Rosiecki v. Rosiecki

• Decision Date: 09 April 2020
• Docket Number: No. 932 MDA 2019,932 MDA 2019
• Citation: 231 A.3d 928
• Parties: Sharon A. ROSIECKI v. Walter R. ROSIECKI, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

231 A.3d 928

Sharon A. ROSIECKI

v.Walter R. ROSIECKI, Appellant

No. 932 MDA 2019

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued December 10, 2019

Filed April 09, 2020

Andrew J. Katsock III, Wilkes-Barre, for appellant.

Terrence J. McDonald, Dunmore, for appellee.

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.^*

OPINION BY NICHOLS, J.:

Walter R. Rosiecki (Husband) appeals from the order granting the motion to dismiss filed by Sharon A. Rosiecki (Wife) and denying Husband's petition to terminate alimony. Husband argues that the trial court erred in finding that it did not have the authority to modify the terms of Husband's alimony obligation. Further, he asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

By way of background, Wife filed a complaint for support on May 11, 2007. On December 7, 2009, while the divorce matter was pending, the parties entered a marital settlement agreement before the Master.¹ At the hearing, the Master set forth the relevant terms of the marital settlement agreement as follows:

[T]he parties have acknowledged that there is a marital interest in certain parcels of real estate. There are certain parcels of real estate that are presently titled in [H]usband's name in 840 Main Street in Dickson, 1140 Main Street in Peckville, 1132 Main Street in Peckville, and the rear 1126 Main Street in Peckville.

* * *

It is acknowledged by the parties that there is presently a spousal support order entered, that the parties are agreeing that the spousal support order will convert first to an alimony pendente lite [ (APL) ] order before the divorce of the parties and that shall be effective today, an order of $900 per month [APL]. And once the divorce is finalized by the parties, that will continue as an order of $900 per month as alimony.

* * *

The alimony payment will continue until such time as the following events occur: Once all of the aforesaid properties are sold that we have listed, that being the 801 property, 1140 property, the 1132 property, and the property known as "The Lot," which was the property at 1126 Main Street[,] are sold, [H]usband's obligation for alimony shall cease in its entirety.

However, pending the termination in its entirety of alimony, should any of the properties be sold, those being the four properties that we listed, Husband shall be entitled to a reduction of alimony as follows: If at the time that 801 Main Street is sold, [H]usband's reduction shall be 20 percent. At the time that the 1140 Main Street is sold, the reduction shall be 21 percent. At the time that 1132 Main Street is sold, it will be 54 percent. And at the time that the lot at 1126 is sold, it will be a five percent reduction.

So, it doesn't make any difference on the order in which they are sold, but when they are sold, those percentages of the alimony payment will be reduced, that's contemplating obviously, they will be sold, [W]ife will receive 35 percent of the net of [H]usband's interest in that property and basically will be her own interest in that property at that point and in fact, those alimony payments will be reduced on that basis.

N.T. Master's Hr'g, 12/7/09, at 12-13. The agreement was incorporated but not merged into the final divorce decree that was entered on January 21, 2010.

On January 7, 2019, Husband filed an emergency petition to terminate alimony and requested a hearing. See Emergency Pet. for Special Relief to Terminate Alimony & Req. for a H'rg, 1/7/19. Therein, Husband acknowledged that he was obligated to pay alimony because the parties’ four properties had not been sold. Id. at 4. However, he argued that he could no longer afford to make payments because he was "out of work" and experiencing health problems. Id. Husband argued that he "did not understand the settlement ... as it relates to the payment and/or termination of [a]limony." Id. at 4. He also stated that he believed that the agreement and order were "incorrect and in error." Id. Finally, Husband asserted that the agreement did "not take into account all sources of income of [Wife]," or Husband's "necessary expenses" and loss of income. Id.

At the hearing on April 10, 2019, Wife made an oral motion to dismiss Husband's petition. The trial court directed Wife to file a written motion and ordered Husband to file a response. In her written motion, Wife asserted that the trial court did not have statutory authority to modify the terms of Husband's alimony obligation because it arose from the parties’ agreement, and not from a court order. See Wife's Mot. to Dismiss, 4/11/19, at 3 (unpaginated). In his response, Husband incorporated the same arguments that he raised in his original petition. See Husband's Resp. to Wife's Mot. to Dismiss, 4/22/19. He also requested that the trial court "order an evidentiary hearing for the taking of testimony and the creation of a record." Id. at 6.

