Lopez v. Sikkema

• Decision Date: 08 April 1991
• Docket Number: No. F012603,F012603
• Citation: 229 Cal.App.3d 31,280 Cal.Rptr. 7
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Dolores LOPEZ, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Ralph SIKKEMA, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 7

280 Cal.Rptr. 7

229 Cal.App.3d 31

Dolores LOPEZ, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Ralph SIKKEMA, Defendant and Respondent.

No. F012603.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

April 8, 1991.

Certified for Partial Publication ^*

[229 Cal.App.3d 33] Sayre, Moreno, Purcell & Boucher, Federico C. Sayre, Moreno, Purcell & Schindler, and Hermez Moreno, Santa Monica, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Jacobson, Hansen & Najarian, Jube J. Najarian and Leith B. Hansen, Fresno, for defendant and respondent.

OPINION

STONE (WM. A.), Associate Justice.

Appellants are the surviving family members of decedent, Renee Lopez. They include decedent's mother, Dolores Lopez, who is named individually and as administratrix of decedent's estate, and six surviving siblings, four of whom were adults at the time decedent died. Respondent is Ralph Sikkema, who is named individually and doing business as Sikkema Dairy. The issues on appeal are (1) whether a compromise and release approved by order of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) precludes litigation of appellants' wrongful death and civil rights claims against respondent and (2) whether adult dependent family members, as heirs of decedent's estate, have standing to pursue a wrongful death action against respondent.

THE FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In September 1984 appellants filed a complaint against Donato Estrada, Dieter Ashman and respondent for personal injury, wrongful death, conspiracy to violate civil rights and violation of civil rights.

The complaint alleged: Decedent was a striking farm worker employed by respondent. On September 22, 1983, decedent and several other farm workers cast ballots to determine whether they would be represented by the United Farm Workers. After casting his ballot, decedent proceeded to a company housing site located approximately 200 yards from the election site. Soon thereafter, Estrada and Ashman drove to the housing site and summoned decedent to their car. Respondent had employed Estrada and Ashman as strike breakers and provided them with weapons. As decedent approached the car, Estrada and Ashman shot decedent in the head, fatally wounding him.

Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication of issues on two grounds: First, the superior court did not have jurisdiction because appellants had executed a compromise and release approved by the WCAB which released respondent from liability for any and all claims arising out of decedent's death, and second, decedent's adult siblings had no standing to maintain a wrongful death action since they are not decedent's "heirs" within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 377.

Appellants opposed the motion, claiming the workers' compensation compromise and release pertained only to the workers' compensation dependency claims and was never understood by them to be a waiver of claims which were not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. According to appellants, there remain triable issues of fact regarding the interpretation of the compromise and release, the meaning attributed to the compromise and release by the parties, the status of the compromise and release as an adhesion contract, and the extent of dependency of decedent's siblings for purposes of determining whether they had standing to sue for wrongful death.

The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding:

"FIRST, the applicants signed and are bound by the Workers' Compensation 'Compromise and Release' (Case No. 84 FRE 65307). Upon approval of the compromise agreement and payment in accordance with its provisions, the applicants released and forever discharged the employer and insurance company 'of and from all claims, demands, actions or causes of action, of every kind or nature whatsoever on account of, or by reason of the injury and death sustained' by the decedent.

"SECOND, the compromise agreement has been approved and the applicants have received payment according to established procedures.

"THUS, the applicants were represented by counsel during the Workers' Compensation proceeding and, thus, knew or should have known of the consequences of the Compromise and Release."

DISCUSSION

PART I

Effect of Compromise and Release

The parties do not dispute these facts:

In November 1984 appellants executed a compromise and release of their dependency claims which had been filed with the WCAB. The compromise and release form recited the parties agreed "for the purpose of compromise only" that decedent was "[s]hot in the head, resulting in death" and that the injury arose out of and in the course of decedent's employment with respondent. It recited appellants were dependents of decedent and agreed to settle "any and all claims ... on account of the claimed injury and the death" by payment of a lump sum of $15,000 less an attorney's fee of $1,800. The form reflected that counsel represented appellants. Typewritten in the space following the printed words "Reason for compromise" was the explanation:

"Very serious issue as to injury AOE/COE, nature and extent of dependency, if any, burial expenses and identity of dependents. Parties desire to resolve these disputes by way of this compromise and release, which includes interest up to 20 days after order of approval issues by WCAB. Provisions of California Labor Code 5313 are waived."

