Lopez v. Irvine Co.

• Decision Date: 01 July 2022
• Docket Number: G058725
• Parties: ARTHUR LOPEZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. IRVINE COMPANY LLC et al., Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: California Court of Appeals

ARTHUR LOPEZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. IRVINE COMPANY LLC et al., Defendants and Respondents.

G058725

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division

July 1, 2022

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, No 30-2018-01000086, Deborah C. Servino, Judge. Affirmed.

Arthur Lopez, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Ruzika, Wallace & Coughlin, Frank J. Coughlin and Steven E. Bolanos for Defendants and Respondents.

OPINION

GOETHALS, ACTING P.J.

Arthur Lopez appeals from the trial court's entry of judgment after it granted defendants' motion for summary judgment (MSJ) on Lopez's housing discrimination claims.^[1] The trial court found Defendants in their motion "made a prima facie showing that the refusal to renew Plaintiff's lease was based on business reasons not discriminatory ones," including "that Plaintiff was routinely late with rent payments," and that Lopez failed to present evidence-rather than mere assertions-in rebuttal. Lopez does not challenge this finding in his appellate briefing. Rather, Lopez argues that his claims were not barred by any limitations period. He also contends the trial court erred in an early demurrer ruling and in failing to grant him leave to amend his complaint on the eve of the MS J hearing to add federal and state antitrust claims against Defendants. As we explain, Lopez has not met his appellate burden to show error in the trial court's rulings, and we therefore affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the interest of brevity, we limit our background discussion to the procedural history relevant to our review of the issues that Lopez presents on appeal.

Lopez filed suit against Defendants in June 2018 for "deprivation of his rights" under state and federal law "due to his race, sex [and] familial status." Lopez alleged Defendants violated his right to be free from unlawful discrimination by "refusing to rent apartments [and] discriminating] in the terms, conditions and privileges of rental of an apartment dwelling over a period of 3-4 years." According to Lopez's complaint, "[t]he most recent lease denial . . . would have been January 18, 2016 effectively, since Plaintiff had [then] sought to occupy and make effective [an] apartment rental on January 19, 2016."

The trial court sustained Defendants' demurrer to the complaint, with leave for Lopez to amend; the court subsequently denied Defendants' request for dismissal. Instead, the court allowed Lopez to file an amended complaint beyond the original deadline.

Defendants answered Lopez's amended complaint and later moved for summary judgment. The trial court's minute order after it took the summary judgment motion under submission summarizes the remainder of the relevant procedural history. Specifically, the court "exercise[d] its discretion to consider Plaintiff's opposition and supporting documents that [he] belatedly filed on December 16 and December 19, 2019. Defendants' request to strike these documents . . . is denied."

The trial court cited, but does not appear to have relied on as a basis for its summary judgment ruling, a statutory limitations period. (Gov. Code, § 12989.1, subd. (a).) That provision states that a litigant must generally "commence a civil action in an appropriate court not later than two years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice . . . ." (Ibid.)

Rather than analyzing timelines or circumstances pertinent to any potentially applicable limitations period-or exceptions or tolling thereof-the trial court instead cited declarations Defendants submitted as evidence, which they referenced in their separate statement of facts supporting the motion.

In particular, the court observed that Defendants "present[ed] evidence that Plaintiff was routinely late with rent payments and carried an overdue balance. For this reason, Newport Bluffs declined to renew Plaintiff's lease. [Citation.] The lateness in paying also resulted in Plaintiff incurring late fees. [Citation.] Defendants have also presented evidence that the lease rate given to Plaintiff and his wife for the 2014-2016 lease was the amount originally quoted to them and as advertised. [Citation.]"

The court ended with this conclusion: "With this evidence, Defendants have made a prima facie showing that the refusal to renew Plaintiff's lease was based on business reasons, not discriminatory ones and that the previously-provided lease rate matched the advertised price. Plaintiff has not presented evidence that creates a triable issue of fact. Plaintiff's declaration (as opposed to assertions in his unsworn response to [Defendants'] separate statement) simply authenticates exhibits rather than testifies to any facts. Plaintiff does describe one exhibit as showing falsely and deceitfully assessed fees, but does not explain how this is so or testify to facts suggesting this would be because of discrimination. (Lopez Decl., ¶ 12.)" (Original parenthetical and italics.)

The trial court reached the same conclusion regarding the unfair competition cause of action (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200) that Lopez premised on his discrimination claims. The court found Defendants "made a prima facie showing of no fraudulent, unfair, or unlawful business practice." Explaining again that Lopez's declaration "simply authenticates exhibits rather than testifies to any facts," the court found Lopez had "not shown a triable issue of fact." The court therefore granted the summary judgment motion and subsequently entered judgment against Lopez. He now appeals.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is granted when a moving party establishes the right to entry of judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc § 437c, subd. (c).) We review such a ruling de novo. (Eriksson v. Nunnink (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 826, 848.) "Although our review of a summary judgment is de novo, it is limited to issues which have been adequately raised and supported in [the appellant's] brief." (Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6.)

As the appellant, Lopez has the burden of affirmatively showing error; he may not simply assert error and then leave it to us to supply a supporting argument. (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956; Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207.) We therefore turn to his specific contentions. In doing so, we are guided by the rule of court requiring appellants to present each point of alleged error under a separate heading or subheading in their briefing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) This rule applies equally to represented and self-represented appellants alike. "[A]s is the case with attorneys, pro. per. litigants must follow correct rules of procedure." (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.)

Lopez divides the argument portion of his brief into three sections, each marked by a roman numeral. Although he provides no headings or subheadings which identify or summarize his points, we address his primary contention in each of the three sections. However, "we do not consider . . . loose and disparate arguments that are not clearly set out in a heading and supported by reasoned legal argument." (Provost v. Regents of University of California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1294.)

Under his first heading ("I"), beginning on page 20 of his brief, Lopez offers various arguments regarding tolling, the discovery doctrine, and other exceptions to statutory limitations periods, as if timeliness was the basis for the trial court's summary judgment ruling. Lopez argues, for example, that the trial court "grossly erred in accepting the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment without any evidence of Plaintiff's claims being barred by the Statute of Limitations . . . ." He similarly insists Defendants failed to "produce[] any evidence to contradict a suspension of the statute of limitations . . . ."

These arguments are misplaced since the court did not grant Defendants' summary judgment motion because it found Lopez's claims ran afoul of any limitations period. Lopez ignores the fact that Defendants brought a fact-intensive motion for summary judgment, as reflected in what we infer (from references in the motion) was a lengthy and detailed separate statement of facts-which Lopez does not include in the record on appeal. We do not decide Lopez's tolling and related arguments against him on the basis of that omission, though it is his responsibility as the appellant to designate a complete record, and not just material he may view as favorable to his position. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.)

Instead, we find Lopez's statute of limitations arguments are inapplicable. He ignores the trial court's careful analysis of his opposition to summary judgment, which the court considered even though it was untimely. More fundamentally, Lopez also ignores the court's considered judgment that on each of his claims Defendants made a prima facie showing that their actions were nondiscriminatory and did not constitute an unlawful business practice. Lopez failed to rebut this with admissible evidence. (See Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354-357 [describing burden-shifting test on summary judgment of discrimination claims].) None of the various receipts, notices, or any other documents Lopez attached to his opposition was admissible as submitted to establish discrimination; instead, it was Lopez's responsibility to explain through his own testimony or other evidence that the material evidenced discrimination. He failed to do so.

In essence, the trial court engaged in "classic" summary judgment analysis to comply with Code of Civil Procedure, section 437c, to determine...