Louisiana Af. of Nat. Or. for Ref. of Marijuana Laws v. Guste
Decision Date | 19 March 1974 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 74-163. |
Citation | 380 F. Supp. 404 |
Parties | The LOUISIANA AFFILIATE OF the NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR the REFORM OF MARIJUANA LAWS (NORML), and John Doe, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Hon. William J. GUSTE, Jr., Attorney General of the State of Louisiana, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
William E. Rittenberg, New Orleans, La., Peter H. Meyers, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.
Louis Jones, Asst. Atty. Gen., New Orleans, La., L. J. Hymel, Michael E. Ponder, Baton Rouge, La., for defendants Hon. William J. Guste, Jr. and Hon. Edwin Edwards.
John Schupp, James Carriere, Asst. U.S. Attys., New Orleans, La., for defendants William B. Saxbe and Hon. John R. Bartels.
MEMORANDUM OF REASONS
The plaintiffs herein have filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Federal Controlled Substances Act and the Louisiana Controlled Dangerous Substance Law insofar as they make the private use and possession of marijuana by adults a crime in Louisiana. The federal statutes which prohibit the possession of marijuana are contained in 21 U.S.C. ß 801-904. The Louisiana provision is encompassed in LSA-R.S. 40:966.
Plaintiffs allege that these statutes violate their rights of privacy and personal liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and by the Ninth Amendment as well as constituting cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. They contend that these laws encroach on constitutionally protected zones of privacy since social, medical and historical facts show that there can be neither an overwhelming compelling state interest nor any possible relationship to a legitimate state interest which can justify the exercise of the police powers of the state. In addition they allege that the criminalization of the mere possession of marijuana is a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments which constitutes invidious and arbitrary discrimination since other more potentially harmful substances such as alcohol and cigarettes are not subject to the same control.
The anonymous representative John Doe seeks to maintain a class action. Doe's identity is to be revealed to the Court in a sealed affidavit.
Presently before the Court for consideration is the propriety of the plaintiff's request for convening a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ß 2284.
The scope of a district court's considerations when a three judge court has been requested is set out in Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U. S. 713, 715, 82 S.Ct. 1294, 1296, 8 L.Ed. 2d 794 (1962).
"When an application for a statutory three-judge court is addressed to a district court, the court's inquiry is appropriately limited to determining whether the constitutional question raised is substantial, whether the complaint at least formally alleges a basis for equitable relief, and whether the case presented otherwise comes within the requirements of the three judge statute."
The present question at issue is the substantiality of the question presented. Several general principals emerge from the cases.
"The existence of a substantial question of constitutionality must be determined by the allegations of the bill of complaint."
Mosher v. Phoenix, 287 U.S. 29, 53 S. Ct. 67, 77 L.Ed. 148 (1922); Levering & Garrigues & Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 53 S.Ct. 549, 77 L.Ed. 1062 (1933); Local U. No. 300 Amal. Meat Cutters & B. Workmen v. McCulloch, 428 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court in Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32, 54 S. Ct. 3, 4, 78 L.Ed.2d 152 (1933) set forth the dual standards under which substantiality must be determined.
In the present case the issue of jurisdiction against the federal and state defendants as well as the question of preclusion of substantiality through prior decisions is not present. The state defendants come within the provisions of 42 U.S.C. ß 1983 since state action is attacked which allegedly results in the deprivation of constitutional rights. The federal defendants are covered by the issue of a federal question as alleged in the complaint under 28 U.S.C. ß 1331. Although attacks on the constitutionality of these statutes have been made in criminal proceedings, research reveals no civil action for declaratory or injunctive relief in which a decision has been rendered.
The Eighth Circuit in Herald Company v. Harper, 410 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1969) commented on the problem of substantiality which we ourselves face in resolving this issue:
"At the outset we realize, as Judge Friendly has stated, id. p. 128.
Plaintiff's causes of actions may be categorized into three general categories: 1) violation of right of privacy; 2) cruel and unusual punishment and 3) violation of equal protection of the laws.
Plaintiff in the present case bases his claim to privacy on a far too expansive interpretation of this phrase. The present case does not rest its roots in the First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L. Ed.2d 542 (1969), in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), in penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. All of the above cases have involved concepts of basic and fundamental rights such as the right to marry, to bear children, to think and read what one wishes, to worship God according to the dictates of his conscience, to acquire useful knowledge. Even Roe and Doe came within these basic provisions and to a large extent are no more than a logical extension of the Griswold philosophy of marital privacy as applied to women. Plaintiffs' claim in the present case rests on bare allegations of a general right to privacy to do what one wishes in his own home and with his own body. Although plaintiff does claim enforcement of this right of privacy through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment and through the Ninth Amendment he does not ground it or even attempt to ground it on any one of the amendments which protect certain guaranteed rights and which in doing so create constitutionally guarded zones of privacy. The right of plaintiff to possess marijuana in his own home can under no factual or legal interpretation be classified as fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
The Supreme Court in Stanley v. Georgia, supra, the very case relied on so strongly by plaintiff, qualified its approval of private possession of obscene material with the following:
Stanley, footnote 11 at 394 U.S. at 568, 89 S.Ct. at 1249, 22 L.Ed.2d at 551.
The Fifth Circuit in United States Drotar, 416 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1969) used this very expression of the Supreme Court in Stanley, to uphold an...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Margaret S. v. Edwards, Civ. A. No. 78-2765.
...at 941-43, & 1979 Supp. at 87); the right to possess marijuana in one's own home, Louisiana Affiliate of the Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Guste, 380 F.Supp. 404, 406-7 (E.D.La.1974). Access to laetrile has sparked a number of decisions. Compare Rutherford v. United States,......
-
State v. Smith
...F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 834, 78 S.Ct. 54, 2 L.Ed.2d 46 (1957); Louisiana Affiliate of Nat'l Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Guste, 380 F.Supp. 404 (E.D.La.1974), aff'd 511 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 867, 96 S.Ct. 129, 46 L.Ed.2d ......
-
Nat. Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Bell
...416 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated on other grounds, 402 U.S. 939, 91 S.Ct. 1628, 29 L.Ed.2d 107 (1971); Louisiana Aff. of NORML v. Guste, 380 F.Supp. 404 (E.D.La.1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 867, 96 S.Ct. 129, 46 L.Ed.2d 96 (1975); United States v. Maid......
-
Marcoux v. Attorney General
...Cir. 1969), vacated on other grounds, 402 U.S. 939, 91 S.Ct. 1628, 29 L.Ed.2d 107 (1971); Louisiana Affiliate of Nat'l Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Guste, 380 F.Supp. 404 (E.D.La.1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 867, 96 S.Ct. 129, 46 L.Ed.2d 96 ......
-
Ravin Revisited: Do Alaskans Still Have a Constitutional Right to Possess Marijuana in the Privacy of Their Homes?
...(stating that a marijuana possession conviction should be reversed because of a right to privacy). [33]See, e.g., NORML v. Guste, 380 F. Supp. 404, 407 (E.D. La. 1974); State v. Murphy, 570 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Ariz. 1977); Kreisher v. State, 319 A.2d 31, 32 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); Laird v. Sta......