Paragraph 11 of the compromise and release form provides the following printed language:

"Upon approval of this compromise agreement as provided by law, and payment in accordance with the provisions of said order of approval, said applicants and each of them do hereby release and forever discharge said employer and said insurance company of and from all claims, demands, actions or causes of action, of every kind or nature whatsoever, on account of, or by reason of the injury and death sustained as aforesaid by the employee, and in particular of any, all and every claim or cause of action which the undersigned, heirs, executors, representatives, or administrators may have had, now have, or shall hereafter have against said employer, said insurance carrier, and each of them under Division IV of Labor Code of the State of California." (Emphasis added.)

The WCAB approved the compromise and release by order filed in April 1985. The order stated:

"The parties to the above-entitled action having filed a Compromise and Release herein, on November 29, 1984, settling this case for $15,000.00 in addition to all sums which may have been paid previously, and requesting that it be approved; and this Board having considered the entire record, including said Compromise and Release, now finds that it should be approved.

"...

"Based on the reasons set forth in Paragraph 9 of the Compromise and Release agreement, settlement appears fair and adequate and in the best interests of the parties." (Emphasis added.)

Appellants each received payment pursuant to the order approving the compromise and release.

The issue before us turns on the meaning and scope of the language of paragraph 11. Respondent contends it clearly and unambiguously releases respondent from any and all claims arising out of the injury and death of Rene Lopez. Appellants, on the other hand, contend the final words of paragraph 11, "under Division IV of Labor Code of the State of California" qualify and restrict the scope of the release only to those claims which are compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.

As recognized by the California Supreme Court in Johnson v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 964, 88 Cal.Rptr. 202, 471 P.2d 1002, the compromise and release form used by the WCAB is a release of workers' compensation liability--it is not a release of tort liability. (Id. at pp. 972-973, 88 Cal.Rptr. 202, 471 P.2d 1002.) Although the issue addressed in Johnson is not the same as we face here, we find instructive its discussion of the meaning and scope of a workers' compensation compromise and release and the risks associated with ambiguous language contained in such a release.

In Johnson, an employee executed a compromise agreement using the mandatory printed form for compromise and release of workers' compensation. The form provided that the employee released the employer and workers' compensation insurance carrier from " '... all claims and causes of action, whether now known or ascertained, or which may hereafter arise or develop as a result of said injury, including any and all liability of said employer and said insurance carrier and each of them to the dependents, heirs, executors, representatives, administrators or assigns of said employee.' " (2 Cal.3d at p. 969, 88 Cal.Rptr. 202, 471 P.2d 1002; emphasis omitted.) The employee subsequently died of his injuries and his widow applied for workers compensation death benefits. The workers' compensation judge dismissed her claim on the ground that the release executed by her husband released the employer and the insurance carrier from further liability under the act. She claimed her husband did not know he was releasing her claim to death benefits and did not intend that result. She relied upon Casey v. Proctor (1963) 59 Cal.2d 97, 28 Cal.Rptr. 307, 378 P.2d 579, which held that tort liability releases which purport to cover later-discovered injuries should be set aside if the releasor did not knowingly intend to discharge such liability. Her claim was rejected.

"Petitioner's argument fails because of the significant difference in legal effect between a release of tort liability and a release of workmen's compensation liability. A tort release is effective upon execution, but a compromise and release of workmen's compensation liability is invalid until approved by the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board. (Lab.Code, § 5001; see Chavez v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1958) 49 Cal.2d 701, 702 .) California Administrative Code, title 8, section 10882, provides that: 'The Appeals Board or referee will inquire...