Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp.

• Decision Date: 25 August 1998
• Docket Number: Nos. 15832,15833,s. 15832
• Citation: 246 Conn. 563,717 A.2d 215
• Parties: Raymond M. LODGE et al. v. ARETT SALES CORPORATION et al. Patricia HUGHES, Administratrix (Estate of Howard A. Hughes) et al. v. ARETT SALES CORPORATION et al. Maritza RIVERA, Administratrix (Estate of Heriberto Rivera) et al. v. ARETT SALES CORPORATION et al. James A. MOROTTO, Jr. et al. v. ARETT SALES CORPORATION et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 215

717 A.2d 215

246 Conn. 563

Raymond M. LODGE et al. v. ARETT SALES CORPORATION et al.

Patricia HUGHES, Administratrix (Estate of Howard A. Hughes) et al. v. ARETT SALES CORPORATION et al.

Maritza RIVERA, Administratrix (Estate of Heriberto Rivera) et al. v. ARETT SALES CORPORATION et al.

James A. MOROTTO, Jr. et al. v. ARETT SALES CORPORATION et al.

Nos. 15832, 15833.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 19, 1998.

Decided Aug. 25, 1998.

[246 Conn. 565] Frank H. Santoro, with whom was Matthew G. Conway, Hartford, for defendant Baker Protective Services, Inc., Wells Fargo Alarm Services Division.

Brian M. Gildea, with whom, on the brief, was Thomas E. Stevens, New Haven, for defendant Advanced Automatic Sprinkler Protection Systems, Inc.

James K. Robertson, Jr., with whom were Giovanna T. Weller, John R. Horvack, Jr., and, on the brief, Michael A. D'Amico, Waterbury William J. Tracy, Jr., Terryville, for plaintiff Maritza Rivera et al.

and Neil Rossman, for plaintiff Raymond Lodge et al.

Thomas G. Parisot, with whom were John J. Coughlin and, on the brief, Eric R. Brown, Waterbury, for defendant Arett Sales Corporation.

Andrew J. O'Keefe, Hartford, with whom was Joseph M. Busher, for City of Waterbury.

William H. Narwold, Charles D. Ray, Hartford, and Mary C. Morabito, New York City, filed a brief for Connecticut Business and Insurance Industry Association, Inc., as amicus curiae.

John T. Harris, Sheila A. Huddleston, S. Bryan Lawrence III and F.J. Lucchino, Pittsburgh, PA, filed a brief for National Burglar and Fire Alarm Association et al. as amici curiae.

J. William Gagne, Jr., Wethersfield, filed a brief for Waterbury Fire Fighters Association, Local 1339, as amicus curiae.

David T. Grudberg, filed a brief for Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, PALMER and EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Chief Justice.

The dispositive issue in these appeals is whether the defendants, who negligently caused the transmission of a false fire alarm, are liable to firefighters injured during an accident precipitated by the negligent maintenance and failure of the brakes on the responding fire engine. ¹ The plaintiffs ² are two Waterbury firefighters, the representatives of the estates of two Waterbury firefighters, and three of the firefighters' spouses. They brought this action against three defendants--Baker Protective Services, Inc., Wells Fargo Alarm Services Division (Wells Fargo), Arett Sales Corporation (Arett), and Advanced Automatic Sprinkler Protection Systems, Inc. (Advanced). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants negligently caused the transmission of a false fire alarm to which the plaintiffs responded. They allege further that, while they were responding to the false alarm, the brakes of their fire engine failed, causing the engine to strike a tree. As a result of the collision, two firefighters died and the surviving plaintiffs suffered serious injuries. The jury returned a verdict against the defendants in favor of the plaintiffs in excess of $4.4 million. ³ The defendants The record reveals the following facts. Wells Fargo installed a burglar and fire alarm system at premises owned by Arett in Waterbury. After Wells Fargo began monitoring the system, but prior to the time the system became fully operational, Wells Fargo contracted with Advanced to perform certain services on the system. Although Advanced asked both Wells Fargo and Arett whether the system was operational and monitored, both responded that it was not. On the morning of May 10, 1990, Advanced proceeded to perform the necessary services without first testing whether the system was operational and without taking steps to shut the system down. At no time during the course of the services being performed by Advanced was the alarm monitoring station or the local fire dispatch center notified that service was being performed on the Arett system. The failure to give such notice was contrary to both the internal policies of Wells Fargo and the standards of the National Fire Protection Association. It is likely that proper notification would have prevented a response to the false alarm that resulted from the performance of services on Arett's alarm system.

appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, now § 65-1, and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Additionally, on the morning on which Advanced was working on the system, the Wells Fargo monitoring station received two supervisory signals, which are indicative of a problem with the system. Although proper procedures mandated that the monitoring station contact the client to determine the nature of the problem, the monitoring station never contacted Arett. Had the station followed proper procedure, it would have learned that service was being performed on the system and could have made the necessary notation to avoid reporting the subsequent false alarm. Two minutes after the second supervisory signal was received at the monitoring station, an alarm was received indicating the existence of a fire at Arett. When a system transmits a fire alarm soon after a supervisory signal, it often indicates that the system is being serviced and that the alarm is false. Nonetheless, the monitoring station erroneously notified the Waterbury fire department at approximately 11:20 a.m. that a fire was in progress at Arett's business location. ⁴ Waterbury Fire Engine Company 11 (Engine Company 11) was dispatched to respond to the alarm. Engine Company 11 was operating Engine Number 9 (engine), a spare vehicle provided to them while their primary vehicle was undergoing repairs. A fire engine carries water and hoses, as opposed to a fire truck, which provides aerial ladders.

Prior to receiving the alarm concerning Arett, James Morotto, the driver for Engine Company 11, had been advised by the previous driver that the engine's brakes were not functioning properly. When Morotto tested the brakes, however, they appeared to be adequate. When the engine crew attended a training session that morning, however, Morotto observed while in transit that the engine's brakes were not operating correctly. After the training session, therefore, Morotto brought the engine to the city garage for repair. The mechanic on duty noted that the engine's brakes needed minor adjustments, but informed the crew that he was unable to perform the service until after lunch.

The alarm from Arett was received soon after Engine Company 11 returned to its base and before the engine's brakes were repaired. The engine crew responded to the alarm, which they believed to be legitimate. Because of wet road conditions, Morotto flipped a switch to eliminate power to the engine's front brakes because, although this reduces braking power by approximately 50 percent, it is usually safer to operate without front brakes on wet roads. After having The engine's brake failure was caused by a leak in a water hose. The city had been aware of the leak for some time, and the engine's crew had made repeated requests to repair the hose. Several requests to repair the brakes also had been made. The leaking water had caused the engine's braking mechanism to rust, creating the braking problem.

gone approximately three blocks, the engine began to descend a hill. It was traveling at approximately fifteen miles per hour when Morotto realized that the engine's brakes had failed. Attempts to use the engine's auxiliary brake were unsuccessful. Because cars were stopped at the bottom of the hill, Morotto attempted to veer into a parking lot, the entrance to which was partially blocked by a car. While attempting to swerve around the car, Morotto struck an embankment, which caused him to lose control of the vehicle and strike a tree.

The plaintiffs, as employees of the city of Waterbury, were subject to workers' compensation law and received benefits pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act. General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. Consequently, they have no cause of action against the city for negligence for allowing the brakes to fail. General Statutes § 31-284(a). ⁵ The plaintiffs brought this action against Arett, Advanced and Wells Fargo seeking to hold them liable for the full extent of the plaintiffs' harm owing to the negligent transmission of the false alarm to which the plaintiffs were responding when they were killed or injured.

It cannot be disputed that there was adequate evidence from which the jury could have found that the defendants acted negligently in causing and reporting the false alarm, and the defendants concede that if they owed a duty to the plaintiffs, a breach of that duty could have been found. As a threshold matter, therefore, it is necessary to determine whether, as a matter of law, the defendants owed the plaintiffs a duty of care to protect them from the harm that occurred while they were responding to the false alarm. The defendants argue that they cannot be held to have owed a duty to the plaintiffs because the failure of the engine's brakes, which precipitated the collision, is beyond the scope of the reasonably foreseeable risks created by their negligent conduct. The plaintiffs contend, however, that any collision of a fire engine with any object, for any reason, is a foreseeable risk whenever an engine is responding to an emergency, and, therefore, a duty toward them must be imposed on the defendants.

"Duty is 'a legal conclusion about relationships between individuals, made after the fact, and imperative to a negligence cause of action. The nature of the duty, and the specific persons to whom it is owed, are determined by the circumstances surrounding the conduct of the individual.' 2 D. Pope, Connecticut Actions and Remedies, Tort Law (1993) § 25:05, p. 25-7." Jaworski v. Kiernan, 241 Conn. 399, 405, ...