Lorfano v. Dura Stone Steps, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 January 1990
• Parties: 11 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 39, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 12,381 Gary S. LORFANO, et al. v. DURA STONE STEPS, INC., et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 195

569 A.2d 195

11 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 39, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 12,381

Gary S. LORFANO, et al. v. DURA STONE STEPS, INC., et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Jan. 3, 1990.

Decided Jan. 29, 1990.

Robert Knight (orally), Daniel Warren, Bean, Jones & Warren, Scarborough, for appellants.

Jonathan S. Piper, Joan M. Koski (orally), Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, Portland, for Dayton Sand & Gravel Co.

Harold J. Friedman (orally), Jennifer S. Begel, Friedman & Babcock, Portland, for Dura Stone Steps.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and ROBERTS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN, HORNBY and COLLINS, JJ.

WATHEN, Justice.

Plaintiffs Gary and Jo-Ann Lorfano appeal from an order of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Alexander, J.) granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Dura Stone Steps, Inc. (Dura Stone). ¹ Although plaintiffs do not challenge the judgment entered on their negligence claim, they contend on appeal that Dayton was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their claims of strict liability and breach of warranties. We disagree and affirm judgment.

The facts developed at the motion hearing may be summarized as follows: Plaintiff Gary Lorfano's employer maintained an office in a building owned by Dayton Sand & Gravel, Inc. (Dayton). On July 9, 1985, he was injured when he fell off the side of a set of prefabricated concrete steps at the entry to the building. The steps consisted of four risers and were manufactured by Dura Stone and installed by them on a concrete base fabricated by Dayton. When the steps were ordered, Dura Stone's sales manager offered to sell handrails to accompany the steps, but Dayton's purchasing agent refused.

Gary Lorfano and his wife filed suit, naming both Dayton and Dura Stone as defendants. The Superior Court granted Dura Stone's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the order as it relates to their claims based on strict liability and breach of warranties.

I.

Plaintiffs do not contend that the steps were defective in design or manufacture. Rather, they argue that Dura Stone is strictly liable because of a failure to warn of the dangers presented by the use of the steps without handrails. Maine's strict products liability statute provides as follows:

One who sells any goods or products in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to a person whom the manufacturer, seller or supplier might reasonably have expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods, or to his property, if the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product and it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without significant change in the condition in which it is sold. This section applies although the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product and the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.

14 M.R.S.A. § 221 (1980). We have previously traced the development of liability predicated upon a duty to warn back to comment j to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). See Bernier v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 516 A.2d 534, 538 (Me.1986). It is now clear that a product, "although faultlessly made, may nevertheless be deemed 'defective' under the [statute] and subject the supplier thereof to strict liability if it is unreasonably dangerous to place the product in the hands of a user without a suitable warning and the product is supplied and no warning is given." Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal.App.2d 44, 53, 46 Cal.Rptr. 552, 558 (1965). Admittedly this aspect of strict liability bears a strong resemblance to a negligence action. Professor Prosser describes an action premised on a failure to warn in the following terms:

Although this ground of recovery is sometimes referred to as strict liability, it is really nothing more than a ground of negligence liability described as the sale of a product in a defective condition, subject, however, only to the defenses and other limitations on liability applicable to strict liability rather than negligence.

W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts, § 99 at 697 (5th ed. 1984). See also Bernier v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 516 A.2d at 540 ("A strict liability failure-to-warn case does resemble a negligence action because the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct is the critical issue.").

We have construed the statute as requiring that "[a] manufacturer has a responsibility to inform users and consumers of dangers about which he either knows or should know at the time the product is sold." Id. As a corollary to that rule, however, courts have held that a manufacturer has no duty to warn of a danger that is obvious and apparent. See, e.g., Plante v. Hobart, 771 F.2d 617, 620 (1st Cir.198...