Black v. Barnwell County, 18169
| Decision Date | 13 February 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 18169,18169 |
| Citation | 243 S.C. 531,134 S.E.2d 753 |
| Parties | Josephine G. BLACK, Respondent, v. BARNWELL COUNTY and State Workmen's Compensation Fund, Appellants. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., David Aiken, Asst. Atty. Gen. Columbia, for appellants.
Blatt & Fales, Barnwell, for respondent.
The late Jeff Black, while sheriff and jailor of Barnwell County, suffered a heart attack on September 27, 1960, from which he died on October 11, 1960. His widow filed claim with the Industrial Commission for death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, contending that the heart attack from which Sheriff Black died was caused by unusual strain and over-exertion in the performance of the duties of his employment and, therefore, was a compensable accident. After taking the testimony, the Industrial Commission concluded that the deceased 'did not sustain any injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment,' and denied the claim. Upon appeal by the claimant from such decision, the circuit court reversed the findings of the Commission and remanded the cause for the purpose of entering an award for the claimant. For decision of the circuit court was based upon the conclusion that the only reasonable inference to be deduced from the evidence was that Sheriff Black died from a heart attack induced by over-exertion in the performance of his duties and, therefore, the Commission should have, as a matter of law, entered an award for the claimant. From this judgment of the circuit court, the defendants have appealed.
The question to be decided is whether there was any competent evidence to sustain the findings of the Commission that the heart attack suffered by the deceased was not a compensable accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The testimony shows that the deceased had been sheriff of Barnwell County for a number of years and, in 1950, assumed the additional duties of jailor of the County. The Barnwell County jail was a two story building with cells for prisoners located on the second floor and living quarters for the jailor on the first. The second floor was reached by a rather steep stairway of fifteen steps. At the time that the deceased assumed the position of jailor, he and his wife moved into the living quarters in the jail and continued to reside there until his death, serving as both sheriff and jailor. For sometime prior to his death, he had suffered from a weakened heart condition, having suffered coronary attacks in 1952 and 1959.
During the late afternoon of September 27, 1960, the deceased made seven or eight trips within a period of a little over an hour up the stairway to the second floor of the jail in answer to numerous requests made by two drunk prisoners who had been placed in a second floor jail cell. The deceased complained shortly thereafter of feeling badly and, in order to rest, he and his wife left the jail for a visit to their country place for about two hours. Upon returning to their quarters at the jail, the deceased was still not feeling well and he retired for the night. He suffered a heart attack in the early morning hours of the following day, from which he died on October 11, 1960. It is the contention of the claimant, as held by the circuit court, that the evidence conclusively shows that the deceased died from a heart attack induced by unusual and extraordinary exertion in climbing the stairs of the jail in the performance of his duties as jailor on the afternoon of September 27, 1960.
The general rule has been adopted in this State that a coronary attack suffered by an employee constitutes a compensable accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act if it is induced by unexpected strain or over-exertion in the performance of the duties of his employment, or by unusual and extraordinary conditions in the employment. Kearse v. South Carolina Wildlife Resources Department, 236 S.C. 540, 115 S.E.2d 183. It has also been held, as stated in Walsh v. United States Rubber Co., 238 S.C. 411, 120 S.E.2d 685, that
Citation of authority is unnecessary for the settled rule that in Workmen's Compensation cases the Industrial Commission is the fact-finding body; and that, on appeal, this Court and the circuit court are limited in their review of the facts to a determination of whether or not there is any competent evidence to support the factual findings of the Commission. When there is a conflict in the evidence, either of different witnesses or of the same witness, the findings of fact of the Commission are conclusive. It is only when the evidence gives rise to but one reasonable inference that the question becomes one of law for the court to decide.
To establish that the death of Sheriff Black resulted from a compensable accident, it was necessary for the claimant to prove (1) a causal connection between the climbing of the stairs and the heart attack from which the deceased died and (2) that the climbing of the stairs constituted an unusual and extraordinary exertion of his part. If the evidence was conflicting upon these issues, or either of them, such conflicts in the evidence could only be resolved by the Industrial Commission, the fact-finding body.
Whether climbing the stairs by the deceased on the occasion in question constituted an unusual or extraordinary exertion must be determined in the light of his usual and normal duties as jailor of Barnwell County. Sims v. South Carolina State Commission of Forestry, supra, 235 S.C. 1, 109 S.E.2d 701. The deceased was jailor of Barnwell County and was responsible for the performance of the duties of the office. These duties included caring for the prisoners lodged in the jail and required the use of the stairway in administering to their needs. While there is testimony that the deceased had restricted his climbing of the stairway because of his previous coronary attacks, there is testimony that he did climb the stairs on occasions in the performance of his duties and that he alone determined the necessity for so doing. It is reasonably inferable from all of the facts and circumstances that the deceased in climbing the stairs was about the normal and usual duties of his employment as jailor and that such activity did not constitute unusual and extraordinary exertion. We may concede that the opposite inference might also be reasonably drawn from the evidence. This, however, simply emphasizes the fact that conflicting inferences may be reached from the evidence, which makes the findings of the Commission thereabout binding on this Court and the circuit court on appeal.
We find no material dispute in the medical testimony as to the probable causal connection between climbing of the stairs by the deceased and the heart attack from which he died. Under the uncontradicted testimony that the coronary symptoms developed shortly after the climbing of the stairs by the deceased, all doctors, who expressed an opinion, agreed that such activity would have contributed to the fatal heart attack. The conflicting evidence upon the remaining material question in the case, however, clearly precludes a determination on appeal of the factual issues as a matter of law.
The judgment of the circuit court is accordingly reversed and the cause remanded for entry of judgment for the defendants in accordance with the decision of the Industrial Commission.
Finding myself unable to agree with the majority opinion in this case, I feel it to be my duty to set forth the reasons for my dissent, particularly since the views I hold may possibly have some influence upon the just and proper disposition of similar cases in the future.
In my humble opinion, this case would not likely even be before this court, let alone disposed of in the manner it is being disposed of, were it not for what I regard to be some confusion as to what constitutes a 'finding of fact' and what constitutes a 'conclusion of law'.
In the instant case the hearing Commissioner, the late John W. Duncan, under the denomination of 'findings of fact' made the following findings:
'That the claimant has failed to sustain the burden of proof necessary in proving his claim as required by our many Supreme Court decisions involving such death cases.
'That the claimant, Jeff Black, did not sustain any injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment resulting in his death.'
No other even so-called findings of fact were made which are pertinent to the appeal here. On appeal to the full Commission, the attorney for the claimant challenged the foregoing findings as being conclusions of law rather than findings of fact. The only conclusion of law stated as such by the hearing Commissioner was as follows:
'It is the conclusion of this Commissioner that Section 72-14 defines injury and personal injury.'
The full Commission, with the exception of Commissioner Reid, who filed an exhaustive and analytical dissent, affirmed the hearing Commissioner in a very brief order which did not set forth in any detail the basis upon which the hearing Commissioner was being affirmed.
On appeal to the circuit court counsel for claimant again challenged the above quoted so-called findings of fact as being mere conclusions of law...
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