Lopez v. Sony Elecs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 July 2018
• Docket Number: S235357
• Citation: 5 Cal.5th 627,234 Cal.Rptr.3d 856,420 P.3d 767
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Dominique LOPEZ, a Minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SONY ELECTRONICS, INC., Defendant and Respondent.

5 Cal.5th 627

420 P.3d 767

234 Cal.Rptr.3d 856

Dominique LOPEZ, a Minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.SONY ELECTRONICS, INC., Defendant and Respondent.

S235357

Supreme Court of California.

Filed July 5, 2018

Waters Kraus & Paul and Michael B. Gurien, El Segundo, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Musick, Peeler & Garrett, William A. Bossen, Los Angeles, Alejandro H. Aharonian and Cheryl A. Orr, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent.

Hugh F. Young, Jr. ; Drinker Biddle & Reath and Alan J. Lazarus, San Francisco, for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Keller/Anderle, Jennifer L. Keller, Irvine, Yen–Shyang Tseng, Irvine, and Michael A. Schachter for Western Digital Corporation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Horvitz & Levy, Jeremy B. Rosen, Burbank, John F. Querio, Burbank, Scott P. Dixler ; Janet Y. Galeria ; and Fred J. Hiestand, Sacramento, for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, American Insurance Association, Association of Southern California Defense Counsel and Civil Justice Association of California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

CORRIGAN, J.

When a child is allegedly harmed by in utero exposure to hazardous chemicals, which statute of limitations applies: that for toxic exposure claims ( Code Civ. Proc., § 340.8, subd. (a) ),¹ or that for prenatal injuries (§ 340.4)? The answer determines the viability of this lawsuit. Because the toxic exposure statute was more recently enacted, and its language plainly encompasses prenatal injuries, we conclude it applies here. The limitations period for toxic exposure suits is two years, but it is tolled while the plaintiff is a minor. (See § 352; Nguyen v. Western Digital Corp. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1540–1541, 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 897 ( Nguyen ).) Accordingly, the claims here are not time-barred, and the trial court’s entry of summary judgment should be reversed.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Dominique Lopez was born on April 13, 1999, with multiple birth defects, including chromosomal deletion, cervical vertebrae fusion, facial asymmetry, dysplastic nails, diverticulum of the bladder, and a misshapen kidney. She also suffers from developmental delays. For over 20 years, including the term of her pregnancy, plaintiff’s mother worked at a Sony Electronics, Inc. (Sony) manufacturing plant. She allegedly worked with and around "teratogenic and reproductively toxic" chemicals.

Plaintiff sued on January 6, 2012, when she was 12 years old. She alleged that she and her mother were exposed to toxic chemicals at the Sony plant, resulting in her birth defects. Seeking summary judgment, Sony argued the action was time-barred under section 340.4, the six-year statute of limitations for birth and prenatal injuries. It urged that, by August of 2000, plaintiff’s mother had reason to suspect her workplace chemical exposure had caused plaintiff’s birth defects. Plaintiff did not dispute this assertion. Instead, she maintained her action fell not under section 340.4, governing prenatal injuries, but under section 340.8, covering injuries caused by toxic exposure. Section 340.8 ’s limitations period is only two years but, unlike section 340.4, it permits tolling during minority and periods of mental incapacity.

The trial court applied section 340.4 and granted summary judgment. A divided panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed. The majority disagreed with the Sixth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Nguyen , supra , 229 Cal.App.4th 1522, 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 897, which had reached the opposite conclusion. We granted review to resolve the conflict.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Relevant Statutes

The prenatal injury statute, section 340.4, states: "An action by or on behalf of a minor for personal injuries sustained before or in the course of his or her birth must be commenced within six years after the date of birth, and the time the minor is under any disability mentioned in Section 352 [providing for tolling during minority or incapacity] shall not be excluded in computing the time limited for the commencement of the action."

The origins of the prenatal injury statute trace back to 1872, when the Legislature first authorized a right of action for injuries sustained before birth. ( Young v. Haines (1986) 41 Cal.3d 883, 892, 226 Cal.Rptr. 547, 718 P.2d 909 ( Young ).) The original statute² did not specify a limitations period. A later amendment incorporated the six-year limitations period for personal injuries and expressly prohibited tolling. (Stats. 1941, ch. 337, § 1, p. 1579; see Young , at p. 892, 226 Cal.Rptr. 547, 718 P.2d 909.) The amended statute was reenacted without substantive change as section 340.4. (Stats. 1992, ch. 163, § 16, p. 731.) Thus, since 1941, the statute of limitations for prenatal injuries has been six years and is not tolled during minority.

