Lockridge v. State
| Decision Date | 17 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-12-00034-CR,06-12-00034-CR |
| Parties | TORONTO E. LOCKRIDGE, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Before drug dealer Kelvin Muckleroy was fatally shot in his own kitchen, his live-in girlfriend, Kamica Barron, trying to protect her children in a closet toward the rear of the same house, heard Muckleroy plead, She then heard three gunshots.
Toronto E. Lockridge, identified at trial as "Trigger," was convicted of murdering Muckleroy and was sentenced to life in prison, at least in part based on the testimony of an accomplice, Brandon Horne. He appeals on numerous grounds.1
We affirm the judgment of the trial court because (1) admitting Horne's testimony was proper, (2) sufficient evidence supports Lockridge's conviction, (3) no error was preserved regarding the admission of Lockridge's prior testimony, (4) lack of an accomplice-witness instruction was not egregiously harmful, and (5) counsel's failure to request an accomplice-witness instruction was not prejudicial.
Horne, also known as "Bull," was reportedly at the residence with Lockridge and Muckleroy at the time of the shooting. Lockridge argues that the trial court erred in allowing Horne's testimony from a previous trial to be read to the jury. We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court's decision to admit evidence. Cameron v. State, 241 S.W.3d 15, 19(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). "A trial court does not abuse its discretion if the decision to admit evidence is within the 'zone of reasonable disagreement.'" Marsh v. State, 343 S.W.3d 475, 478 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. ref'd) (). "If the trial court's decision on the admission of evidence is supported by the record, there is no abuse of discretion, and the trial court will not be reversed." Id. (citing Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 379). We will not substitute our own decision for that of the trial court. Id. (citing Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)).
Horne was called, but refused to testify at Lockridge's trial. The trial court informed Horne that he had "the constitutional right not to answer questions" "because [Horne] still ha[d] a case pending." Horne invoked this right, and the trial court determined that, "[b]y invoking his constitutional rights, that also makes him unavailable to testify." The State then sought to introduce sworn testimony Horne had given in Lockridge's previous trial for this charge, which resulted in a mistrial. Lockridge's counsel objected to the reading of the transcript on the ground that Horne was available to testify because he was present and because he would "not have an opportunity to confront him." Finding that Lockridge had the opportunity to cross-examine Horne at the previous trial, the court allowed the direct and cross-examinations of Horne from the previous trial to be read.
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted" and is generally not admissible unless allowed "by other rules prescribed pursuant to statutory authority." TEX. R. EVID. 801(d), 802.
Rule 804 of the Texas Rules of Evidence provides:
Davis v. State, 961 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Baird, J., concurring) (citing Bryan v. State, 837 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), abrogated on other grounds, Trevino v. State, 991 S.W.2d 849, 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)).
Lockridge argues that Horne was not rendered "unavailable" by his refusal to testify because he was present during the trial. However, '"[u]navailablity as a witness' includes situations in which the declarant: (1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement." TEX. R. EVID. 804(a)(1). When a witness invokes "his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination . . . he bec[omes] 'unavailable' for purposes of Rule 804(a)(1)." Davis, 961 S.W.2d at 159 (Baird, J., concurring) (citing Bryan, 837 S.W.2d at 644); see Del Carmen Hernandez v. State, 273 S.W.3d 685, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Appling v. State, 904 S.W.2d 912, 916 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, pet. ref'd). Therefore, Horne was unavailable underthe meaning of Rule 804 because he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Next, "as a general rule, when the parties, the charge, and the issues to be litigated are the same in the first and second trials, the two proceedings are necessarily the same and former testimony is admissible." Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 739 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Bryan, 837 S.W.2d at 644). Horne's testimony was from Lockridge's previous trial that terminated in a mistrial. Thus, the parties, charges, and issues were necessarily the same. Finally, the record of Horne's testimony established that Lockridge had an opportunity and similar motive to cross-examine Horne in the previous trial.
We find no error in the trial court's admission of Horne's testimony. See TEX. R. EVID. 804. Accordingly, we overrule this point of error.
In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict to determine whether any rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of murder. Brooks v. State,2 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); Hartsfield v. State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref'd) (citing Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury "to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimatefacts." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19). In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we must evaluate all of the evidence in the record, both direct and circumstantial, whether admissible or inadmissible. Shaw v. State, 122 S.W.3d 358, 364 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (citing Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)).
Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge "sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried." Id. Here, Lockridge committed the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly caused Muckleroy's death. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1) (West 2011).
Muckleroy was a drug dealer who was gunned down in his own residence, allegedly by Lockridge, after a drug deal took an unexpected turn. Lockridge's longtime friend, Monda Harris, testified that Lockridge was commonly known to others by his street name, "Trigger." According to Harris, Lockridge visited her home at 917 Douglas Street, September 23, 2009, at approximately 7:00 p.m. to borrow her two-door, blue Pontiac Grand Am for what Harris believed would be a "short trip and back." Instead, Harris would not see her car until the following morning after it had been used in the commission of a crime.
Barron, Muckleroy's girlfriend, lived in Muckleroy's residence with her children. After the children were in their room asleep, Barron saw Horne drive up to the Muckleroy residence ina black Cadillac and engage in conversation with Muckleroy outside the residence at 1:00 or 2:00 a.m. After Horne left, Barron remembered that Muckleroy received a telephone call at 3:00 a.m. which led to a heated discussion. Muckleroy warned Barron to go to the back room of the house because he was expecting Horne's return.
Barron testified that Horne returned and was speaking with Muckleroy in the kitchen when she heard a third party walk in.3 Muckleroy told the third party that he just needed to speak with Horne. Both Horne and the third party commanded Muckleroy "to get down," adding, "You know what time it is." Barron immediately understood this to be a serious threat. She "grabbed [her] kids and . . . hid in the closet." From the closet, she could hear the men asking Muckleroy, Muckleroy assured them that they had everything and begged for his...
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