Lott v. Davidson
| Decision Date | 19 May 1961 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 38065,38071,38067,38066,s. 38065 |
| Citation | 261 Minn. 130,109 N.W.2d 336 |
| Parties | Patricia LOTT, Respondent, v. George R. DAVIDSON, d.b.a. Red and White Airway Taxi Company, Respondent, andEugene A. Alton and Michael E. Alton, Appellants. Marie G. SPATH, a minor, appearing by Allen N. Spath, her father and naturalguardian, Respondent, v. Michael E. ALTON and Eugene A. Alton, defendants, and third-party-plaintiffs, Appellants, v. George R. DAVIDSON, d.b.a. Red and White Airway Taxi Company, third-party-defendant, Respondent. Betty RAYMOND, as trustee for the next of kin of Gary L. Raymond, deceased, Respondent, v. Michael E. ALTON and Eugene A. Alton, Appellants. George R. DAVIDSON, d.b.a. Airway Taxi, Respondent, v. Eugene ALTON and Michael Alton, Appellants. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Where a jury fully considers disputed fact questions as to negligence and proximate cause under proper instructions as to the applicable law, its decision must stand unless it is manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence viewed as a whole. The evidence and inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party; only where different minds can reasonably arrive at but one result does the issue become one of law to be resolved by the court.
2. Where the court fully and correctly instructed the jury as to the standard of care required by a taxicab driver to his passenger on the one hand and to the general public on the other, it was not inconsistent, on the facts recited in the opinion, for the jury to find in answer to special interrogatories that the cab driver failed to exercise the highest degree of care owed to the passenger but that this failure did not constitute a breach of duty owed to others under similar circumstances. Causation is a fact issue for determination by the jury, except where facts are undisputed and susceptible of but one inference.
3. The instruction of the trial court must be viewed in its entirety, and all that is required is that it convey to the jury a clear and correct understanding of the law. It is not necessary that every possible opportunity for misapprehension be guarded against.
4. Generally, whether there should be a new trial for misconduct of counsel in closing arguments to the jury rests almost entirely in the discretion of the trial court. From a review of the record and a full consideration of the circumstances surrounding the admittedly improper argument, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a new trial, especially since counsel for the appellants specifically refused to move for a mistrial.
5. The legislature has the power to modify or change a remedy provided no substantial right is impaired. There is no such thing as a vested right in a particular remedy. Minn.St. 602.04 (L.1957, c. 949) creates a presumption of due care in actions brought for negligently causing the death of a person, and as a rule of presumption it simply changes the burden of proof. The legislature has entire control over such rules, subject only to the limitations of evidence expressly enshrined in the Constitution.
6. One who invokes the power of the court to declare a statute unconstitutional must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury resulting from its enforcement and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally. The power of the court to declare a law unconstitutional is to be exercised only when absolutely necessary in a particular case.
Meagher, Geer, Markham & Anderson, and M. J. Coyne and O. C. Adamson, Minneapolis, for appellants.
Minenko, Feinberg, Mirviss, Meyers & Schumacher, Schermer, Gensler & Shields, Theodore Rothman, and Samuel G. Smilow, Minneapolis, for respondents.
The four cases involved in this appeal arose out of a collision at an uncontrolled intersection at Sixth Avenue North and Fourth Street in Minneapolis. An Oldsmobile owned by Eugene Alton and driven by Michael Alton, going east on Fourth Street, collided with a taxicab operated by Gary Raymond, who was going north on Sixth Avenue. Raymond, who was employed by Red and White Airway Taxi Company, was killed in the accident. Patricia Lott, a passenger in the taxicab, was injured, as was Marie Spath, a passenger in the Alton car. The four actions involve suits (1) by Patricia Lott against the Altons and the owner of the taxicab; (2) by Marie Spath against the Altons and the owner of the taxicab; (3) by Betty Raymond, surviving wife of the taxicab driver, against the Altons; and (4) by George Davidson, doing business as Red and White Airway Taxicab Company, against the Altons for property damages.
