Woodson v. State
Decision Date | 02 May 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 53A01–1109–PC–466.,53A01–1109–PC–466. |
Citation | 966 N.E.2d 780 |
Parties | Leondre WOODSON, Appellant–Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Respondent. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Stephen T. Owens, Public Defender of Indiana, Linda G. Nicholson, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Angela N. Sanchez, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Appellant–Petitioner Leondre Woodson appeals from the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"), in which Woodson claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm.
The facts underlying this post-conviction proceeding were detailed by this court in our unpublished disposition of Woodson's direct appeal:
Woodson v. State, No. 53A05–0604–CR–174, 2007 WL 506890, slip op. at 1–2 (Ind.Ct.App., Feb. 19, 2007), trans. denied.
Prior to trial, Woodson filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from the rental car. On December 9, 2005, the trial court denied Woodson's motion to suppress. During the subsequent trial, Woodson's trial counsel did not renew any objection to evidence regarding the items seized from the rental car. On December 13, 2005, Woodson was convicted of Class C felony cocaine possession, Class C felony possession of cocaine while in possession of a firearm, and Class B felony possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. The trial court sentenced Woodson to an aggregate sentence of twenty years of incarceration. On direct appeal, this court ordered Woodson's possession of cocaine while in possession of a firearm conviction vacated and affirmed in all other respects, leaving his aggregate sentence unaffected. See Woodson, No. 53A05–0604–CR–174, slip op. at 5.
On May 13, 2008, Woodson filed his pro se PCR petition. On February 10, 2011, Woodson filed his amended PCR petition. On August 24, 2011, the post-conviction court denied Woodson's PCR petition.
Our standard for reviewing the denial of a PCR petition is well-settled:
In reviewing the judgment of a post-conviction court, appellate courts consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting its judgment. The post-conviction court is the sole judge of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. To prevail on appeal from denial of postconviction relief, the petitioner must show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite to that reached by the post-conviction court.... Only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, and the post-conviction court has reached the opposite conclusion, will its findings or conclusions be disturbed as being contrary to law.
Hall v. State, 849 N.E.2d 466, 468, 469 (Ind.2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the principles enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) :
[A] claimant must demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms, and that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice. Prejudice occurs when the defendant demonstrates that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." A reasonable probability arises when there is a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ind.2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Because an inability to satisfy either prong of this test is fatal to an ineffective assistance claim, this court need not even evaluate counsel's performance if the petitioner suffered no prejudice from that performance. Vermillion v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (Ind.1999).
Woodson contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object at trial to the admission of evidence related to the search of the rental car, thereby failing to preserve the issue for direct appeal. Woodson contends that (1) continued police detention and investigation beyond writing a traffic ticket violated Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and (2) the record does not support a conclusion that he had apparent authority to consent to a search of the rental car, rendering the search improper under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Woodson argues that raising these claims on appeal would have had a reasonable likelihood of success and that the failure to preserve them therefore prejudiced him.
Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1146, 1153 (Ind.2005).
At the suppression hearing, Officer Harris testified regarding the traffic stop. According to Officer Harris, he was alone on patrol at approximately 11:30 p.m. when he pulled the rental car over. Upon receiving Onyeji's driver's license from him, Officer Harris observed Onyeji push aside a handgun when he reached for the registration. Onyeji had not previously warned Officer Harris of the presence of the handgun. At that point, Officer Harris pulled his weapon and ordered the duo to place their hands behind their heads while he called for backup, which arrived approximately four...
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