Lopez v. Sony Elecs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 May 2016
• Docket Number: B256792
• Citation: 247 Cal.App.4th 444,202 Cal.Rptr.3d 171
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Dominique LOPEZ, a Minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SONY ELECTRONICS, INC., Defendant and Respondent.

247 Cal.App.4th 444

202 Cal.Rptr.3d 171

Dominique LOPEZ, a Minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant

v.SONY ELECTRONICS, INC., Defendant and Respondent.

B256792

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 8, California.

Filed May 13, 2016

Waters, Kraus & Paul and Michael B. Gurien, El Segundo, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Musick, Peeler & Garrett and William A. Bossen, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent.

GRIMES

, J.

We are asked to resolve whether an action alleging personal injuries caused by prenatal exposure to toxic substances is governed by the statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.4¹

(applicable to tort actions for birth and prebirth injuries), or the statute of limitations set forth in section 340.8 (applicable to tort actions for exposure to hazardous materials and toxic substances).

Plaintiff and appellant Dominique Lopez, at age 12, by and through her mother and guardian ad litem Cheryl Lopez, brought an action against defendant and respondent Sony Electronics, Inc. (Sony) alleging that her prenatal exposure to toxic substances caused her to suffer birth defects and permanent injuries. Sony successfully argued in the trial court that plaintiff's action was time-barred under section 340.4

, which expressly provides that actions for prenatal injuries are not tolled during the plaintiff's minority. Plaintiff appeals from the entry of summary judgment in favor of Sony, contending the correct statute of limitations applicable to her claims is section 340.8, under which her action would be timely.

We conclude section 340.4

governs plaintiff's claims and that her action is time-barred. In so holding, we depart from our colleagues in the Sixth District who concluded that section 340.8 supplants the limitations period of section 340.4 for claims based on prenatal injuries caused by exposure to hazardous materials or toxic substances. (See Nguyen v. Western Digital Corporation (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1522, 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 897 (Nguyen ).)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The material facts related to the time-bar are not in dispute. Plaintiff was born in April 1999, with numerous birth defects

, including fusion of her cervical vertebrae, facial asymmetry, dysplastic nails, diverticulum of the bladder

, and a misshapen kidney. She also suffers from developmental delays. Plaintiff's mother worked at a Sony facility in San Diego from 1978 through 2000, including during her pregnancy with plaintiff.

On January 6, 2012, plaintiff filed this action against Sony for negligence, strict liability, willful misconduct, and intentional misrepresentation. Plaintiff alleged that, during her mother's employment with Sony, she was exposed for prolonged periods of time to chemicals which caused plaintiff's birth defects.

Sony moved for summary judgment on the ground plaintiff's action was barred by section 340.4

which imposes a six-year statute of limitations for birth and prebirth injuries, and which also expressly provides there is no tolling of the limitations period under section 352² during the plaintiff's minority. Sony acknowledged in its motion that the common law delayed discovery rule applies to actions governed by section 340.4, but produced evidence showing plaintiff's mother reasonably suspected a connection between her workplace exposures at Sony and her daughter's injuries on or before August 2000 (including records related to a worker's compensation claim plaintiff's mother filed concerning the same workplace exposures).

Plaintiff opposed Sony's motion, arguing her action was subject to section 340.8, not section 340.4

. While section 340.8 incorporates the shorter two-year limitations period of the general personal injury statute (§ 335.1), the limitations period may be tolled under section 352 during a plaintiff's minority. Thus, plaintiff argued her action was timely because it was filed when she was still a minor. Plaintiff did not offer any evidence to dispute that her mother knew, since at least 2000, of the connection between her workplace exposures at Sony and plaintiff's birth defects. Instead, plaintiff objected to the admissibility of the evidence presented by Sony on that issue (e.g., records from the worker's compensation proceeding), and otherwise argued it was irrelevant because tolling under section 352 applied to an action under section 340.8, so she need not rely on the separate tolling afforded by the delayed discovery rule.

The trial court granted Sony's motion, reasoning that section 340.4

applied and barred plaintiff's action as a matter of law. Judgment in favor of Sony was entered thereafter on April 8, 2014. (Nguyen was not decided until Sept. 2014.)