The Altons appeal from orders of the district court denying a new trial. As grounds therefor they assert that the finding of the jury that the taxicab driver exercised due care and that his conduct was not a contribution cause of the accident is contrary to the evidence; that the failure of the driver of the taxicab to exercise the highest degree of care for the safety of his passenger constituted a contributing cause of the passenger's injuries; that the court's instructions with reference to the right-of-way in an uncontrolled intersection were erroneous and prejudicial; that they were denied a fair trial because of misconduct in argument to the jury; and that the court erred in instructing the jury with reference to the presumption of due care as provided by Minn.St. 602.04 on the ground that that particular statute is claimed to be unconstitutional as repugnant to the equal-protection clause.
From an examination of the record it appears that the jury could have found these facts: On the evening of May 17, 1958, Michael Alton, then 19 years of age, and his fiancee, Marie Spath (now Mrs. Marie Teschendorf), drove to a place near the north edge of Minneapolis, where they stopped to discuss Marie's intended journey to California to live with her mother. Michael planned to enter the United States Navy, and since he wished Marie to remain in Minneapolis until his departure, the young people had a difference of opinion concerning her plans. It appears that this discussion left Alton in a highly emotional state. It is not disputed that on their return trip to downtown Minneapolis Alton drove at an excessive rate of speed. Marie asked him to slow down and told him that she wanted to get out of the car. She was asked, 'Did you continue to ask him to slow down or that you wanted to get out from the time he started to speed until the time of the accident?' and she answered, 'Yes, sir.' She testified that he did slow down to some extent, probably by applying his brakes just prior to the collision, so that he was traveling between 30 and 40 miles an hour at the time he struck the taxicab. Alton admitted that he was traveling 40 to 50 miles an hour in the block just before the intersection where the accident occurred. He stated that when he was approximately three car lengths from the intersection line he saw the cab, which was then one car length from the intersection line, at which time he applied his brakes and slowed down somewhat. After the accident, Alton told one of the police officers that he was proceeding at a speed of 45 to 50 miles an hour just prior to the time he saw the cab enter the intersection.
It appears that the point of impact was in the southeast quarter of the intersection. At this intersection Fourth Street is 42 feet 6 inches wide, and Sixth Avenue is 54 feet 4 inches wide. There is a building on the southwest corner of the intersection extending to the sidewalk. There is no direct evidence as to the width of the sidewalk but from a plat and exhibits it appears to be 10 to 15 feet. Obviously, this building would interfere with the view of both drivers until they were quite close to the intersection. The testimony of the witness George Smykalski was of significance. He was standing on the sidewalk along Fourth Street North about three blocks west of the intersection where the collision occurred. His attention was attracted by the speed of the Alton car as it passed. He estimated that it was traveling at a rate of approximately 60 miles an hour. He watched the car, as if in expectation that an accident might happen. As the Alton car entered the intersection of Fourth Street with Sixth Avenue North, he noticed the dome light of the cab come into view and then perceived from the headlights the spinning motion of the cars. This witness could not, of course, form an opinion as to the speed of the cab, but he did testify that at no time did the brake lights on the Alton car indicate that Alton had applied the brakes.
While Michael Alton and Marie were on their way back to downtown Minneapolis, Patricia Lott entered the Red and White cab operated by Gary Raymond at 1123 Irving Avenue North. The cab proceeded along Sixth Avenue to the intersection with Fourth Street, where the collision occurred. It appears that Mrs Lott sustained a loss of memory beginning at or about the time of impact or at the time the car entered the intersection a few feet before the impact. She testified that up to the time she lost her memory the cab was going approximately 30 miles an hour and that '(i)t could have been faster, could have been slower.'
At the conclusion of the testimony the court instructed the jury that Michael E. Alton was negligent as a matter of law and that his negligence was a proximate cause of the collision. The court then submitted the following interrogatories:
(1) 'Was Gary L. Raymond negligent in the sense of failing to exercise reasonable care in the operation of George R. Davidson's taxicab?' This question was answered in the negative by a ten and two verdict.
(2) 'If your answer to Question 1 is Yes, then was Gary L. Raymond's...
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State v. Caulfield, No. A04-1484.
...proof by the legislature of a kind that this court had approved. 633 N.W.2d 81, 84-85 (Minn.App. 2001) (citing Lott v. Davidson, 261 Minn. 130, 141-42, 109 N.W.2d 336, 344 (1961)). The court of appeals did not address the Confrontation Clause in Pearson and has not done so in any other case......
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