ordinance in this action. The new ordinance is not before this Court.2
Summary judgment is proper if following discovery, the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits and admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The Court must view all evidence and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir.1997). Judgment in favor of a party is proper where there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party on the issue before the Court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
The Court must consider threshold jurisdictional issues before analyzing Plaintiff's constitutional claims. See Coral Springs Street Sys. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir.2004).
To meet the constitutional requirements for standing, a plaintiff must show that: (1) it suffered or is immediately likely to suffer an injury in fact; (2) a causal connection exists between the injury and the alleged conduct; and (3) there is a likelihood that a favorable judicial decision will redress the injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Tanner Adver. Group, L.L.C. v. Fayette County, Ga., 411 F.3d 1272, 1274 (11th Cir.2005). Injury in fact means the plaintiff has suffered or is likely to suffer an injury that amounts to "an invasion of a legally protected interest" which is "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent" rather than "conjectural or hypothetical" and that affects the plaintiff in a "personal and individual way." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (quotations and citations omitted); see also Tanner Adver. Group, L.L.C., 411 F.3d at 1274. Causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of means that the injury is "fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (quotations and citations omitted). Lastly, it must be "likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (quotations and citations omitted).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has met the constitutional requirements for standing. The record establishes that Plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact, namely the loss of income from the billboards he was not permitted to erect. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The injury is causally connected to the allegedly unconstitutional ordinance upon which the application denials were based. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Further, there is a likelihood that a favorable judicial decision would redress the injury by allowing the billboards to be erected and money damages to be awarded. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130.
Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff's standing to challenge the specific provision(s) of the ordinance upon which his applications were denied (§ 13.3.3(3)). (Dkt.84, p. 12). Defendant does, however, dispute that Plaintiff has standing to challenge the entire ordinance on its face.3 (Dkt.84, pp. 13-14).
Generally, a plaintiff who meets the constitutional requirements of standing may only assert its own legal rights and interests, as opposed to the legal rights and interests of third parties. Tanner Adver. Group, L.L.C., 411 F.3d at 1274. However, an exception to this limitation on standing exists under the "overbreadth doctrine," where facial challenges to ordinances are permitted for the benefit of litigants and third parties. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 504, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981); Tanner Adver. Group, L.L.C., 411 F.3d at 1275-76. Under this doctrine, a party who meets the standing requirements is permitted to challenge the constitutionality of an ordinance as it was applied, as well as to facially challenge the entire ordinance. Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 504, 101 S.Ct. 2882; Tanner Adver. Group, L.L.C., 411 F.3d at 1277.
Defendant relies on Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, Fla., 351 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir.2003), in support of its argument that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert a facial challenge to the ordinance under the overbreadth doctrine. However, this argument ignores the holding in Tanner Advertising, in which the Eleventh Circuit applied the "prior precedent" rule and disregarded the narrow approach to the overbreadth doctrine employed in Granite State v. Clearwater. In Tanner Advertising, the court expressly concluded that because the plaintiff suffered an injury in fact as to a particular provision of an ordinance (and otherwise met the standing requirements), the plaintiff had standing to challenge the ordinance in its entirety.4 Tanner Adver Group, L.L.C., 411 F.3d at 1277. Under Tanner Advertising, Plaintiff has met the constitutional requirements and has standing to challenge the ordinance both facially and as applied.
Defendant asserts that this case is moot based on its repeal of the ordinance. Plaintiff asserts that the case is not moot based on the doctrine of voluntary cessation and his acquisition of vested rights in the billboards he applied for.
A case is moot when circumstances subsequent to the challenged conduct preclude a court from awarding a plaintiff meaningful relief. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 162 F.3d 627, 629 (11th Cir.1998). "[I]f a suit is moot, it cannot present an Article III case or controversy and the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to entertain it." Coral Springs, 371 F.3d at 1328. A case can become moot based on a change in circumstances or a change in the law. Id. Whether repeal or amendment of a law moots a case depends on what relief a plaintiff seeks.
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