Longphre v. Longphre, No. E2006-00323-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 4/25/2007), E2006-00323-COA-R3-CV.
| Decision Date | 25 April 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. E2006-00323-COA-R3-CV.,E2006-00323-COA-R3-CV. |
| Parties | RICHARD K. LONGPHRE v. CAROLYN LONGPHRE. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County; No. 91 DR 712; W. Neil Thomas, III, Judge.
Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed; Case Remanded.
R. Jonathan Guthrie, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, Richard K. Longphre.
John R. Meldorf, III, Hixson, Tennessee, for the appellee, Carolyn Longphre.
OPINION
This is a post-divorce case. Carolyn Longphre ("Wife") registered in South Carolina a support order of the Hamilton County Circuit Court ("the trial court") against her former husband, Richard K. Longphre ("Husband"). The South Carolina court ordered Husband to pay Wife an alimony arrearage of $64,475.39. Husband brought the instant action, asking the trial court to hold that Wife, by seeking an alimony arrearage in South Carolina, breached a written contract between the parties, by the terms of which Wife had released Husband from his court-ordered alimony obligation. The trial court granted Wife summary judgment. Husband appeals. We affirm.
The parties were divorced by the trial court in 1992. As subsequently modified by the court, Husband was ordered to pay Wife $400 per month as alimony in futuro. The site of this litigation shifted to the state of South Carolina in May 2003. That is when Wife filed a petition in the Richland County Family Court relying upon the South Carolina version of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("the UIFSA"), and requesting that the South Carolina court register the trial court's order pertaining to the subject of Husband's alimony obligation. Husband received notice of the filing by way of certified mail. According to Husband, he was, at the time, a resident of Lexington County, South Carolina. He further stated that he had never resided in Richland County. Husband says that, upon receiving the notice, he contacted the clerk of the Richland County court and informed the clerk that the petition had been filed in the wrong county. Husband claims that the clerk then "assured [him] that the matter would not move forward because venue was improper." Husband took no further action.
The Richland County Family Court held a hearing on Wife's petition in September 2003. Husband was personally served with a notice of the hearing but failed to appear in person or by counsel. Following the hearing, the South Carolina court entered an order, which, in pertinent part, sets forth the following findings and conclusions:
[Wife] is a resident and citizen of the County of Hamilton, Tennessee. [Husband] resides in Lexington County, South Carolina but at the time of filing of the action, [Wife], upon information and belief, believed that [Husband] resided in Richland County, South Carolina.
By Orders of the Circuit Court of Tennessee for Hamilton County Division IV, [Husband] was ordered among other things to pay alimony and child support. [Husband] refused and failed to pay said alimony except when ruled into Court for contempt of Court and sentenced to jail time. [Husband] left the State of Tennessee in 1995 and owed a total alimony arrearage of $3,800 at the time. [Husband] has failed to pay any sums since then and is presently in arrears in the amount of $38,400 as of March 31, 2003 and is in contempt of Court for his violation of the Orders of the Court and should be ordered to comply with said Orders.
Said Orders have been properly registered for enforcement in the State of South Carolina pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, UIFSA, set out in South Carolina Code of Laws, Section 20-7-960 through 20-7-1170. [Husband] was served with a copy of Summons, Petition, Notice of Filing and Registration of Foreign Support Order, Verified Statement of Facts for Registration of a Foreign Support Order under UIFSA and Affidavit of Arrearage by Certified Mail, Restricted Delivery on May 29, 2003. [Husband] failed to contest the validity or enforcement of the Registered Orders within the time limit set out by statute, therefore the Registered Orders are enforceable and the arrearage confirmed as of the date of registration and further contest of that Order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted is precluded. By the most recent Tennessee Court Order, [Husband] is ordered to pay the sum of $400 per month alimony. Said future payments should be made payable through the Richland County Family Court by wage withholding. [Husband] should be required to pay the arrearage due, together with interest, pursuant to Tennessee law at the rate of 10% per annum. Pursuant to Pertew v. Pertew, 03A01-9711-CH-00505 (Tenn. App. 7-13-1999) each installment due accrues interest at the rate of 10% from the due date of the payment as a matter of law. Therefore, [Husband]'s arrearage as of August 1, 2003 is $64,475.39. Said sum should also be reduced to a judgment and entered into the Judgment Rolls of the Clerk of Court in Richland County.
