Lombardo v. Lombardo

• Citation: 35 S.W.3d 386
• Parties: (Mo.App. W.D. 2000) Sandra L. Lombardo (DeHaan), Appellant, v. Richard J. Lombardo, Respondent. WD57222 0
• Decision Date: 08 February 2000
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

35 S.W.3d 386 (Mo.App. W.D. 2000)

Sandra L. Lombardo (DeHaan), Appellant, v. Richard J. Lombardo, Respondent.

WD57222

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District

02/08/2000

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Cass County, Hon. Thomas M. Campbell, Judge

Counsel for Appellant: Kenneth C. Hensley

Counsel for Respondent: Daniel W. Olsen

Opinion Summary: Sandra L. Lombardo (DeHaan) appeals from the circuit court's judgment declaring the parties' nineteen-year-old child emancipated for purposes of continuing child support pursuant to section 452.340.5 RSMo Supp. 1998.

AFFIRMED.

Majority opinion holds: One way section 452.340.5 RSMo Supp. 1998 extends the child support obligation of a non-custodial parent past the age of majority is to require continued child support while the child attends college provided, among other requirements not at issue, the child: (1) enrolls in college; (2) completes at least twelve hours of credit each semester; and (3) achieve grades sufficient to re-enroll at the college. The parties' child did not satisfy the second requirement. Although she enrolled in twelve hours her first semester and was eligible to re-enroll under academic probation, she only received credit for six of the twelve hours. Thus, she did not "complete" at least twelve hours of credit and was properly declared emancipated under section 452.340.5 RSMo Supp. 1998, thereby terminating the continuing child support obligation.

Victor C. Howard, Judge

Opinion modified by Court's own motion on March 28, 2000. This substitution does not constitute a new opinion.

Sandra L. Lombardo appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Cass County ordering the parties' nineteen-year-old child emancipated as of January 1, 1999, thereby terminating respondent's continuing child support obligation under section 452.340.5 RSMo Supp. 1998.¹

The judgment is affirmed.

I. BACKGROUND

Sandra L. and Richard J. Lombardo (appellant and respondent respectively) were married. One child, Amanda, was born of the marriage on November 17, 1979. The parties were subsequently divorced, and respondent was ordered to pay child support. After turning eighteen, Amanda quit high school and obtained her General Equivalency Diploma (GED) in January of 1998. The court then modified respondent's support obligation, ordering him to pay $1,000 per month in child support directly to Amanda, to make the lease payments on her car, and to maintain Amanda on his insurance.

Amanda enrolled in twelve hours of courses at the University of Texas at San Antonio for the fall semester of 1998. She subsequently failed two of the courses (six hours) and received credit for the other two.² Although eligible to re-enroll at the University of Texas at San Antonio on academic probation for the spring 1999 semester, Amanda chose instead to enroll in twelve hours at the College of San Antonio, a junior college.

Respondent subsequently filed a "Notice of Emancipation" seeking to have Amanda declared emancipated for purposes of child support. In the "Notice," respondent alleged that Amanda enrolled at Longview College in the spring of 1998 and failed to complete any portion of those classes. He further alleged that Amanda enrolled in twelve hours at the University of Texas at San Antonio, for the 1998 fall semester and had the problems indicated above. The respondent terminated support after December of 1998. After the emancipation issue was submitted to the Cass County Circuit Court on a stipulation of facts, the court adjudged Amanda to be emancipated as of January 1, 1999, thereby terminating respondent's support obligation to Amanda.

Appellant subsequently filed this appeal seeking interpretation of the requirements for continuing support as set forth in section 452.340.5 -- the relevant section the trial court relied on in entering its judgment in favor of emancipation.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a court-tried case, Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976) requires an appellate court to affirm the trial court's judgment unless: (1) there is no substantial evidence to support it; (2) the judgment is against the weight of the evidence; or (3) the trial court erroneously declared or applied the law. At issue is the meaning of "completes at least twelve hours of credit" as set forth in section 452.340.5. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, "and where the lower court rules on matters of law, it is not discretionary." Knipp v. Director of Revenue, 984 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998). Thus, we conduct an independent review, granting no deference to the trial court's determination of the law. Barry Serv. Agency Co. v. Manning, 891 S.W.2d 882, 887 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995).