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

The sole issue before us is one of statutory interpretation based on undisputed facts. We therefore exercise independent review. ( Imperial Merchant Services, Inc. v. Hunt (2009) 47 Cal.4th 381, 387, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 212 P.3d 736

(Imperial Merchant Services ).)

“The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” (Young v. Haines (1986) 41 Cal.3d 883, 894, 226 Cal.Rptr. 547, 718 P.2d 909

(Young ); accord, Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. County of Riverside (1989) 48 Cal.3d 84, 95, 255 Cal.Rptr. 670, 767 P.2d 1148 [“the intent of the Legislature is the end and aim of all statutory construction”].) Courts look first to the statutory language in attempting to glean legislative intent, giving the words their “ ‘usual and ordinary meaning.’ [Citation.]” (Imperial Merchant Services, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 387, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 212 P.3d 736

.) If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute governs. (Vafi v. McCloskey (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 874, 880, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 608.)

Section 340.4

provides: “An action by or on behalf of a minor for personal injuries sustained before or in the course of his or her birth must be commenced within six years after the date of birth, and the time the minor is under any disability mentioned in Section 352 shall not be excluded in computing the time limited for the commencement of the action.”

Section 340.8, in relevant part, provides: “In any civil action for injury or illness based upon exposure to a hazardous material or toxic substance, the time for commencement of the action shall be no later than either two years from the date of injury, or two years after the plaintiff becomes aware of, or reasonably should have become aware of, (1) an injury, (2) the physical cause of the injury, and (3) sufficient facts to put a reasonable person on inquiry notice that the injury was caused or contributed to by the wrongful act of another, whichever occurs later.”

If read separately and in isolation, both section 340.4

and section 340.8 are unambiguous on their face under the plain meaning rule. Both may be read to govern plaintiff's action for injuries sustained before her birth and for exposure to toxic substances. However, we do not construe statutory provisions in isolation. “Where, as here, we are called upon to interpret two seemingly inconsistent statutes to determine which applies under a particular set of facts, our goal is to harmonize the law [citation] and avoid an interpretation that requires one statute to be ignored.” (Chatsky & Associates v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 873, 876, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 154.) “ ‘ “[Every] statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect. [Citations.]” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 296, 243 Cal.Rptr. 224, 747 P.2d 1152 (Michael G. ); accord, Fuentes v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 1, 7, 128 Cal.Rptr. 673, 547 P.2d 449.)

Here, the statutory language alone does not answer the question which statute of limitations was intended by the Legislature to apply to claims for prenatal injuries caused by exposure to toxic substances. “ ‘If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’ [Citation.]” (Imperial Merchant Services, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 388, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 212 P.3d 736

; see also Kramer v. Intuit Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 574, 579, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 412 [the “ ‘literal meaning of the words of a statute may be disregarded to avoid absurd results or to give effect to manifest purposes that, in the light of the statute's legislative history, appear from its provisions considered as a whole’ ”], and Leslie Salt Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation etc. Com. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 605, 614, 200 Cal.Rptr. 575 [“courts resist blind obedience to the putative ‘plain meaning’ of a statutory phrase where literal interpretation would defeat the Legislature's central objective”].) We therefore turn to a review of the legislative history of both statutes.

First, we discuss the statute of limitations applicable to prenatal injuries. Code of Civil Procedure section 340.4

was enacted in 1992 (Stats. 1992, ch. 163, § 16), but has its provenance in statutes enacted in 1872 and amended in 1941. The California Legislature first created a statutory cause of action for prenatal injuries in 1872. Former Civil Code section 29

abrogated “the common law rule that an unborn child has no independent existence and, therefore, no right of action for injuries suffered before its birth.” (Young, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 892, 226 Cal.Rptr. 547, 718 P.2d 909.) “As originally enacted, [former Civil Code section 29 ] applied to all actions which might be brought after birth and thus did not provide any single statute of limitations for these actions. The applicable statutes of limitations were set forth in other statutes, depending on the nature of the cause of action. Furthermore, [Code of Civil Procedure] section 352, also enacted in 1872, established a general rule that the statute of limitations for most...