(Numbering in original omitted). The South Carolina court also ordered Husband to pay attorney's fees and costs incurred by Wife in filing her petition. Husband subsequently failed to make the payments ordered by the South Carolina court, and, as a consequence of this failure, he was incarcerated.
In March 2004, the South Carolina court held a hearing on a motion to reconsider filed by Husband. Husband did not personally attend the hearing because, according to him, he was still in jail for failing to comply with the terms of the South Carolina order; however, he was represented by counsel at this hearing. During the hearing, counsel for Husband attempted to explain Husband's absence from the earlier September 2003 hearing, stating that Husband "made a mistake" in not attending the hearing. Husband's counsel then explained how Husband had contacted the clerk upon receiving notice of Wife's petition and informed the clerk that he resided in Lexington County, not Richland County. He stated that Husband "made an assumption that the matter was going to be transferred to Lexington County." Husband's counsel also discussed the fact that "it was [Husband]'s belief that an agreement that he had entered into with [Wife] some years before" released him from his alimony obligation. Husband sent the South Carolina court a copy of the alleged agreement on the morning of the motion hearing. This is the first time that the agreement regarding release of the alimony obligation had been brought to the attention of the South Carolina court. That court refused to address the validity of the contract and ruled that its previous order would remain in full force and effect. Shortly thereafter, Husband filed the instant case in Tennessee.
In his Tennessee complaint, Husband states that the parties executed a contract in 1995 that terminated his alimony obligation in exchange for his agreement to pay $100 per week to the parties' daughter.1 The complaint seeks (1) relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60; (2) a finding of breach of contract on the part of Wife; and (3) a declaratory judgment on the issue of whether Wife's petition to register the support order in South Carolina was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and the equitable defenses of waiver and estoppel.
Wife filed a motion for summary judgment arguing, among other things, that Husband's complaint was an impermissible collateral attack on the judgment of the South Carolina court. In opposition to Wife's motion, Husband asserted that the instant case was an independent breach of contract action rather than a collateral attack on a foreign judgment. He also argued that the trial court should not give the South Carolina order full faith and credit (1) because it was inconsistent with the public policy of Tennessee in that "it did not honor the valid written contract the parties entered into"; and (2) because he "was denied due process and did not receive the opportunity to be heard before the court entered the South Carolina judgment."
The trial court granted Wife summary judgment. In its memorandum opinion, the court addressed Husband's breach of contract claim as follows:
[Husband] has asked the Court to deny [Wife]'s motion for summary judgment because the issue between [Wife] and him could also be considered a contractual issue. It is the opinion of this Court that, despite [Husband]'s characterization, the real issue in this case is regarding spousal and child support, which was addressed by the Richland County, South Carolina Court. The judgment by the South Carolina Court will be given full faith and credit by this Court.
The trial court also found that Husband had failed to prove a due process violation. The court pretermitted Husband's contention that the South Carolina order violated Tennessee public policy. The court opined that there was nothing in the record before it precluding a grant to Wife of summary judgment. From this judgment, Husband appeals.
As the Supreme Court has instructed,
[t]he standards governing an appellate court's review of a motion for summary judgment are well settled. Since our inquiry involves purely a question of law, no presumption of correctness attaches to the lower court's judgment, and our task is confined to reviewing the record to determine whether the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been met. See Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn. 1997); Cowden v. Sovran Bank/Central South, 816 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tenn. 1991). Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04 provides that summary judgment is appropriate where: (1) there is no genuine issue with regard to the material facts relevant to the claim or defense contained in the motion, see Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993); and (2)...
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