London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Sterling

• Decision Date: 11 September 1919
• Citation: 124 N.E. 286,233 Mass. 485
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: LONDON GUARANTEE & ACCIDENT CO., Limited, v. STERLING (two cases). STERLING v. LONDON GUARANTEE & ACCIDENT CO., Limited (two cases).

233 Mass. 485

124 N.E. 286

LONDON GUARANTEE & ACCIDENT CO., Limited,

v.STERLING (two cases).

STERLING

v.LONDON GUARANTEE & ACCIDENT CO., Limited (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, suffolk.

Sept. 11, 1919.

Appeals from Superior Court, Suffolk County.

Proceedings by Rena Sterling and another under the Workmen's Compensation Act, for compensation for death of their husbands, opposed by T. Owen Tully, the employer, and the London Guarantee & Accident Company, Limited, the insurer. Agreements for compensation were approved by the Industrial Accident Board, but the insurer discontinued payments, and the widows petitioned for decrees on the agreements, which petitions were allowed, and from the decrees the insurer appealed ineffectually, petitioning to vacate the decrees and suing to enjoin their enforcement, also petitioning for leave to file bill of review. Decrees in accordance with the opinion, dismissing the bills for injunctive relief, directed.

H. S. Avery, of Boston, for insurer.

William N. Osgood, of Boston, for Rena E. and Maud M. Sterling.

PIERCE, J.

Prior to November 2, 1916, the London Guarantee and Accident Co., Ltd., issued to one T. Owen Tully a policy of insurance under the Workmen's Compensation Act (St. 1911, c. 751) to cover a period from January 3, 1916, to January 3, 1917. November 2, 1916, William E. Sterling, the deceased husband of Rena E. Sterling, and William L. Sterling, the deceased husband of Maud M. Sterling, employees of the said T. Owen Tully, a carpenter contractor, in the course of their employment while engaged in installing shifting boards on the steamship Devonian while the steamship was lying at the wharf in Boston Harbor, at Boston, upon navigable water, came to their deaths through exposure to fumigating gas used on the steamship for the purpose of exterminating rats and vermin before the loading of the ship.

At some time before March 21, 1917 the insurance company and the two widows came to an agreement by which the insurance company agreed to pay to each ‘$10.00 weekly for a period of four hundred weeks,’ beginning with November 2, 1916. In accordancewith St. 1911, c. 751, pt. 3, § 4, and amendments thereof, these agreements were signed and filed with the Industrial Accident Board on March 21, 1917. They were approved by that board on April 20 and 26, 1917. The insurance company made the agreed compensation payments as they became due up to August 8, 1917, when it learned that the United States Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900, in May, 1917, had decided that it was beyond the power of the several states to enact a workmen's compensation act applicable to injuries occurring upon navigable waters. Thereupon the insurance company stopped making payments under the agreements and have made no further payments thereon. The widows and their representatives were advised by the insurance company as to the reasons why the payments were discontinued. Subsequently each of the widows brought proceedings under part 3, § 11, in the superior court for a decree on the agreement. After due hearing and in accordance with the statute the petitions of the widows were allowed. Decrees based upon the memoranda of agreement were made on September 5, 1917, and the insurer appealed therefrom. The act makes no provision for appeal from a decree of the superior court, such as was here entered. Dempsey's Case, 230 Mass. 583, 120 N. E. 75.

October 1, 1917, the insurance company filed petitions and amended petitions in each case to vacate the decrees; it also filed motions in each case to vacate the decrees. These petitions and motions after hearing were severally denied on March 16 and April 18, 1918, and the insurance company in each case severally appealed. It is plain the petitions and motions to vacate the decrees were denied rightly. The procedure under the Compensation Act is governed by the practice in equity. Gould's Case, 215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 372. The right first created by St. 1875, c. 33, now R. L. c. 193, §§ 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19, to have final judgments in civil actions reviewed and vacated in practice is limited to proceedings in courts of law under the forms of the common law as distinguished from suits in equity and criminal prosecutions.

May 2, 1918, the insurance company filed a petition in each case with the Industrial Accident Board, in which it prayed ‘that the agreement entered into by the insurer with the widow of the deceased employee be modified and annulled and that the insurer be forthwith released from the payment of any further compensation by the said Industrial Accident Board’; and it asked for this relief on the ground that ‘the agreement entered into by the insurer with the dependent was made by mistake of fact and through a misunderstanding as to the meaning of the law.’ May 14, 1918, the Industrial Accident Board, after hearing, entered the decision ‘The above petition is denied.’ May 21, 1918, the insurance company presented to the superior court certified copies of the decisions and prayed ‘that review of said decision be made and a decree entered thereon in accordance with the law and the facts.’ September 13, 1918, the cases came on for hearing and it was decreed in each ‘that the order of the Industrial Accident Board denying the insurer's petition be affirmed.’ September 13, 1918, the insurance company appealed from the decrees entered in the above cases.

‘The Industrial Accident Board is not a court of general or limited common law jurisdiction; * * * it is purely and solely an administrative tribunal, specifically created to administer the Workmen's Compensation Act in aid and with the assistance of the superior court. * * * [It]...