Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Miller

• Citation: 156 Ky. 677,162 S.W. 73
• Parties: LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. MILLER.
• Decision Date: 07 January 1914
• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky

162 S.W. 73

156 Ky. 677

LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. MILLER.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

January 7, 1914

Appeal from Circuit Court, Warren County.

Action by Loy E. Miller against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff for less than the relief demanded, and both parties appeal. Reversed on both appeals.

Sims &amp Rodes, of Bowling Green, and Chas. H. Moorman and Benjamin D Warfield, both of Louisville, for appellant.

Bradburn & Basham, of Bowling Green, for appellee.

MILLER J.

In December, 1911, the appellee was a passenger upon appellant's train from Nashville, Tenn., to Bowling Green, Ky. When she checked her trunk, appellant's agent gave her a trunk check bearing this indorsement upon its back: "It shall be the duty of every passenger tendering baggage for transportation to declare the value thereof without inquiry by the carrier or any agent or employé thereof. Unless a greater sum is declared by passenger according to the form prepared by checking carrier and charges paid for increased value at the time of the delivery to carrier, the value of the baggage or articles belonging to or checked for an adult passenger shall be held to have been declared and agreed by him to be and shall be deemed to be not in excess of $100.00, and the value of the baggage or articles belonging to or checked for a child of half fare age shall be held to have been declared and agreed by him to be and shall be deemed to be, not in excess of $50.00." The trunk having been lost upon the journey, appellee brought this action against appellant for $516 damages; and, having recovered a judgment for $275, the company appeals, and the plaintiff prosecutes a cross-appeal.

Appellant's only complaint is that the court erred in sustaining a demurrer to its answer; while appellee's only complaint upon her cross-appeal is that the court, by its instruction, gave an erroneous measure of damages.

1. In appropriate terms, the answer alleged that appellee, on the occasion mentioned, was an interstate passenger upon an interstate train, coming from Tennessee to Kentucky; that her trunk constituted interstate baggage; that in its joint baggage tariff, which became effective September 1, 1911, with the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and under which tariff appellant was authorized to handle, and did handle the appellee's baggage, it was provided by rule 17 thereof that, "It shall be the duty of every passenger tendering baggage for transportation to declare the value thereof without inquiry by the carrier, or any agent or employé thereof;" and further that, by section b of rule 17, it was provided that, "unless a greater sum is declared by the passenger according to form prescribed by checking carrier, and charges paid for increased valuation at time of delivery to carrier, or if delivery to the carrier be made at a non-agency station, the value of the baggage or articles belonging to or checked for an adult passenger, shall be held to have been declared and agreed by him to be, and shall be deemed to be not in excess of one hundred ($100.00) dollars, and the value of the baggage or articles belonging to or checked for a child of half fare age shall be held to have been declared and agreed by him to be, and shall be deemed to be, not in excess of fifty ($50.00) dollars;" and that it was further provided by section of rule 17 of said tariff that "no carrier, party hereto, shall be liable in excess of the proportion that the value declared bears to the actual value, if greater." The answer further alleged that the joint baggage tariff referred to was posted in its passenger depot at Nashville, as required by law; that appellee failed to declare a value on her baggage, and that the check given to plaintiff contained the indorsement above set out. Appellant relied upon said regulation and the check given, with the indorsement above referred to, and the plaintiff's failure to declare a value on her baggage in excess of $100, in bar of the plaintiff's right to recover more than $100 in any event, and conceded its liability only to the extent of $50.

The question for decision, therefore, is this: Did the acceptance of appellee's trunk by the appellant, and the delivery to her of the check, indorsed as above indicated, conceding that it was regularly issued under and by virtue of its joint baggage tariff, have the effect of reducing appellant's liability to a maximum of $100? This defense is made under the Interstate Commerce Act of February 4, 1887, as amended June 29, 1906, and generally known as the Carmack Amendment.

There can be no doubt that, as to interstate shipments, the Carmack Amendment supersedes the Kentucky doctrine, announced under section 196 of the Kentucky Constitution, that the shipper is not bound by a recital of value in his contract of shipment, but may show and recover his full loss.

In the application of this federal statute, we are therefore controlled by the construction given it by the United States Supreme Court. And since this federal statute has been construed in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, decided January 6, 1913, and reported in 226 U.S. 491, 33 S.Ct. 148, 57 L.Ed 314, 44 L.R.A. (N. S.) 257, we are to look to that opinion for an authoritative interpretation. It was there held that Congress had so manifested a purpose in the Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn Act to take control of the subject of the liability of a common carrier for the loss of, or damage to, an interstate shipment, as to supersede all state regulations upon the same subject, including the provisions of state constitutions or laws invalidating contracts limiting the carrier's liability to agreed values; and that therefore the validity of any stipulation in a contract for an interstate shipment, which undertakes to limit the carrier's liability, is a federal question, to be determined both by the state and federal courts under the common law as finally declared by the United States Supreme Court. In the Croninger Case, supra, the court said: "That the legislation supersedes all the regulations and policies of a particular state upon the same subject results from its general character. It embraces the subject of the liability of the carrier under a bill of lading which he must issue, and limits his power to exempt himself by rule, regulation, or contract. Almost every detail of the subject is covered so completely that there can be no rational doubt but that Congress intended to take possession of the subject and supersede all state regulation with reference to it. Only the silence of Congress authorized the exercise of the police power of the state upon the subject of such contracts. But when Congress acted in such a way as to manifest a purpose to exercise its conceded authority, the regulating power of the state ceased to exist. Northern P. R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U.S. 370, 32 S.Ct. 160, 56 L.Ed. 237; Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424, 32 S.Ct. 140, 56 L.Ed. 257; Second Employers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co.) 223 U.S. 1, 32 S.Ct. 169, 56 L.Ed. 327, 38 L.R.A. (N. S.) 44. To hold that the liability therein declared may be increased or diminished by local regulation or local views of public policy will either make the provision less than supreme, or indicate that Congress has not shown a purpose to take possession of the subject. The first would be unthinkable, and the latter would be to revert to the uncertainties and diversities of rulings which led to the amendment. The duty to issue a bill of lading and the liability thereby assumed are covered in full, and, though there is no reference to the effect upon state...