Long v. Lafko, 02 Civ. 1705(VM).

• Decision Date: 01 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02 Civ. 1705(VM).,02 Civ. 1705(VM).
• Citation: 254 F.Supp.2d 444
• Parties: Stanford LONG, Plaintiff, v. Linda LAFKO, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

254 F.Supp.2d 444

Stanford LONG, Plaintiff, v. Linda LAFKO, Defendants.

No. 02 Civ. 1705(VM).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

April 1, 2003.

Stanford Long, Cape Vincent, NY, pro se.

DECISION AND AMENDED ORDER

MARRERO, District Judge.

Plaintiff Stanford Long ("Long") brought this action against defendants Nurse Linda Lafko ("Lafko") and Nurse Patricia Pinckney ("Pinckney" and together with Lafko, "Defendants"), both employees of the New York State Department of Correction Services ("DOCS"), alleging deprivations of his constitutional rights, in particular a violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

By Decision and Order dated July 31, 2001,¹ which sets forth the pertinent facts underlying the action at hand, this Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss by reason of Long's failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. In that connection, Long had filed a previous action in this Court before completing the DOCS's grievance procedure by appealing to the DOCS Central Office Review Committee ("CORC") the superintendent's January 29, 1999 ruling rejecting Long's complaint. However, the Court granted leave for Long to refile his complaint either if he exhausted his administrative remedies or CORC had not issued a decision by October 19, 2001. CORC subsequently declined to consider Long's grievance, on the ground that he had failed to file a timely appeal of the superintendent's January 29, 1999 decision.

Defendants again move to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ 12(b)(6) on the grounds that: (1) the complaint fails to state a claim; (2) Defendants have qualified immunity; and (3) Long failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. By Decision and Order dated March 28, 2003, the Court dismissed the complaint in this action and indicated that its findings, reasoning and conclusions would be set forth in a separate Decision and Order. Accordingly, for the reasons described below Defendants' motion is GRANTED.

DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is proper only where "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247 (2d Cir.1999). In considering such a motion, a court accepts all well-pleaded factual assertions in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Jaghory v. New York State Dep't of Educ, 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir.1997). Because Long is acting pro se, the Court must "read the pleadings [ ] liberally and interpret them to `raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'" McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir.1999) (citing Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1994)); see also Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir.1995). Moreover, in deciding a motion to dismiss involving a claim of a pro se plaintiff, the court may look beyond the complaint to the plaintiffs opposition papers. See Burgess v. Goord, No. 98 Civ.2077, 1999 WL 33458, at *1 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1999). Otherwise, the court may not consider matters outside the pleadings, see Tewksbury v. Ottaway Newspapers, 192 F.3d 322, 325 n. 1 (2d Cir.1999), but may review documents integral to the complaint of which the plaintiff had notice or relied upon in drafting his pleadings, as well as "any written instrument attached to [the complaint] as an exhibit...." Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir.2000) (citation omitted); see also Schnall v. Marine Midland Bank, 225 F.3d 263, 266 (2d Cir. 2000). Pro Se status by itself, however, does not exempt a litigant from compliance with relevant procedural rules or relieve him from the application of governing substantive law. See Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.1983).

B. DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Long's claims stem from allegedly improper medical treatment he received at the DOCS's Downstate Medical Facility on December 13, 1998 that he asserts caused him permanent eye injury. Long charges that Lafko administered a wrong medication to his eye before checking its content, and that, rather than obtaining proper medical attention when he complained of pain and injury to his eye, she and Pinckney sent him to his cell. He alleges that instead of then seeking immediate medical assistance, Pinckney attempted to cover up the incident by falsely representing the facts to the eye doctor when she subsequently reported the occurrence. Under Long's theory, these actions constituted deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to him.

To establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment in respect of his medical treatment in this case, Long must demonstrate that, subjectively, Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to an objectively substantial risk of serious harm to him. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir.1996). Deliberate indifference entails conduct more severe than mere negligence or medical malpractice; it implicates acts equivalent to reckless, conscious or callous disregard for the risk of the serious harm presented. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, 114 S.Ct. 1970; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). This standard demands that the defendant not only must be aware of facts from which an inference of substantial risk of harm may be reasonably drawn, but that he also drew that inference in proceeding with the conduct that posed the serious risk of injury in question. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970; Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.2000). "This principle may cover a delay in treatment based on a bad diagnosis or erroneous calculus of risks and costs, or a mistaken decision not to treat based on an erroneous view that the condition is benign or trivial or hopeless, or that the treatment is unreliable, or that the cure is as risky or painful or bad as the malady." Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir.2000).

Here, nothing in Long's pleading indicates that Lafko's conduct in applying the wrong drops to Long's eye satisfies this standard. In fact, Long himself characterizes Lafko's conduct as merely negligent or unprofessional in failing to check the medication before administering it. Long pleads no other facts directly implicating Lafko in any other conduct that crosses the rigorous deliberate indifference threshold described above. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the complaint against Lafko must be dismissed on this basis.

The allegations against Pinckney suggest somewhat more aggravated conduct. However, the Court need not address the issue of whether Pinckney's acts rise to the level of deliberate indifference, or whether she is entitled to invoke qualified immunity, because the Court concludes that Long did not exhaust available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C.1997e(a) and that his claim is now barred by applicable DOCS regulations. The PLRA provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under ... Federal law, by a prisoner ... until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (holding that the PRLA's exhaustion provision is a prerequisite to all federal lawsuits by inmates concerning prison conditions); Neal v. Goord, 267 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir.2001) ("[G]rievances must now be fully pursued prior to filing a complaint in federal court.") (emphasis added); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 733-34, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001).

Pursuant to 7 NYCRR § 701.7(b)(5) the DOCS facility superintendent is required to render a decision on an inmate's appeal of an Inmate Grievance Review Committee's determination within ten working days of an inmate's appeal to the superintendent. If the superintendent has not ruled within that time, under 7 NYCRR § 701.8 the inmate is entitled to proceed to the next step in the process, an appeal directly to CORC. Long's grievance was filed with the superintendent on January 26, 1999 and rejected on January 29, 1999. Thus, as of approximately February 10, 1999 Long was permitted to pursue an appeal to CORC. It is undisputed that he did...