Loso v. Lancaster County
Decision Date | 10 November 1906 |
Docket Number | 14,450 |
Citation | 109 N.W. 752,77 Neb. 466 |
Parties | PHILANDER G. LOSO, APPELLANT, v. LANCASTER COUNTY, APPELLEE |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county: LINCOLN FROST JUDGE. Reversed.
REVERSED.
Field Ricketts & Ricketts, for appellant.
J. L Caldwell, F. M. Tyrrell and Charles E. Matson, contra.
EPPERSON, C. AMES and OLDHAM, CC., concur.
Plaintiff Loso and an assistant went by rail to the village of Agnew, in Lancaster county, and from there walked a mile and a half to the farm of one Rhoman to repair a well. After the work was completed Rhoman's son volunteered to convey them back to the village. A horse was hitched to a single buggy, and the three men started north along the highway in the direction of Agnew. A ravine, over which the defendant, the county of Lancaster, maintained a bridge, crosses the highway at right angles. The bridge was 16 feet long, was not protected by guard rails, and one corner had settled about a foot, causing the structure to slope toward the southeast. When the buggy approached the bridge, plaintiff was sitting on the east side, his assistant on the west, and Rhoman in the middle, driving the horse. A mist was falling and it was getting dark. As they approached to cross the bridge, the horse slipped on the wet boards and fell. In his efforts to arise he fell from the bridge, carrying the buggy and the three men with him to the bottom of the ravine, 16 feet below. Plaintiff was injured, and, under the provisions of the statute, brought this action against the county, alleging that the county was negligent in not providing side-rails and in permitting the bridge to slope toward one corner. The county contended that the driver, Rhoman, was guilty of contributory negligence, and a verdict was returned for defendant. The court instructed the jury "that, if the driver was negligent in driving upon the bridge in the manner he did under the circumstances, his negligence would be imputed to the plaintiff, and in that event the plaintiff could not recover." The giving of this instruction presents the principal question in the case.
As a general rule, "there can be no such thing as imputable negligence, except in cases where that privity which exists in law between master and servant and principal and agent is found." 16 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (1st ed.), 447. The doctrine of imputed negligence or identification as to vehicles was first stated in the English case of Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115. It was there held that a passenger in a public vehicle, though having no control over the driver, must be held to be so identified with the vehicle as to be chargeable with any negligence on the part of its managers which contributed to an injury inflicted upon such passenger by the negligence of a stranger. This decision has been followed by a few of the courts of this country, notably Wisconsin. Prideaux v. City of Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513. Thorogood v. Bryan, however, has been recently overruled by the courts of England, because the reasons upon which the decision rests are "inconclusive and unsatisfactory," and the "identification upon which the decision * * * is based has no foundation in fact." Mills v. Armstrong, 58 L. T. n. s. 423.
The supreme court of the United States has also declined to follow Thorogood v. Bryan. In Little v. Hackett, 116 U.S. 366, 29 L.Ed. 652, 6 S.Ct. 391, Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the court, said:
Not only are the authorities to the effect that the doctrine of identification or imputed negligence has no application to public conveyances, but the overwhelming weight of authority is that the doctrine cannot be extended to private vehicles.
Sanborn, J., speaking for the court, in Union P. R. Co. v. Lapsley, 51 F. 174, uses this language:
In Dean v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 129 Pa. St. 514, 6, 18 A. 718. L.R.A. 143, it is said: See also Bunting v. Hogsett, 139 Pa. St. 363.
In Dyer v. Erie R. Co., 71 N.Y. 228, the plaintiff was injured while crossing the defendant's railroad track on a public thoroughfare. He was riding in a wagon by the permission and invitation of the owner of the horse and wagon. At that time a train standing south of certain buildings, which prevented its being seen, had started to back over the crossing without giving the driver of the wagon any warning of its approach. The horses, becoming frightened by the blowing off of steam from engines in the vicinity, became unmanageable, and the plaintiff was thrown, or jumped, from the wagon, and was injured by the train, which was backing. It was held that no relation of principal and agent arose between the driver of the wagon and the plaintiff, and although he traveled voluntarily, he was not responsible for the negligence of the driver, where he himself was not chargeable with negligence, and there was no claim that the driver was not competent to control and manage the horses.
In Robinson v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 66 N.Y. 11 23 Am. Rep. 1, it is said by Church, C. J.: ...
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Loso v. Lancaster Cnty.
...77 Neb. 466109 N.W. 752LOSOv.LANCASTER COUNTY.Supreme Court of Nebraska.Nov. 10, 1906 ... Syllabus by the Court.The doctrine of identification or imputed negligence does not apply to one injured while riding in a private vehicle, where no privity exists between the injured person and the owner or driver of the vehicle, and the injured ... ...