Martin v. Spalding
| Decision Date | 15 December 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 23880.,23880. |
| Citation | 133 Idaho 469,988 P.2d 695 |
| Parties | Larry MARTIN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James T. SPALDING, Director of the Idaho Department of Corrections; Joe Klauser, Warden of the Idaho State Correctional Institution; Captain Jeff Henry, Deputy Warden of Security; George Miller, Deputy warden of Operations; Lt. Kevin Castiglione, Disciplinary Hearing Officer; Sgt. Conant; Sgt. Everhart; Cpl. Page; Corrections Officer Cameron; Dr. Neilsen; Dr. Steuart; and Alan G. Lance, Attorney General of Idaho, Respondents. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Larry J. Martin, Boise, pro se appellant.
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Michaelina Murphy, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Larry Martin, a prison inmate, appeals from a summary judgment dismissing his "petition for a writ of habeas corpus," which alleged, inter alia, that correctional officials deprived him of personal property without due process. We affirm.
Larry Martin is a medium security inmate at the Idaho State Correctional Institution. A correctional officer issued a disciplinary offense report alleging that Martin had interfered with an inmate count. A disciplinary review officer found Martin guilty and, as punishment, ordered that Martin serve thirty days in administrative segregation.
Incident to his transfer to administrative segregation, Martin's cell was searched and his personal items inventoried. The correctional officers performing the inventory determined that Martin possessed unauthorized property. Specifically, he had more than the allowed number of certain items, including photographs, calendars, and magazines, and also possessed certain property that inmates were not authorized to possess, including envelopes with stamps on them, newspaper clippings, file folders, and other miscellaneous items. All of these items were confiscated as contraband. Martin was given the choice of mailing the contraband items out of the institution at his expense to a person of his choosing, donating the items, or having them destroyed.1 Martin chose to donate the property. Other property that was authorized for inmates in medium security but not for those in administrative segregation was placed in storage and was returned to Martin after the thirty-day term of segregation.
Martin filed a "petition for a writ of habeas corpus" alleging that his constitutional rights were violated by the manner in which the disciplinary review was conducted, that his punishment was excessive, and that his due process and equal protection rights were violated by the taking of his property. The prayer for relief in the petition included a request for compensation for the cost of the personal possessions that were confiscated and not less than $25,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages for violation of his federal constitutional rights. The respondents moved for summary judgment, which the magistrate granted. With respect to Martin's disciplinary placement in administrative segregation, the magistrate held that there had been no deprivation of due process. Martin's claims for compensatory damages and injunctive relief were dismissed by the magistrate on the basis that they were beyond the court's jurisdiction. Martin appealed to the district court. At oral argument before the district court, he voluntarily dismissed all his claims except the claims that he was entitled to compensation for the taking of his property without due process. The district court affirmed the summary judgment.
On further appeal, Martin argues, as he did in the magistrate division and in district court, that he was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing before confiscation of his personal property.
On review from a district court decision made in an appellate capacity, this Court examines the magistrate's decision independently, while giving due regard to the district court's analysis. Application of Henry, 127 Idaho 349, 350, 900 P.2d 1360, 1361 (1995); Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431, 436, 860 P.2d 634, 639 (1993). On appeal from a summary judgment, we review the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c); Mitchell v. Siqueiros, 99 Idaho 396, 398, 582 P.2d 1074, 1076 (1978); Lopez v. State, 128 Idaho 826, 827-28, 919 P.2d 355, 356-57 (Ct.App. 1996). The facts and all reasonable inferences from the evidence are construed in the favor of the party opposing the summary judgment. Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct.App.1993); Mitchell, supra.
The magistrate summarily dismissed Martin's claims relating to the confiscation of his property on the ground that Martin's request for compensatory damages was "beyond the court's jurisdiction in this matter." The magistrate's order does not explain in what respect jurisdiction was believed to be lacking. We surmise, however, that the magistrate was referring to the fact that the damages alleged in Martin's petition exceeded the $10,000 monetary limit for civil actions assignable to the magistrate division under I.R.C.P. 82(c)(2).
Although the magistrate was correct in concluding that claims for damages in the amount alleged by Martin are not properly assignable to the magistrate division, this was not a jurisdictional bar that called for dismissal of the action. As we observed in St. Benedict's Hosp. v. County of Twin Falls, 107 Idaho 143, 146, 686 P.2d 88, 91 (Ct.App. 1984):
A complaint which seeks relief available only from the district court, but which is captioned in the magistrate division, may be procedurally irregular but it is not jurisdictionally defective. The magistrate division is not an entity wholly separate from the district court. It is part of the district court, served by the same clerk and by a unitary filing system. Judges of the magistrate division receive their cases by assignment from the district judges, pursuant to statutes and to rules of our Supreme Court. See I.C. §§ 1-2208, 2210; I.R.C.P. 82(c)(1), 82(c)(2). If a case exceeds the subject-matter jurisdiction granted a magistrate, it is transferred to another judge of the district court having such jurisdiction.
Hence, Martin's damages claims should not have been dismissed because they exceeded the scope of the magistrate's authority. Once the magistrate had dismissed Martin's claims that fell under the ambit of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, his remaining claims should have been transferred to the district court.
This error will not call for reversal of the summary judgment, however, if the magistrate's decision can be sustained on alternative grounds. "[W]here the decision of the lower court is based upon an erroneous theory, we will nonetheless uphold the decision if any alternative legal basis can be found to support it." Hanf v. Syringa Realty, Inc., 120 Idaho 364, 370, 816 P.2d 320, 326 (1991); See also Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 179, 595 P.2d 709, 713 (1979)
. Therefore, we will consider the respondents' alternative arguments supporting the summary judgment.
The respondents first argue that the magistrate's dismissal of Martin's claims for deprivation of property should be affirmed because a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not the correct form of pleading to seek the return of property or to claim compensation for its confiscation.
We disagree. We addressed the same issue in Freeman v. State, 115 Idaho 78, 764 P.2d 445 (Ct.App.1988), where a magistrate had dismissed a pleading labeled a petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the pleading form was improper. We held that the irregularity in the pleading form should be disregarded and that the court should address the substance of the claim. We explained:
Freeman, 115 Idaho at 79, 764 P.2d at 446 (citations omitted). See also Sivak v. State, 111 Idaho 118, 120, 721 P.2d 218, 220 (Ct. App.1986) (Sivak I)
().2 Accordingly, we will not affirm the magistrate's decision on the ground that the relief sought by Martin is unavailable through habeas corpus proceedings.
We thus turn to the merits of Martin's action. Martin asserts that his due process rights were violated by two distinct types of property deprivations. First, as to the property which was declared to be contraband and which he was given the choice of mailing to an outside party or donating, Martin contends that he was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing to determine whether the seized property was, in fact, of a type or quantity forbidden by the prison rules. Second, Martin claims that he was permanently deprived of a towel which, though not considered contraband, was not returned to him after the completion of his term in administrative segregation.
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