The toxic exposure statute, section 340.8, subdivision (a), states: "In any civil action for injury or illness based upon exposure to a hazardous material or toxic substance, the time for commencement of the action shall be no later than either two years from the date of injury, or two years after the plaintiff becomes aware of, or reasonably should have become aware of, (1) an injury, (2) the physical cause of the injury, and (3) sufficient facts to put a reasonable person on inquiry notice that the injury was caused or contributed to by the wrongful act of another, whichever occurs later." The statute further provides that a " ‘civil action for injury or illness based upon exposure to a hazardous material or toxic substance’ " in subdivision (a) "does not include an action subject to Section 340.2 or 340.5." ( § 340.8, subd. (c)(1).) These exceptions refer to the statutes of limitations specifically prescribed for asbestos-related injury claims (§ 340.2) and medical malpractice claims (§ 340.5).

The toxic exposure statute became effective on January 1, 2004. (Stats. 2003, ch. 873, § 2, p. 6398.) We had previously held that a tort cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff knows, or has reason to suspect, that he was injured as a result of someone’s wrongdoing. ( Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397–399, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 453, 981 P.2d 79 ; Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110–1111, 245 Cal.Rptr. 658, 751 P.2d 923 ; see Clark v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1058–1060, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 223.) This common law delayed discovery rule has long applied to prenatal injury claims. (See Young , supra , 41 Cal.3d at pp. 892–893, 226 Cal.Rptr. 547, 718 P.2d 909.) The Legislature declared that section 340.8 was intended to codify the delayed discovery rule for personal injury and wrongful death cases involving toxic exposure.

(Stats. 2003, ch. 873, § 2, p. 6398; see Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 331 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 29, 2003, p. 1.)³ Section 340.8 has been applied broadly, encompassing both environmental hazards and prescription drugs. (See Nelson v. Indevus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 668.)

B. The Toxic Exposure Statute Applies to Prenatal Toxic Injuries

This case poses a pure question of statutory interpretation, subject to independent review. ( Pineda v. Williams–Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524, 529, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 531, 246 P.3d 612.) "Our fundamental task is to determine the Legislature’s intent and give effect to the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s words ‘ "because they generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent." [Citation.] If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous our inquiry ends.’ " ( In re D.B. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 941, 945, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 320 P.3d 1136.) In that case, the plain meaning of the statute is controlling, and " ‘resort to extrinsic sources to determine the Legislature’s intent is unnecessary.’ " ( Ste. Marie v. Riverside County Regional Park & Open–Space Dist. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 282, 288, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 369, 206 P.3d 739.)

Plaintiff’s case appears to fall within the ambit of both statutes of limitations. It is "[a]n action ... for personal injuries sustained before or in the course of ... birth" (§ 340.4) and a "civil action for injury or illness based upon exposure to a hazardous material or toxic substance" ( § 340.8, subd. (a) ). Allegedly, plaintiff’s injuries were both sustained before birth and caused by toxic exposure.

When possible, courts seek to harmonize inconsistent statutes, construing them together to give effect to all of their provisions. ( State Dept. of Public Health v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 940, 955, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 60, 342 P.3d 1217 ( State Dept. of Public Health ).) Sony urges us to reconcile the provisions by holding that section 340.8 applies to all toxic exposure injuries except those incurred before birth. "But the requirement that courts harmonize potentially inconsistent statutes when possible is not a license to redraft the statutes to strike a compromise that the Legislature did not reach." ( State Dept. of Public Health , at p. 956, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 60, 342 P.3d 1217.) Here, harmony is not possible. Each statute plainly encompasses plaintiff’s claims, yet the choice of one automatically nullifies the other. If section 340.4 applies, a subset of toxic exposure claims will be governed by an untollable six-year statute of limitations instead of the two-year toxic exposure limit, tolled during minority. If section 340.8 applies, a subset of prenatal injury claims will fall under the tollable two-year limit instead of the six-year period. We must determine which limitations period the Legislature intended to apply.

The rules for construing irreconcilable statutes are well established. ( State Dept. of Public Health , supra , 60 Cal.4th at p. 960, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 60, 342 P.3d 1217.) "If conflicting statutes cannot be reconciled, later enactments supersede earlier...