On May 1, 2019, the trial court granted Wife's motion to dismiss Husband's petition. In its order, the trial court explained:

The terms of the agreement dated December 7, 2009 are clear and unambiguous and provide no language for modification, extension or termination.

Although Husband cites alimony law in his brief, this court is without jurisdiction to modify the terms of the agreement. The alimony awarded is a contractual agreement entered into by both parties, who swore under oath to their understanding of the agreement. Additionally, there is no evidence of fraud, mistake or duress. Therefore, this court cannot modify the terms of the agreement. As such, Wife's Motion to Dismiss shall be GRANTED.

Trial Ct. Order, 5/1/19, at 2 (some formatting altered).

Husband filed a timely notice of appeal on May 31, 2019. He also filed a timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.² The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion asserting that Husband's claims were meritless.

On appeal, Husband raises the following issues, which we have reordered as follows:

[1.] Did the trial court err in failing to find that [ 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701 ] contains a provision for the modification, suspension, or even termination of alimony, and in failing to find that it had both the jurisdiction and power to consider the Emergency Petition for Special Relief to Terminate Alimony and Request for a Hearing filed by [Husband]?

[2.] Did the trial court err in granting the [Wife's] Motion to Dismiss [Husband's] Petition to Terminate Alimony?

[3.] Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit an error of law in failing to permit the calling of witnesses, the presentation of evidence and the cross-examination of witnesses before issuing its May 1, 2019 order?

[4.] Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit an error of law where it appears from a review of the record that there is no evidence to support the [trial] court's findings?

Husband's Brief at 3-4.³

We address Husband's first two claims together.⁴ Husband contends that the trial court erred by finding that it did not have jurisdiction or authority to modify his alimony payments. Id. at 17. Husband contends that a court can modify the terms of alimony under Section 3701(e) of the Divorce Code. Id. at 17 (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(e) ).

Because Husband's alimony obligation arose from a marital settlement agreement, our review is governed by the following principles:

A marital support agreement incorporated but not merged into the divorce decree survives the decree and is enforceable at law or equity. A settlement agreement between spouses is governed by the law of contracts unless the agreement provides otherwise. The terms of a marital settlement agreement cannot be modified by a court in the absence of a specific provision in the agreement providing for judicial modification.

Stamerro v. Stamerro , 889 A.2d 1251, 1258 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

When interpreting a marital settlement agreement, the trial court is the sole determiner of facts and absent an abuse of discretion, we will not usurp the trial court's fact-finding function. On appeal from an order interpreting a marital settlement agreement, we must decide whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.

Because contract interpretation is a question of law, this Court is not bound by the trial court's interpretation. Our standard of review over questions of law is de novo and to the extent necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as the appellate court may review the entire record in making its decision. However, we are bound by the trial court's credibility determinations.

Id. at 1257-58. Moreover, we are not limited by a trial court's rationale, and we may affirm its decision on any basis. See Blumenstock v. Gibson , 811 A.2d 1029, 1033 (Pa. Super. 2002).

In "construing agreements involving clear and unambiguous terms, this Court need only examine the writing itself to give effect to the parties[’] understanding." Lang v. Meske , 850 A.2d 737, 739-40 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). "In other words, the intent of the parties is generally the writing itself. In ascertaining the intent of the parties to a contract when unclear from the writing itself, the court considers the parties’ outward and objective manifestations of assent, as opposed to their undisclosed and subjective intentions." Stamerro , 889 A.2d at 1258. "[A]bsent fraud, misrepresentation, or duress, spouses should be bound by the terms of their agreements." Stackhouse v. Zaretsky , 900 A.2d 383, 386 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).

In the context of a settlement agreement, alimony is "not governed by statute, but [by] express mutual agreement of the parties." See Woodings v. Woodings , 411 Pa.Super. 406, 601 A.2d 854, 859 (1992). Therefore, alimony agreements are "not be subject to modification by the court" unless the agreement contains "a specific provision to the contrary." 23 Pa.C.S. § 3105(c) ; see also Egan v. Egan , 125 A.3d 792, 798 (Pa. Super. 2015) (explaining that the...