III. CONTINUING CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION UNDER SECTION 452.340.5

Missouri extends the child support obligation of a non-custodial parent past the age of eighteen in certain instances. Section 452.340.3(5). This appeal is based on section 452.340.5, which reads, in pertinent part:

If when a child reaches age eighteen, . . . the child is enrolled in an institution of vocational or higher education not later than October first following . . . completion of a graduation equivalence degree program and so long as the child enrolls for and completes at least twelve hours of credit each semester . . . at an institution of vocational or higher education and achieves grades sufficient to reenroll at such institution, the parental support obligation shall continue until the child completes his or her education, or until the child reaches the age of twenty-two, whichever first occurs.

(Emphasis added.) At issue is what the statute means by "completes" in terms of the "completes at least twelve hours of credit" requirement. This statute was amended in 1997 to add the language at issue, and its interpretation appears to be an issue of first impression. Therefore, we examine the statute in order to determine, "the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider words used in the statute in their plain and ordinary meaning." Farmers' & Laborers' Coop. Ins. Ass'n v. Director of Revenue, 742 S.W.2d 141, 145 (Mo. banc 1987); see also Mickey v. City Wide Maintenance, 996 S.W.2d 144, 148-49 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999). In deciding whether a statute is clear and unambiguous so as to ascertain the intent of the legislature, the appellate court must consider whether the language is plain and clear to a person of ordinary intelligence. Wheeler v. Board of Police Comm'rs of Kansas City, 918 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996). Only when the language is ambiguous or its plain meaning would lead to an illogical result will the court look past the plain and ordinary meaning of a statute. Id.

The pertinent portion of the statute reads: "[the support obligation will continue] so long as the child enrolls for and completes at least twelve hours of credit each semester . . . at an institution of vocational or higher education and achieves grades sufficient to reenroll at such institution." Section 452.340.5 (emphasis added). Reading this statute according to its plain meaning, there are three main requirements that a child must meet in order for the non-custodial parent to remain liable for support while she attends college: ³ (1) she must enroll in college; (2) she must complete at least twelve hours of credit each semester; and (3) she must achieve grades sufficient to re-enroll at the college. Again, it is the second requirement and what is meant by use of the word "completes" that is at issue in this appeal. However, we consider all three requirements in order to better understand the legislature's intent.

Because the statute does not expressly define "completes," we consult a dictionary. Moon Shadow, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 945 S.W.2d 436, 437 (Mo. banc 1997). The sixth edition of Black's Law Dictionary defines "complete" as, "to finish; accomplish that which one starts out to do." To satisfy the first requirement a student must be enrolled in college. In order to "finish" the required twelve-hour minimum, the student must receive credit for twelve hours. Otherwise, she will not progress toward a degree, or, in other words, she will not "accomplish that which one starts out to do." We believe it is clear that the legislature, by saying, "completes at least twelve hours of credit," intended that the student must receive credit for at least twelve hours worth of courses each semester. A student does not receive "credit" by merely enrolling and attending class. The Cambridge International Dictionary of American English defines "credit" as, "a successfully completed part of an educational course."

Appellant suggests that "complete," as used in section 452.340.5, does not mean successfully complete, but rather, appellant believes, "as long as the child is attending classes regularly, does not drop the class, and is making a good faith effort to finish the course, the student has 'completed' such course." We do not believe that was the legislature's intent. To so rule would make the second requirement that the student "complete" the twelve hours he or she is enrolled in superfluous. A student is not required only to attend twelve hours of classes, but to "complete" twelve hours of "credit."

In order for a student to remain eligible for such continued parental support, he or she must also submit a transcript showing each parent "the courses the child is enrolled in and has completed for each term, the grades and credits received for each such course, and [a class schedule for the following semester showing eligibility to re-enroll and enrollment in at least twelve hours]." Section 452.340.5 (emphasis added). This additional requirement provides the parents with sufficient information to determine if the non-custodial parent is still required, under the statute, to support his or her child through college. The legal file on appeal includes Amanda's ...