Lopez v. Amazon Logistics, Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 April 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:19-CV-2424-N
• Citation: 458 F.Supp.3d 505
• Parties: Laura Pecina LOPEZ, Individually and on Behalf of Gustavo Lopez, Deceased; Minors K.P.L., G.L., S.L., and K.L.; and on Behalf of Gustavo Lopez, Sr. ; and Giovanni Lopez, Individually and on Behalf of Gustavo Lopez, Deceased, Plaintiffs, v. AMAZON LOGISTICS, INC.; Amazon Transportation Services, Inc. ; J.W. Logistics, LLC; Kedrin Harris, Individually and d/b/a All Points 360, LLC ; Dwane Edwards, Individually and d/b/a Sinnie Mae Trucking; and Timmie Turner, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

458 F.Supp.3d 505

Laura Pecina LOPEZ, Individually and on Behalf of Gustavo Lopez, Deceased; Minors K.P.L., G.L., S.L., and K.L.; and on Behalf of Gustavo Lopez, Sr. ; and Giovanni Lopez, Individually and on Behalf of Gustavo Lopez, Deceased, Plaintiffs,

v.AMAZON LOGISTICS, INC.; Amazon Transportation Services, Inc. ; J.W. Logistics, LLC; Kedrin Harris, Individually and d/b/a All Points 360, LLC ; Dwane Edwards, Individually and d/b/a Sinnie Mae Trucking; and Timmie Turner, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:19-CV-2424-N

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

Signed April 28, 2020

Nuru Witherspoon, Witherspoon Law Group, Aubrey Nick Pittman, The Pittman Law Firm PC, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiffs.

Jeffrey O. Marshall, Amanda Nicole Harvey, Kayleigh J. Watson, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker, LLP, Dallas, TX, for Defendant Amazon Logistics Inc.

David L. Sargent, Ross Caughran Miracle, Sargent Law PC, Dallas, TX, for Defendant Kendrin Harris.

Christopher Michael Staine, Crowe & Dunlevy PC, Dallas, TX, for Defendant JW Logistics LLC.

Dwane Edwards, Midolothian, TX, pro se.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

David C. Godbey, United States District Judge

This Memorandum Order and Opinion addresses the motion for remand [2] filed by Plaintiffs Laura Pecina Lopez, individually and on behalf of Gustavo Lopez, deceased; minors K.P.L., G.L., S.L., and K.L.; and Gustavo Lopez, Sr.; and Giovanni Lopez, individually and on behalf of Gustavo Lopez, deceased (collectively, "Plaintiffs"). Because the Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded complaint does not raise a federal question and because the subject matter of the action is not preempted by federal law, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.¹ Accordingly, the Court grants the motion and remands this case to the 116th Judicial District Court in Dallas County, Texas.

I. ORIGINS OF THE DISPUTE

This is a personal injury suit arising from a fatal vehicle accident that occurred on October 24, 2018, in Johnson County, Texas. Pltfs.’ First Am. Pet. 5–6 [1.46]. The accident was allegedly caused when Timmie Turner ("Turner"), a carrier for Amazon Logistics, Inc. and Amazon Transportation Services, Inc. (collectively, "Amazon"), rear-ended Gustavo Lopez while Turner was operating a Hino Box Truck at an excessive speed. Id. at 6. At the time, Turner was transporting and delivering items sold by Amazon. Id. Gustavo Lopez died from injuries allegedly sustained from this accident. Id. at 7.

Plaintiffs then filed this suit in state court, alleging multiple state tort and statutory claims against Turner; Amazon; Kedrin Harris, individually and d/b/a All Points 360, LLC ("All Points"); Dwane Edwards, individually and d/b/a Sinnie Mae Trucking ("Sinne Mae Trucking"); and J.W. Logistics, LLC ("J.W. Logistics") (collectively, "Defendants"). The amended petition alleges that Amazon had a broker-carrier agreement with All Points and that All Points in turn had a broker-carrier agreement with J.W. Logistics, which "covered the pickup and delivery of Amazon shipments." On October 14, 2019, J.W. Logistics removed the case to this Court, arguing that the state tort claims were preempted by the Federal Aviation and Administration Authorization Act ("FAAAA") and an FAAAA amendment, the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act ("ICCTA"). Plaintiffs subsequently filed this motion to remand.

II. REMAND LEGAL STANDARD

District courts must remand a case if, at any time before final judgment it appears that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). "Because removal raises significant federalism concerns, the removal statute is strictly construed and any doubt as to the propriety of removal should be resolved in favor of remand." Gutierrez v. Flores , 543 F.3d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). The removing defendant "bears the burden of demonstrating that a federal question exists." Id.

Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, "a suit ‘arises under’ federal law only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon [federal law." Vaden v. Discover Bank , 556 U.S. 49, 129 S. Ct. 1262, 1272, 173 L.Ed.2d 206 (2009) (internal quotation omitted). In cases where the plaintiff has pled only state law causes of action, there is generally no federal question jurisdiction. The complete preemption doctrine is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Under this jurisdictional doctrine, a federal court may assert jurisdiction over a complaint that purports to rest on state law where the law governing the complaint is exclusively federal. Id. at 1273. In other words, "what otherwise appears as merely a state law claim is converted to a claim ‘arising under’ federal law for jurisdictional purposes because the federal statute so forcibly and completely displace[s] state law that the plaintiff's cause of action is either wholly federal or nothing at all." New Orleans & Gulf Coast Ry. Co. v. Barrois , 533 F.3d 321, 331 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted).

The central inquiry in a complete preemption analysis is "whether Congress intended the federal cause of action to be the exclusive cause of action for the particular claims asserted under the state law." Id. Complete jurisdiction is distinct from ordinary preemption, which constitutes a defense but does not provide federal jurisdiction. Johnson v. Baylor Univ. , 214 F.3d 630, 632 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Complete preemption, which creates federal removal jurisdiction, differs from more common ‘ordinary preemption’ (also known as ‘conflict preemption’) which does not."). In general, complete preemption is "less common and more extraordinary" than ordinary preemption, and the Supreme Court has found complete preemption only three times. See Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson , 539 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) (indicating that the Supreme Court had found complete preemption under only the Labor Management Relations Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and the National Bank Act); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER , 14C FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3722.2 (4th ed. 2016) (indicating that the Supreme Court has found complete preemption under the LMRA, ERISA, and the National Bank Act).

III. THE COURT HOLDS THAT THE FAAAA DOES NOT PREEMPT PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS AGAINST J.W. LOGISTICS

J.W. Logistics’ notice of removal implicates two preemption provisions of the FAAAA — section 14501(c)(1), and section 14501(b), an FAAAA amendment titled the ICCTA. Section 14501(c)(1) provides:

Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of 2 or more States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier (other than a carrier affiliated with a direct air carrier covered by section 41713(b)(4)) or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). The ICCTA provision, section 14501(b), is more narrowly focused and reads:

Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, no State or political subdivision thereof and no intrastate agency or other political agency of 2 or more States shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to intrastate rates, intrastate routes, or intrastate services of any freight forwarder or broker.

49 U.S.C. § 14501(b)(1). J.W. Logistics argues that, as a broker, the negligence and negligent-hiring claims Plaintiffs assert against it² are federally preempted by these provisions and provide this Court with jurisdiction. The Court agrees that section 14501(c)(1) applies to the claims and parties here. The Court holds, however, that Plaintiffs’ negligence claim does not fall within the scope of section 14501(c)(2) and assumes without deciding that the negligence-hiring claim does fall within its scope but determines that the negligent-hiring claim also falls within the scope of section 14501(c)(2) ’s preemption exception.

A. The Parties and Claims Fall Within the Scope of Section 14501(c)(1) But Section 14501(b) is Inapplicable

As a threshold matter, the Court must initially determine whether J.W. Logistics is a broker within the meaning of the FAAAA and whether Plaintiffs’ state common law claims constitute "a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law" that may be subject to FAAAA preemption. See 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). Regarding J.W. Logistics’ broker status, Plaintiffs contend that the allegations in their state court amended petition do not identify whether J.W. Logistics is a broker or whether its services are interstate or intrastate in nature. Pltfs.’ First Am. Pet. 5 [1.46] (stating that All Points "had a Broker Carrier arrangement with JW Logistics" but not specifying which party was the broker). Further, Plaintiffs argue that under the facts alleged in their amended petition, J.W. Logistics does not meet the FAAAA's definition of a broker, defined in part as "a person, other than a motor carrier or an employee or agent of a motor carrier. " 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2) (emphasis added). The amended petition alleges that "each Defendant was an agent of the other Defendants ," and later identifies one defendant, Turner, as a "carrier." Pltfs.’ First Am. Pet. 4–5 [1.46].

The Court finds these arguments unpersuasive. First, J.W. Logistics has provided the Court with a copy of its broker authority issued by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration ("FMCSA") and requests that it take judicial notice of this. Def.’s Resp. Mot. Remand Ex. 1 [10.1]. Because this is a publicly available document relevant to an issue in this case, and there is no dispute as to the accuracy of this document, the Court takes judicial notice of the certificate and its identification of J.W. Logistics as a broker. See ...